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ABSTRACT

The book contains eight papers originally presented at a University of Chicago conference on October 27-28, 1978, to discuss the socio-political consequences of different policies toward the Spanish language in the United States. Each pair of papers is followed by the remarks of the official discussants. The papers and their authors are: "Bilingualism in America," Pastora San Juan Cafferty; "Language and Political Consciousness among the Spanish-speaking in the United States: A Demographic Study," Leobardo F. Estrada (discussant: Theresa A. Sullivan); "Ethnicity and the State," Brian Barry; "Social and Political Implications of Language Policies: Observations on the Canadian Experience," Raymond Breton (discussant: Sigmund Diamond); "Bilingual Education in the United States: The 'Either/Or' Mistake," Noel Epstein; "Psychological Conflicts in Bilingual American Residents: A Case Study," Dr. Horacio Fabrega (discussant: John Carroll); "Political Demands of Spanish-speaking Communities in the United States," Isidro Lucas; and "Discrimination Against the Spanish Language in Public Service: A Policy Alternative," Mario Obledo and Carlos Alcala. A final discussion and summary by James Coleman notes three major issues raised at the conference: should bilingualism be encouraged; should services and facilities be bilingual; and should cultural pluralism be encouraged. A list of participants is included. (SB)

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Politics and Language: Spanish and English in the United States

D. J. R. Bruckner, Editor

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CONTENTS

v Foreword
D. J. R. Bruckner

vii Preface
Martin E. Marty

1 Bilingualism in America
Pastora San Juan Cafferty

13 Language and Political Consciousness among the Spanish-speaking in the United States: A Demographic Study
Leobardo F. Estrada

23 Discussion of Cafferty and Estrada Presentations
Teresa A. Sullivan

31 Ethnicity and the State
Brian Barry

49 Social and Political Implications of Language Policies: Observations on the Canadian Experience
Raymond Breton

73 Discussion of Barry and Breton Presentations
Sigmund Diamond

85 Bilingual Education in the United States: The "Either/Or" Mistake
Noel Epstein

111 Psychological Conflicts in Bilingual American Residents: A Case Study
Dr. Horacio Fabrega

125 Discussion of Epstein and Fabrega Presentations
John Carroll

4

133 Political Demands of Spanish-speaking Communities in the United States
Isidro Lucas

155 Discrimination Against the Spanish Language in Public Service: A Policy Alternative
Mario Obledo and Carlos Alcalá

163 Final Discussion and Summary
James Coleman

169 Participants in the Conference on Politics and Language

FOREWORD

The papers in this volume were presented at a conference on October 27 and 28, 1978 at the University of Chicago. The faculty group which organized the conference agreed that the central question to be asked all participants was: "Given the large increase in the Spanish-speaking population in the United States, what are the social and political consequences of different policies toward the Spanish language?"

All the papers had been circulated before the conference, the critical discussions presented were brief and pointed, and so the general discussion was both a good deal more animated and better informed than most discussions at conferences.

There is a complete transcript of the conference, much of it rewarding to read. But, when I began to edit this little volume, I decided that printing even sections of the transcript would make the book too complicated and too large. I wanted to produce a book which would be useful to many people interested in the question and one which might stimulate a much wider discussion throughout the country. Also, I believe that the remarks of the official discussants, which I edited from the transcript and which are printed in this volume, touch all the lines of argument in the general discussions.

It is a pleasure to thank the organizing committee for the careful planning it did for more than a year before the conference. Its members included Gerhard Casper, Dean of the Law School; James Coleman, University Professor of Sociology; Dr. Jarl Dyrud, Professor of Psychiatry and Associate Dean of the Biological Sciences Division; Martin Marty, the Fairfax M. Cone Distinguished Service Professor in the Divinity School; Aristide Zolberg, Professor of Political Science; and Peter J. Kountz, Assistant Director of the Center for Policy Study. All of them are at the University of Chicago. This was a committee which in fact did *all* the work needed to organize the conference, negotiate the papers with their authors, nominate and invite the participants. What a pleasure it was to work with such a group will be obvious to anyone who has ever organized a conference.

A special word of thanks is owed Mr. Marty who was the chairman, and a very firm but fair one, of this lively meeting and who wrote the preface for this book.

The conference was sponsored by the Center for Policy Study at the University of Chicago and funded in part by a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.

At the back of this book there is a complete list of those presenting papers, those discussing them and of all the participants in the conference. I thank them all for their work.

D. J. R. Bruckner

PREFACE

Harold R. Isaacs opens his *Idols of the Tribe* (Harper and Row, 1975) with the claim that "we are experiencing on a massively universal scale a convulsive ingathering of people in their numberless grouping of kinds—tribal, racial, linguistic, religious, national." He speaks of a great clustering into separatenesses that will, it is thought, "improve, assure, or extend each group's power or place, or keep it safe or safer from the power, threat, or hostility of others."

While Isaacs focuses on transoceanic versions of such conflict, they come rather close to home in the instance of divided Quebec. The United States has also seen reassertions of group identity on racial and ethnic lines during the last couple of decades. In all such ingatherings, language becomes most controversial. Speech is a basic mark of our humanness, and shared speech and writing serve to define people in groups.

In the history of American ethnic pluralism, attitudes toward language have undergone many changes. According to one familiar sociological viewpoint, codified by Marcus Lee Hansen, "what the son wishes to forget, the grandson wishes to remember." In the second generation, the child wants to leave behind many cultural inheritances which immigrant parents brought with them. Language was one of these, as English was the dominant tongue, and passing acquaintance with its nuances was necessary for anyone who aspired to rise in American society. The public schools became instruments for teaching this single language at the expense of those brought along by non-English-speaking immigrants.

From time to time ethnic groups have found reason to fight for retention of their own linguistic practices. At the time of the First World War, Roman Catholic and Lutheran parochial schools whose clienteles were of Germanic background had to take extraordinary steps to retain the right to teach the German language in those schools. After the legal battle was won, most of them dropped the language, while parents of most German children in public schools never did press their case. In

recent decades court cases have also dealt with the issue of "Black English," a dialect version of English that has developed in the transit of people from southern plantations to metropolitan ghettos.

The contemporary debate which has been most heated has to do with the retention of the Spanish language in public schools and institutions. While people of Hispanic descent are not so conveniently sequestered in a specific area of the country as are the French in Canada, they are especially well-represented in the Southwest and Southern California, in greater New York and Miami, and in many of the industrial cities around the Great Lakes. In these areas, plus in rural zones where migratory workers who speak Spanish are gathered, there have been calls for formal and systematic teaching of this language spoken by millions of Americans.

The advocates of bilingualism in education—no one seriously proposes that a huge subculture be deprived of the language of the majority—insist that the dominant culture all too hastily will obliterate all traces of a heritage if they can expunge from the memory of the present generation of immigrants the Spanish they brought with them. Language is a mark of pride, a badge of identity, a sign of bonding; the proper use of the language, they insist, is an asset within the Spanish-speaking community.

Over against them have ranged a host of opponents. The most frequent argument against bilingualism is expense. In a day when public education faces constant cutbacks, it seems to these opponents that the teaching of Spanish to millions of children is a luxury when more urgent needs present themselves. But alongside the budgetary concerns are many others, not least of all a kind of ideological commitment to the notion that Americans must all be eloquent in one language, whatever else they pick up or retain as part of their private enterprise. Otherwise there will not be a functioning society. Sometimes this approach also finds advocates among those who feel that overattention to a language other than English will work to the disadvantage of children who must compete in an English-speaking society.

Whether in Spanish or English, partisans of these viewpoints usually avoid each other entirely, confront each other across lines marked by hostility, or simply talk past each other. This collection of papers marks an experiment at getting representatives of opposing views to talk to each other and to listen. The participants in the conference out of which these come were not invited because they were bland compromisers but because they had expertise in one or another of the disciplines that inform the topic, or because they held positions of responsibility in government or in the represented communities.

Like a number of other participants and, I surmise, like some readers

of this book, I did not come with strong opinions on the subject. I tried to set a tone of chairpersonal neutrality by reminding participants that, as a Swiss, I came from a multilingual nation, but also that the Swiss were known for neutrality and their ability to arbitrate. Arbitration skills became important in the midst of the passionate expressions of the conference, and I am not sure that all felt I remained perfectly neutral. But several of us found, and again I have no doubt some readers will find, that presentation of the issues by such gifted people on both sides did not overcome all of our reservations about either side. We found the stakes being raised on both sides in the face of many plausible arguments by both.

To be left sitting on the fence is not necessarily the best posture in a day when people have to make up their minds and take action. And it is not likely that many will remain poised there. Instead, they will discern the need for some dispassion, a great deal of understanding, and far more curiosity about the subject for the days of decision which lie ahead. It would not be difficult for me to summarize the chapters or to comment on their effect, but to do so would begin to show my own tiltings, and that might disturb the sense of neutrality which a chairperson and associate editor should bring to a project like this. Despite linguistic difficulties and intensely cherished opinions about language, we learn that it is possible for us to read and hear each other with more empathy than before. This collection should make its contribution to that possibility.

Martin E. Marty

PASTORA SAN JUAN CAFFERTY*

Bilingualism in America

The person who can speak two languages with relatively similar fluency finds that he uses each language more comfortably in different situations. Indeed, he finds that his mastery of specific vocabulary differs in the two languages. Words relating to home, family, food, and basic needs often come quickly to mind in the mother tongue but seem highly inappropriate and are easily forgotten in the second language. In business or social situations, the second language is spoken easily and certain technical words are often not known in the native language.

If the individual mind is the ultimate focus of bilingualism, then it is the child who is the ultimate guardian of the cultures of an immigrant community. Fitzpatrick defines the basic links for the individual and his community as (1) occupation, (2) education of children, and (3) political action. The individual is linked to his community first by the work he does—his occupation defines his contribution to society. The education of his children provides him with the link to the generation that will follow him as well as with exposure to other ideas and values. To the extent that he participates in political action, he further defines his relationship to his community by identifying common values. Fitzpatrick further argues: "Education is the major socializing institution which communicates to the children, of immigrants or not, the culture of the United States. It is the process of education which guarantees initial assimilation."[1]

Education is the process of transmitting the common history and culture of a society, and, therefore, education begins the process of *satisfaction* with the values of the host society. If the educational process is successful, the child will accept those values as his own. This makes

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the school the focus of the struggle between assimilation and retention of native culture for each immigrant community. Borhek, in a study of Ukrainian-Canadians, also found the important source of assimilationist attitudes was education.[2]

Children learn to identify and accept the values of the host society in school. Since it is seldom that an ethnic group offers a similar opportunity to learn its own native culture and values to the children, the values of the host society easily supplant those native values which are relatively unknown to the children. Even those children who attend religious or language schools do so one day out of the week while they usually spend five days a week in the public schools.

The importance of education has been recognized by every nation in fashioning the cultural and linguistic assimilation of minority groups. In America, where succeeding groups of immigrants spoke a foreign language and came from a foreign culture, the public school system became the great assimilator. Since 1790, the immigrant's proof that he had become an American—that he had assimilated—was the ability to speak English. The early growth and development of public education policy in the states was founded on educating the immigrants to speak English and learn the values of democracy. That being an American was often defined as the ability to speak English is shown by the fact that English language instruction was the earliest form of adult education.

In their study of cultural pluralism in America, Stent, Hazard, and Rivlin point out that the school curriculum reflects the values of society in general and, thus, the child's perception of self.[3] The child will learn the norms which define acceptance and success in society as he pleases his teacher. He will learn the history of a society along with subtle political values, for example, the belief that a democracy is always better than an autocratic government. He will also measure himself and his parents according to the values he learns in the classroom. The children of American immigrants soon learn that speaking English is demanded for acceptance by American society.

This demand for conformity by children who speak a native language other than English to an English monolingualism is yet to be questioned generally in America. Yet there is ever-growing evidence from a considerable number of linguistic studies which shows that, if one of the languages is the mother tongue, children who learn in two languages learn better than those who learn in only one.[4] Indeed, bilingual schooling has never been questioned for upper-class children for whom the knowledge of two languages has always been considered an asset. The children of the well-to-do take French and German lessons and travel in Europe to absorb the language and culture of another country. The children of the

poor soon learn that knowing two languages is the sign of an inferior—not a superior—education.

The fact is that bilingualism and ethnic identity have been assumed to be temporary in America. It has been assumed that all immigrants should assimilate—abandoning their language and culture to adopt the American language and culture. It has been assumed that ethnic identity disappears in time. On the contrary, evidence indicates that ethnic identity in America persists beyond cultural assimilation.[5] For some groups, this identity becomes more important than it is to others. This is particularly true of those groups which are not welcome to assimilate freely into the host society.

Bilingualism and nationalism are highly complex phenomena. Historical evidence indicates that nations like India, in which such a variety of native languages are spoken that the national language is little more than an official language, have a long history of warring among the different language groups. However, Heinz Kloss points out that there is no reason why a nation-state should resist bilingualism as long as there is one official language spoken by all. He stresses that the one official language will be sufficient to ensure unity if the newcomers are truly bilingual. If they speak both their native language and the official language, they can retain their culture while adapting to the host culture. Only if bilingualism does not occur, and newcomers retain their native tongue to the exclusion of the national language, does dissension occur.[6]

It was this fear of dissension among the many immigrant groups of early American society which caused Congress to declare English the one official language. This same fear led states and municipalities to finance public school systems to teach English to the children of immigrants. Language as a means of preserving culture is the history of every society. The history of organized language consciousness, language loyalty, and language maintenance by different ethnic groups in the Western world dates back more than five centuries to the formation of the large nation-states and the colonization of the New World.[7]

In our own hemisphere, to the south, the preservation of native languages by the indigenous inhabitants of South American countries reflects the preservation of indigenous culture. In countries such as Ecuador and Peru, where the native culture plays a vital contemporary role, particularly in the remote mountain areas, the indigenous languages are preserved, sometimes to the exclusion of the national language, Spanish. Those who have kept their native language live in isolation from the Spanish-speaking majority. This isolation, partly a result of the inaccessibility of the mountain areas, results in preserving a society which is markedly different from that of the country as a whole. Thus, the preservation of the indigenous language and culture is not a

conscious assertion of ethnic identity but the result of little or no exposure to the host culture.

To the north, Canada has a long history of linguistic division which reflects the political and cultural division between the French and English Canadians. It was largely this fear of political division and domestic dissension which gave great impetus to monolingualism in America. The European experience had provided the young nation with ample evidence that language was a powerful force in establishing and maintaining national loyalty. Within the British empire, Wales, in the process of asserting its independence, was in the midst of a linguistic revival while the rebellious Irish tenaciously clung to Gaelic in an effort to stave off British dominance.

Linguistic Assimilation

Societies view linguistic change as one of the prime targets breaking down old loyalties and adapting to a new culture. The reverse is also true: the retention of the native language provides an effective shield against assimilation. The rights most often sought by groups who are struggling to maintain their ethnic identity in the face of assimilation into the dominant society are the provision of adequate education in the group's own tongue as well as the recognition of the group's language as an official government language.

Linguistic assimilation was recognized as an important factor in cultural and political assimilation. Speaking a common language was important to forging a common national identity. Benjamin Franklin's concern that the members of the Pennsylvania legislature would be unable to communicate with one another because half would speak English and the other half German was evidence of a very realistic concern. If different language groups were allowed to preserve their native languages to the exclusion of English, the possibility of political dissension by these settlers was a serious possibility. German farmers who did not see the colonists' quarrel with England as their own came close to rebellion in Pennsylvania following the end of the Revolutionary War. It was important for the immigrants to have as much in common as possible in order to create a national identity: a common language was essential to achieve this. In the zeal to establish a common language, the young nation sought to eradicate all other languages.

Return Migration

Although many came to America to seek religious and political freedom, the majority seem to have come to seek a better life through economic opportunity. It is futile to argue what complex motives led millions of immigrants to leave home and risk the rigors of an ocean cross-

ing, but from the beginning many came to find work. And many of these who did find work returned home with their earnings.

Although there are few studies of return migration in America, the data available support the fact that return migration was always a major factor in American migration. There has always been a pattern of immigration and emigration so that for every major stream a counterstream developed.[8] For the most part, the returning migrant has been ignored. This is unfortunate since the fine studies that do exist seem to indicate that the decision to return or to stay is directly related to the degree to which the immigrant adapts to American society.[9]

Foreign Language Schools

However, in America the assumption has always been that the immigrant came to stay. In fact, while many immigrants did return, the majority stayed. Among those groups who tended to remain were the Germans, and it is among the Germans that the greatest efforts have been made to retain native language and culture. Theirs is the oldest and most persistent immigrant language community in the United States, beginning in 1683 in Pennsylvania and still maintaining a vigorous dialect.

Other immigrants organized efforts at preserving language and culture around the church and parochial schools. Notable among these were the Czechs and Slovaks who, in addition to parochial schools, supported language schools after school hours and on weekends.[10] The church was a major means for all ethnic groups to preserve their native language. Before 1800, the Germans had parochial schools throughout the country. Both the French in New England and the Scandinavians and Dutch in the Midwest had their schools. While some of these were monolingual schools, the majority of them offered bilingual education—that is, education in and through the native language. After 1800, the Germans, French, and Scandinavians continued to operate parochial schools as did the new immigrants, particularly the Poles, Lithuanians, and Slovaks.[11] The effort to preserve language by immigrants in America is so closely aligned to efforts to preserve religious belief that it offers evidence that language is seen as the catalyst to preserving cultural values.

Not all language preservation efforts were church-related. Between 1840 and 1880, there were bilingual programs offered in the public schools. In addition to German bilingual education, there were French-English schools in Louisiana and Spanish-English schools in New Mexico. After 1880, only one group successfully maintained bilingual programs in the public schools—the Germans, who did so until 1917.[12]

There is no evidence that bilingual programs were welcomed by the

community at large. Rather, there is substantive evidence to show that efforts at maintaining a bilingual community were always resisted in America. Bilingual programs existed in the public schools due to the political pressure exerted by ethnic communities; they were merely tolerated by the English-speaking.

Following World War I, all efforts at bilingual education ceased in public schools in the United States, although certain parishes continued to teach the native language in parochial and Sunday schools. The United States, having fought a war to save democracy and end all future wars, had emerged as a major world power. Americans asserted the uniqueness of their democratic experience and of all things American including the American language. In spite of this effort at creating a monolingual society, each group of immigrants, with varying success, has attempted to preserve its culture by preserving linguistic identity.

The success of these efforts is shown by the fact that, in 1971, the Center for Applied Linguistics estimated that 20 million Americans had a non-English mother tongue. Of the 3 million children whom the Office of Education estimates to still be using their native language, 1.75 million are Spanish-speaking; another million speak some thirty other languages including French, Italian, Polish, German, and Czech.[13]

It is the Spanish-speaking who, as a people, have had the greatest retention of native language in the United States.[14] In the case of the Mexican-Americans in the Southwest, retention of Spanish language and culture can be attributed to a proximity to Mexico and to the continuing stream of Mexican migrant workers, as well as to isolation and exclusion by the English-speaking society.[15] Retaining the native Spanish language has been preserved for two centuries by the descendants of the Mexicans who inhabited the Southwest territories annexed after the War of 1848. There is evidence that the preservation of native language and culture in America has been greatest in rural areas where migrants were isolated and continued to communicate in their native tongue. This may account for initial retention of Spanish language and culture in the Southwest.

The phenomena of the retention of Spanish among Puerto Ricans, the increase in the use of English in Puerto Rico, and the growth of "Spanglish" or "the language of the *barrio*" among Puerto Ricans both on the island and on the mainland are other major factors in the preservation of the Spanish language in America. They speak not only to the needs of 1.3 million Puerto Ricans on the mainland and the nearly 2.7 million on the island but to the larger question of ethnic diversity and cultural pluralism in contemporary America.

* * *

In the United States, it has been generally acknowledged that no public institution has a greater impact on the individual's place in society than the schools. This was the rationale for states and local communities investing large sums to finance public school systems. Between the ages of six and eighteen most American children spend most of their time in schools. Their social contacts, their concepts of knowledge, and their social values are largely derived from the schools. Early educational success or failure will greatly determine the student's concept of self and of his position in society. The importance of assuring every American child an equal educational opportunity was the guiding principle in *Brown* v. *Board of Education*. By finding that segregated schools were inherently unequal, the Supreme Court ruled state laws segregating black and white students in the system to be unconstitutional.[16] The ruling was followed by a decade of civil rights activities to put an end to segregated schools. Leaders in the black community repeatedly underscored the inequality of educational opportunity in segregated school systems and the importance of equal educational opportunity in achieving social and economic equality. In recent years, the Spanish-speaking community has also focused its civil rights efforts on the public schools. Both Puerto Rican and Mexican leaders have decried the lack of equal access to education to the Spanish-speaking in the public schools.

Since 1954, when the Supreme Court ruled in the landmark decision *Brown* v. *Board of Education* that "separate but equal" educational programs and facilities were unconstitutional, a series of decisions has widened the interpretation of equal educational opportunity to include the needs of children whose native language is other than English. The passage of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which forbids discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin, furthered the right for equal educational opportunity for children who are not native English speaking. In 1965, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare established regulations stating that schools may not use tests which require proficiency in the English language to place students in tracking systems. In 1968 and again in 1974, federal funds were authorized for programs which teach the language and culture of minority students as well as the dominant language and culture.

In addition, developments regarding bilingual education have taken place at the state level. Various states have taken actions ranging from repealing laws which forbid the speaking of a language other than English on school grounds to enacting laws actually requiring bilingual programs in schools with substantial numbers of students with limited English-speaking skills. Many of these laws have followed closely behind the Supreme Court ruling in *Lau* v. *Nichols*:

> There is no equality of treatment merely by providing students with the same facilities, text books, teachers, and curriculum; for students who do not understand English are effectively foreclosed from any meaningful education.
>
> Basic English skills are at the very core of what these schools teach. Imposition of a requirement that, before a child can effectively participate in the educational program, he must already have acquired those basic skills is to make a mockery of public education.[17]

The Equal Education Opportunity Act of 1974, or Title II of the Education Amendments of 1974,[18] provides a list of six actions that the Congress defines as constituting a denial of equal educational opportunity. Among them is:

> the failure by an educational agency to take appropriate action to overcome language barriers that impede equal participation by its students in its instructional program.[19]

This act provides for the initiation of civil action by individuals who have been denied equal educational opportunity. Thus, it provides for the first time a direct statutory right of action to non-English-speaking persons seeking to vindicate their right to equal educational opportunity through the institution of effective bilingual programs in public schools.

The use of bilingual education funds by school districts having large numbers of non-English-speaking children has been sporadic and involves mainly demonstration programs. In fact, there exists a continuing doubt among educators and the communities they serve that maintaining a native language other than English is desirable for American school children. Indeed, the federal government itself has been vague in enforcing the provisions of the Bilingual Education Act.

It has been more than nine years since the Department of Health, Education and Welfare issued its memorandum of May 25, 1970, in which the department stipulated that school districts with more than 5 percent national origin minority group children have an obligation under Title VII to provide equal educational opportunity for language minority students.[20]

Although the May 25 memorandum requires school districts to provide some form of language program to meet the needs of language minority children, it does not specify what type of program this should be. When a district has not provided an educational program for language minority students, the department has strongly suggested that a curriculum be developed which does not penalize language minority students for their language and culture.

Indeed most of the guidelines—as well as demands for institution of bilingual programs—have been defined by the courts. In *San Antonio*

School District v. *Rodriguez*, the Supreme Court stated that students who are excluded from public educational programs for lack of English fluency are:

> . . . saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.[21]

Thus, just as poverty deprives some access to institutions which maintain monetary entry fees,[22] language "disabilities" work to the detriment of the non-English-speaking in systems which predicate admission on the knowledge of the English language.

American society has historically treated punitively persons whose native language was not English. State-imposed English language requirements for voting,[23] legal proceedings, holding public office, and conducting business, as well as for education, have been utilized to bar non-English-speaking groups from participating in American society. Present-day demands for English language proficiency must be viewed in light of this history. Spanish-speaking persons in particular, as the largest non-English-speaking group in the United States, have had voting difficulties[24] and lack representatives in governmental positions in proportion to their composition of the voting population.

* * *

In those states which have passed bilingual education legislation, the implementation of bilingual education programs has been slow. The states vary in their commitment to bilingual education. Most state statutes define bilingual education as a necessary process to make the student a fluent speaker of English: only two states, New Mexico and Texas, state as their purpose for bilingual education the preservation of the native language and culture.

For example, Arizona defines the purpose of its act "to extend special courses of instruction for school children who are having difficulty in speaking or understanding the English language."[25] California states that "a primary goal of such programs is, as effectively and efficiently as possible, to develop in each child fluency in English so that he may then be enrolled in the regular programs in which English is the language of instruction."[26] Connecticut specifically provides that "any board of education may establish at any level of instruction a bilingual and bicultural program of study involving a culture in which a language other than English is predominantly spoken, provided the purpose of such program shall be to enable children to become proficient in English."[27] Massachusetts specifically defines its program as "transitional,"[28] as does New York which authorizes "operation of programs

in transitional bilingual education in recognition of the educational needs of children of limited English-speaking ability."[29]

On the other hand, Texas and New Mexico recognize the futility of transitional bilingual education for the Spanish-speaking. Texas law provides that:

> (a) The bilingual education program established by a school district shall be a full-time program of instruction (1) in all subjects required by law or by the school district, which shall be given in the native language of the children of limited English-speaking ability who are enrolled in the program, and in the English language; (2) in the comprehension, speaking, reading, and writing of the native language of the children of limited English-speaking ability who are enrolled in the program, and in the comprehension, speaking, reading, and writing of the English language; and (3) in the history and culture associated with the native language of the children of limited English-speaking ability who are enrolled in the program, and in the history and culture of the United States.[30]

New Mexico specifically states that "WHEREAS, our school system should strive not only to teach English better, but it should also encourage Spanish-speaking children and children speaking Indian languages to be proud of their linguistic heritage, as well as their cultural heritage, and to strive to both preserve and improve it."[31]

In 1974, ASPIRA of New York obtained a court decree making selection of Spanish-surnamed and Spanish-speaking children for the Language Assessment Battery Test mandatory. Before the consent decree, bilingual programs were not being given to all the children, only to those identified by the office of the superintendent. The court made it mandatory to give bilingual programs and education to all students who need it by giving all Spanish-surnamed and Spanish-speaking children the LAB Test to determine which children need bilingual programs. It is too early to judge the effect of mandatory bilingual education on the Puerto Rican schoolchildren of New York, but the ASPIRA decree has set a precedent which could be significant for other cities.[32]

Mythology is a poor rationale for constructing and implementing social policies. Yet, all government policy is influenced by myth as well as by fact. Government policies are the response to the demands of those who people a nation. No one will argue that there were good and sound reasons for immigrants to America to have learned English. The fact is that learning English did not mean forgetting the immigrants' native tongue. The Germans—more than any other group—consistently proved that an immigrant could learn English and achieve social and economic assimilation while retaining his native language and culture.

The argument is often made that immigrants must learn English—and abandon their mother tongue—so that they can assimilate and achieve economic success. However, it is interesting to note that those

groups which achieved greater economic success in America—such as the Swedes and the Germans—sustained successful bilingual education programs often at public expense.

Notes

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20. Memorandum issued by J. Stanley Pottinger, Director, Office of Civil Rights, to school districts with more than 5 percent national origin minority group children, May 25, 1970, quoted in United States, Commission on Civil Rights, *A Better Chance to Learn*, pp. 204–06.
21. 411 United States 1, 38 (1973).
22. See *Griffin* v. *Illinois*, 351 United States 12 (1956); *Harper* v. *Virginia Board of Elections*, 383 U.S. 669 (1966); *Bullock* v. *Carter*, 405 United States 134 (1972).
23. See United States, Commission on Civil Rights, *The Voting Rights Act: Ten Years After* (Washington, D.C.: United States, Commission on Civil Rights, 1975), pp. 117–21.
24. See *Torres* v. *Sachs*, 381 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); *Puerto Rican Organization for Political Action (PROPA)* v. *Kusper* 490 F. 2d. 575 (7th Cir. 1973); *Castro* v. *California* 2 Ga. 3d 223 (1970); *Graves* v. *Barnes* 343 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Tex. 1972); *White* v. *Regester*, 412 United States 755 (1973).
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27. Connecticut, General Statutes Annotated (Supp. 1975) §10–17a.
28. Massachusetts, Annotated Laws, Ch. 71 (Supp. 1975) §1.
29. New York, McKinney's Consolidated Laws (Supp. 1973) §3204, Section 1.
30. Texas, Vernon's Codes Annotated (Supp. 1973) §21.454.
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LEOBARDO F. ESTRADA*

Language and Political Consciousness among the Spanish-speaking in the United States. A Demographic Study

The Hispanic Population—Youthful and Increasing

The purpose of this brief presentation is to describe the Hispanic population in demographic terms and to touch upon the implications of these trends for the emerging political consciousness among Hispanics in the United States. The central theme is that the political presence of this population can be inferred from the major characteristics of the Hispanic population—its youthfulness, its rapid growth, its continued immigration, its Spanish language usage, and its heterogeneity.

About one-third of the total United States population is under eighteen years of age. Among the Hispanic population of the United States, however, almost half (47 percent) of the population is under eighteen years of age.[1] This differential is due to several factors including the fact that Hispanic households are larger and contain more children. Not surprisingly, while the median age (the age at which 50 percent of the population is above and below that age) is 28.1 years for the United States as a whole, the corresponding figures for the two largest components of the Hispanic population are 19.3 years for Mexican-Americans and 19.8 years for Puerto Ricans.

The significance of the Hispanic youthful age structure is the growth potential. For women who have children, the overwhelming majority will concentrate their child-bearing between the ages of nineteen and

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twenty-nine. This age interval is considered the period of highest fertility. Thus, a population as youthful as the Hispanic population still has the bulk of its population just entering the high fertility years. This signifies that the next ten to fifteen years will be a period of unprecedented population growth. By contrast, the total United States population is nearing the upper limit of the high fertility years as can be seen by the decrease and stabilization of growth trends in the United States during the 1970s. The 1980s will thus be the period of a Hispanic "baby boom" much like that experienced by the United States population in the late 1940s to early 1950s.

The low median age also indicates that the majority of the Hispanic population has not yet entered the adult labor force, and additionally, low median age is associated with a population of young couples and the formulation of young families. Youthfulness likewise helps to explain why Hispanics presently exhibit a great deal of concern for issues related to young population: prenatal care, day care, bilingual education, drug abuse, dropout rates, delinquency, early employment, and work training.

The relatively high fertility of the Hispanic population has been extensively documented.[2] During the past fifteen years, however, a decrease in fertility rates has occurred among all racial/ethnic groups in the United States. Black fertility rates, for example, have dropped about 40 percent since 1960 to the point of almost approximating the fertility rates of the majority white population. Hispanic fertility rates have also declined but less precipitously (about 25 percent since 1960).[3] Despite the declining rates, Hispanics have the highest fertility rates of any major racial/ethnic group in the United States.

An important aspect of Hispanic fertility is the differential between foreign-born and native-born couples. Foreign-born couples have a fertility rate about 8 points above the average Hispanic fertility rate compared to native-born couples (about 2 points below the average) and couples with one spouse born in the United States and the other born outside the United States (about equal to the average).[4] Another related study in California notes that in 1970, while only 10 percent of native-born Hispanic women had six or more children, approximately 55 percent of foreign-born Hispanic women had six or more children.[5] It is thus clear that the foreign-born population is a major contributor to the overall high fertility of Hispanics.

Continued Flow of Immigration

Immigration from Latin America and Mexico constantly replenishes the United States Hispanic population both numerically and culturally. Since 1960, over 890,000 *legal* Mexican-origin immigrants have entered

the United States at an average of 47,000 per year and thousands of other Mexicans are on waiting lists. The 1960s were also characterized by the entry of more than a quarter million (265,000) Cuban immigrants. Even with severe restrictions imposed by the Cuban government, an average of 22,000 Cuban immigrants still enter the United States each year. Because Puerto Rico is a United States territory, persons who change their residence from the island to the mainland are not considered immigrants although they likewise add to the numerical total of Hispanics. Therefore, excluding Puerto Ricans, about 70,000 *legal* Hispanic immigrants have entered the United States each year for the past fifteen years—adding about one million persons to the number of Hispanics in the United States.

The figures above do not take into account the net gain due to entries without inspection who avoid apprehension (illegal aliens) minus those who return voluntarily never having been detected. While the precise number of undocumented aliens in the United States is unknown, one conservative estimate indicates that a gain of about 115,000 Mexican-origin persons each year cannot be accounted for by natural increase (births minus deaths plus net legal immigration).[6] Even with these rough estimates it is not inconceivable that legal and illegal immigration combined contribute at least 200,000 persons per year to the Hispanic population (with the upper range unknown at this time).

According to our most recent figures approximately four out of every five Cuban-origin persons, one out of every two Puerto Ricans, and one out of every five Mexican-origin persons is foreign-born.

The full impact of immigration cannot be measured simply by its numerical contribution. Immigration is a selective event. Legal immigrants are often skilled and professional workers, spouses or relatives being reunited with their families, or students seeking educational opportunities and specialized training, etc. Undocumented immigrants are largely semi-skilled people trying to gain a foothold in the high-wage American economic system. Each type of immigrant brings to the United States his dreams and hopes as well as his particular perspectives, customs, traditions, and idiosyncrasies of language. As sufficient numbers of immigrants gather in one area, attempts are made to reconstruct self-help agencies, social/political organizations, etc., in the image of similar institutions they left behind in their homeland.

Hispanic immigration (both legal and illegal) thus accelerates the growth of the Hispanic population first by providing more people and secondly through their higher fertility. Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, a constant flow of Hispanic immigration to the United States continuously regenerates the cultural identity of Hispanics. As long as Hispanic immigration maintains its present levels, it is unlikely

that assimilation (as the term is usually used where the end results are "brown-skinned Anglos") will occur. Hispanic immigrants come to the United States in hopes of becoming part of the mainstream economic system but only a few willingly discard their culture as the price to pay to join that system. Most immigrants seek to gain access to the economic system while retaining the security of their Hispanic cultural system.

Language Usage

Approximately 12 percent of all American households have a head who uses a non-English language and approximately 10 percent of all persons in the United States use a language other than English. Among all non-English language users, Spanish is the language spoken in 35 percent of all households and by 44 percent of all persons. Spanish is thus the most common non-English language spoken in the United States. Given these figures, it should not be surprising that Hispanics have been forceful in demanding bilingual education programs, federal government form translations, and bilingual staff in hospitals, police stations, fire stations, and other such places where accurate communication is essential.[7]

Spanish-English Language Usage among the Hispanic Population by Age

Age	English Monolingual	English/Spanish Bilingual (Es)	Spanish/English Bilingual (Se)	Spanish Monolingual
Total Hispanic	22.0%	35.4%	31.7%	10.9%
4–13	26.4	39.9	28.7	4.9
14–24	25.6	41.7	26.7	6.0
25–44	18.3	32.2	36.9	12.6
45–64	17.1	30.5	34.2	18.1
65+	16.9	13.9	32.5	36.6

The table demonstrates that English-language-only usage increases as age decreases and, conversely, Spanish-language-only usage increases as age increases. Bilingualism is reported as English dominant/Spanish bilingualism (Es) or Spanish dominant/English bilingualism (Se). The results indicate that bilinguals who speak English as their primary language tend to be younger than bilinguals who speak Spanish as their primary language. Combining the last three columns, one can see that for all age groups the ratio of Hispanic persons who speak some Spanish to those Hispanic persons who speak only English does not fall below 3 to 1 and is as high as 5 to 1. Stated differently, approximately four out of every five Hispanic persons report some Spanish language usage—a rather remarkable fact given that formal instruction in

Spanish language usage is relatively new in the educational system and that the majority of Hispanics are native born.

How has Spanish language usage managed to survive to this extent in an English dominated society? Various explanations have been offered:

1. segregated living patterns—maintenance through use as the "official" language in ethnic enclaves;
2. geographic concentration—use associated with proximity to the Mexico-United States border and Spanish language media;
3. immigration—continued immigration and the replenishment of the language;
4. Hispanic oral tradition—the means by which traditions, customs, etc., are passed on in a population with high levels of illiteracy;
5. linguistic refuge—continued use as a means of retreat from the alienating Anglo system;
6. Hispanic culture—language as the basis of Hispanic culture; a requisite; an essential element.

Whatever explanation one chooses, Spanish language usage has both positive and negative effects upon educational achievement and social mobility. Recent data[8] clearly show that Spanish language usage is related to the underutilization of preschool programs, to lower enrollment (thus higher attrition), to higher overageness (retention), and to lower post-secondary enrollment. Almost in contradiction to these results are other findings[9] which indicate that Spanish language usage is related to higher-status occupations, higher income, and increased social mobility. These seemingly contrary results combined infer that Spanish language usage decreases the possibility that a Hispanic will complete his or her highest educational potential, but for those who manage to complete their studies, Spanish/English bilingualism is an asset which can be translated into higher earnings, promotions, and other economic achievements. Thus, Spanish language usage is simultaneously a possible hindrance to educational achievement and an asset to social mobility.

One aspect of language usage that cannot be ignored is the social function of language in solidifying group identity. As such, language usage may serve to open conversational interaction as a mutual sign of commonness. At specific times and places, Spanish language usage is expected or demanded as a concrete and public symbol of "we-ness" or group solidarity. That Spanish language usage is a communicative medium is well recognized. Its function as a symbol of cohesiveness, group consciousness, and solidarity is less understood by non-Spanish speakers. The force of language in bringing people together politically has been greatly underestimated in the past.

Emerging Political Consciousness

Prior to 1960, Hispanic political activity was apparent only in the state of New Mexico. Ever since the "Viva Kennedy" organizations in the 1960 presidential campaign and the election of the first Hispanic congressman from Texas in 1962, the Hispanic population has shown signs of flexing its muscles. Hispanics now hold five congressional seats and have won two governorships. Their presence in the Democratic and Republican party structure is more evident as is the role of Hispanic organizations in local politics.

In short, Hispanic political power has begun to evolve.[10] Curiously, Anglo politicians largely ignore Hispanic voters. The reasons given include the facts that: Hispanics usually vote Democratic anyway; no organization exists which can speak to or deliver the majority of Hispanic votes; Hispanics are only interested in local politics; Hispanics are apathetic toward political participation; and Hispanics have bad voting performances. While some of these contentions have been true in the past and some remain true even today, signs that Hispanics are emerging as a significant political force are evident:

National Visibility on National Issues: Recent national issues such as bilingual education, the administration's proposed amnesty program, the amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1975, the issue of "illegal aliens," and the debate on the Panama Canal Treaty have brought Hispanic spokespersons and Hispanic organizations into the area of national politics. Through many voices, but in harmony with one another, Hispanics have taken strong stands and called upon Congress to attend to the wishes of the Hispanic population.

Grassroots Organizations and Local Politics: Hispanics have been slow to become involved in national politics when local issues which affect their daily lives are more immediate and important. Recently, the emergence of Hispanic citizen committees, formed to monitor local government actions, to seek legal redress when necessary, and which focus upon short-term goals with practical and visible results have emerged in several urban centers. The success of these organizations in improving streets, schools, parks, garbage collection, etc., attests to their abilities to develop strategies and tactics that work. The leaders of these organizations are receiving training which will later be put to use in organizations with broader scopes.

Hispanic Leadership: In the past, outspoken Hispanic leaders were co-opted by Anglo leaders who divorced them from their community and controlled their protests by having them serve on committees where

they were always outvoted. A new Hispanic leadership is emerging which is experienced in grassroots organizations and which relies upon strong and constant support from the community. These leaders are not under any obligation to political forces outside the community and have a strong sense of accountability toward the local influentials. These leaders are less likely to be co-opted or drawn into battlegrounds where they can only lose.

Ethnic Politics: Fostered by the social movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s, a resurgence of pride in the Latino culture has developed a stronger sense of group identity across immigrant generations, social classes, and places of residence. Likewise, the era of social movements illustrated the efficacy of organizational action versus individual action. That collective action speaks louder is understood by Hispanics today and this is visible in the spirit displayed at ethnic fairs, Hispanic holidays, and other symbols of collective pride. Hispanic political rallies that appeal to the ethnic vote, partly or mostly in Spanish, with references to Hispanic heroes and heroines of liberation, and with ethnic music, will increasingly become a scheduled scene on every astute politician's itinerary.

Hispanics and the Political Arena

Projecting ahead is always risky. Nevertheless, it is not unforeseeable that in the near future the Hispanic population will join in the national debate regarding the following issues:

Immigration Policy: This issue will be a part of the national debate for years to come. On one side of the debate will be the extremists who will argue for an exclusionary immigration policy. This side will contend that full employment cannot be attained in the United States when the "door is left ajar." Derogatory and racist comments will be made against immigrants who are unprepared to take part in the American society because they do not speak English. Language maintenance among the Spanish-speaking will be considered as evidence of the unwillingness of immigrants to adapt to American ways. Likewise, the shared loyalties which many Hispanics feel for both their country of origin and their new country of residence will be interpreted by the exclusionary extremists as disloyalty. The opposing side of the debate will be led by extremists who will argue for an open border policy which will allow for free movement along the Mexico-United States and Canada-United States borders and the abolition of the quota entry system. Their arguments will center upon the already existing natural flow of business, commerce, culture, and language along the borderlands and

the quota system which unjustifiably favors some over others and encourages illegal immigration. The Hispanic leadership drawn into this battle has taken a compromise position between the polar extremes—asking for a liberal amnesty program for persons residing and working in the United States and supporting the continuation of a quota system with higher quotas for the Western Hemisphere. An important aspect of the middle-of-the-road argument will rest upon the view that the Hispanic population in the United States is distinct in its customs and language but nonetheless loyal to the United States and playing a significant role in the American economic system. Legislation modifying the present immigration laws is likely in the next few years, and the Congressional hearings, public debate, etc., will focus largely upon the Hispanic population as the largest and most visible immigrant group in America.

As an aside, it should be noted that any amnesty program, however liberal or conservative, will create an artificial increase in the number of Hispanics residing in the United States as those granted amnesty who have previously avoided contact with governmental agencies (fearing detection through responses to government census forms, with interviewers from official agencies, etc.) begin to cooperate with information-gathering agencies. Above all, the debate over immigration policy will allow the Hispanic population the opportunity to enlighten America about the role of the Hispanic immigrant in the American economy and allow for a positive portrayal of the contributions of the Hispanic immigrant population—including its role in maintaining Spanish language usage.

Puerto Rican Statehood: Puerto Ricans are citizens of the United States, but the island of Puerto Rico is a United States territory as Alaska and Hawaii once were. Statehood is a hotly debated issue on the island but even as the arguments and counterarguments continue the economic interdependence of Puerto Rico and the United States grows. Statehood for Puerto Rico will soon be seriously debated in the United States Congress and once again the polar extremes will argue that the United States will benefit greatly and, conversely, not benefit at all by admitting Puerto Rico as the fifty-first state. Hispanic leadership will seek a compromise stance asking that statehood be considered only if the island residents overwhelmingly vote for statehood following considerable debate. The implications of adding approximately 3 million largely Spanish-speaking persons to the United States population will be widely discussed. A few will express their concern that federal funding for the island will be used, for example, in the public school system to educate Puerto Rican children in Spanish. Counterarguments will

point to bilingual education in the United States and the fact that the island, like each state in the United States, has the right to determine its own educational policies. It is difficult, at this time, to say what all the specific arguments will be regarding the imagined and supposed implications of Puerto Rican statehood, but much of the debate will center around the ability of a Spanish-speaking state to participate fully in the governmental processes of an English-speaking nation.

National Language Policy: Language usage itself will become a volatile political issue as demands grow for a "quasi-official" recognition of non-English-language usage in American society. Specific requests will include: (1) that the federal government establish an office for the purpose of translating all legislation, significant official speeches, etc., for dissemination to non-English-speaking residents; (2) that federal support be provided for non-English-language media; (3) that the criminal justice system provide, when necessary, simultaneous translation to non-English-speaking clients or patients; (4) that federally funded language training programs be provided for federal, state, and local civil servants; and (5) that translations of all governmental forms, brochures, manuals, etc., intended for the general public be provided.

The debate regarding a national language policy will rage for years with one side fearing that the United States will head toward a "Quebec-like situation" while the opposing forces will seek to diminish the association between non-English-language usage and separation. On the issue of language, the multifaceted Hispanic community will coalesce in support of a national language policy which recognizes that a democratic society requires informed citizens and that it is the government's responsibility to communicate effectively with its citizens. To this end, Hispanics will demand a government-wide program which utilizes non-English-language printed and electronic communication systems. Small-scale efforts in Miami, South Bronx, Chicago, El Paso, etc., will be attempted in the beginning to see if such systems are feasible.

Conclusion

Hispanics in the United States have traditionally been most concerned with their local communities and appear determined to have a say in those matters which directly affect their lives. Concurrently, Hispanics have also entered the national scene, the impetus being the issue of immigration policy. This national issue supersedes any one community or any one subgroup of the Hispanic population and has served to coalesce Hispanic leadership. The near future will see other such issues emerge—like Puerto Rican statehood and a national language policy. Hispanics will not sit back and allow legislative decisions to be made

on these questions without their perspectives being considered and weighed according to their growing numbers and political strength.

Most significant of all, however, is that the discussions will likely be bilingual.

Notes

1. United States, Bureau of the Census, *1970 Census of the Population, Subject Reports: Persons of Spanish Origin*, PC(2)-1C.

2. See, for example, Leo Grebler, J. Moore, and R. Guzman, *The Mexican American People* (New York: The Free Press, 1970) and United States, Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports: Fertility Variations by Ethnic Origin* Series P-20, No. 226, November 1979.

3. James A. Sweet, "Recent Fertility Change Among High Fertility Minorities in the United States" (Center for Demography and Ecology, University of Wisconsin-Madison) Working Paper 74-11, August 1974.

4. Ibid., p. 14.

5. Verne Nelson and R. Schoen, "Fertility Among Spanish Surname Population of California," (Sacramento, California State Department of Health, April 1977).

6. David Heer, "What is the Annual Net Flow of Undocumented Mexican Immigrants to the United States?" (Paper presented at the Population Association of America meetings, Atlanta, Georgia, April 1978).

7. The Bilingual Education Act, Title VII, Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as amended by PL93-380, required a "national assessment of the educational needs of children and other persons with limited English speaking ability" (LESA). To determine the LESA population, the National Center for Educational Statistics conducted the Survey of Languages in July 1975 as a pretest of language-usage items for the Survey of Income and Education (SIE). This pilot study on non-English-language usage was conducted as part of the Current Population Survey of the Bureau of the Census. Final determination of the LESA population will be achieved through the SIE which was completed in July 1977. The results presented in this paper are from the July 1975 pretest.

8. United States, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, National Center for Education Statistics, *The Condition of Education*, 1978 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office).

9. David Lopez, "Rates of Language Maintenance and Shift," *Sociology and Social Research*, Vol. 62, No. 2.

10. Gerald P. Lamberty, *The Growing Political Strength of America's Latinos* (Paper presented at the Executive Seminar in National and International Affairs, April 1978).

TERESA A. SULLIVAN*

Discussion of Cafferty and Estrada Presentations

A conference on language and ethnicity involves a discussion of the pedigree of the discussants, so I will tell you that both of my parents were born in the United States. All four of my grandparents were born in the United States. Two of my great-grandparents were born in the United States, as was my great-great grandfather, who was born in North Carolina in 1783. When he was born, San Diego had had a Mexican garrison for fourteen years, and Los Angeles was already two years old. From his day until my own, Spanish has persisted in what are today the Southwestern states, despite the attempts by employers, schools, and the state governments and politicians to eradicate it. With such a vital and vigorous language, is there a need for any government policy at all? The first point I will discuss is, What is the appropriate scope for government policy? The second point I am going to talk about is a life-cycle perspective on bilingualism.

Let us talk first about the appropriate scope for government policy. If it is appropriate for the government to be involved in language policy, and I am not certain that it is, it seems to me we should discuss at what level of government it is appropriate. I am not sure that a national policy makes as much sense as a state-by-state policy, or one that permits local communities to respond to local needs. Texas, for example, has two and one-half million citizens of Hispanic background. Mississippi, my home state, has fewer than six thousand. To promulgate a national policy which would affect Mississippi in the same way as Texas seems to me to be wasteful.

Let me speak specifically about the issue of bilingual education in the

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schools. I have serious doubts about bilingual education because I am not sure that most American schools are doing a good job of teaching English. The writing ability of nine-year-olds, thirteen-year-olds, and seventeen-year-olds, as measured by their essays, has declined since 1969. SAT verbal averages, which were in the range of about 466 in 1966–67, dropped to 455 four years later, and another 24 points in the next five years. Can the schools teach literacy in two languages? On the other hand, in Miami, which is, as far as I know, the only official bilingual school system in the United States, test scores have remained high, and the scores of students who are originally Spanish-speaking, 90 percent of whom are Cuban, have been higher than the national average. But there is also the possibility that in school systems that are not excellent school systems, bilingual education will succeed in producing citizens who are literate in neither language.

I further remind you that in cosmopolitan cities where there are several dominant ethnic groups the implications of bilingual education may be quite costly for the school system. The Supreme Court decision in *Lau* v. *Nichols* established, for example, that all students, regardless of their language background, had a right to be communicated with in their own language. That's a different story from providing completely bilingual education. *Lau* v. *Nichols* came to the Supreme Court from San Francisco, and the plaintiff in that case was Chinese. San Francisco also has a substantial Hispanic population and a substantial population of other ethnic minorities, particularly from Asia.

Professor Cafferty brings up the issue of German bilingual education, and in particular the fact that, in some school systems at least, German was provided along with English, particularly in the school system in Cincinnati, and to some extent, I understand, also in Minnesota. I invite you to consider this further, because demographers have noticed that in the 1920s, according to census returns in both the United States and Canada, the Germans virtually disappeared. They simply stopped reporting themselves as Germans. They had preserved their language. They had preserved their customs. But the tide of politics turned, and Germans stopped reporting themselves as Germans. The number of Austrians lapsed significantly. And the Germans never came back. Even today, in terms of identification of Germans from generation to generation, there's approximately a 50 percent loss from fathers to sons in those who report themselves of German background.

The reason I make this point is that I think politics defines the conditions under which ethnic diversity is defined as a problem—as a problem of cultural pluralism or as a problem of increasing homogeneity. Ethnic diversity has been perceived as a problem in the United States, historically, chiefly in terms of ethnic groups that were not Protestant. The

Hispanics come under that rubric, and some of the antagonism towards Hispanics is at least partly due to that old strain of nativism.

But on the other hand, the Hispanics began to seek significant national power in a day in which we were already prepared for it by the black civil rights movement, in an age which was favorable to cultural pluralism. David Greenstone, of this University, has argued persuasively that there is a more or less regular shift in political atmospheres that are favorable to cultural pluralism and those which are not favorable to cultural pluralism. That is something that I think the Germans learned decisively in 1920, and which I fear may come to affect the Hispanic population if government policy continues to be concerned with matters of ethnic definition.

Let me talk specifically about ethnic definition. There are two ways the Hispanic population can grow, according to Professor Estrada. One is through natural increase of births over deaths. The other is through immigration. I am going to discuss both of those, and I am going to talk about the third way, which is redefinition.

Professor Estrada says, "The 1980s will thus be the period of the Hispanic baby boom, much like that experienced by the United States populations in the late 1940s and early 1950s." I will partially agree and partially disagree. I think we can agree that there will be a baby boom, or at least an increase in the Hispanic population, but I think we may differ somewhat on its magnitude and timing. I don't think, however, it is going to be like that of the forties and fifties for several reasons. Professor Estrada rightly notes that the Hispanic population is young. However, the more recent data indicate that that youthfulness is beginning to shift somewhat. In the 1970 census, 47 percent of Hispanics in the United States were under the age of eighteen. By 1973, the number was down to 46.1 percent. By 1978, it was down to 42 percent, which is some shift in age structure. Nevertheless he is correct, I think, in stating that the young age structure will tend to increase the fertility of the Hispanic population.

Now this tends to lead to rapid growth, but the growth depends in turn upon three other things. The first is age at marriage. The second is the timing of birth, and the third is the number of births. The baby boom in the 1940s and 1950s in the United States resulted from a confluence of three events. Younger cohorts, that is younger women, married early, and they tended to have more births and space them more closely together. Older women also tended to have more births. So these three things occurred at the same time for this group. I do not think that is going to happen among the Hispanics.

In the Hispanic population, the age at marriage is young, and perhaps has been getting younger. We are not certain about this be-

cause our data are not very good, but we do have some indications. In 1970, Mexican-American women who were aged 45 to 54 had been about 21.6 years of age when they were married for the first time. Women who were aged 35 to 44 had been about 20.7 years on the average when they were married for the first time. And women who were aged 25 to 34 had been, on the average, 20.3 years of age when they were married for the first time. This is a decrease of 1.3 years. On the other hand, this was still older than the rest of the white population, except for the oldest women, those who were 45 to 54. In 1970, Mexican-American women at least seemed to be a little older than other white brides at the time of their marriage. I should point out that these data are for Mexican-Americans only because we do not have enough members of the other Hispanic groups in the United States census to draw reliable conclusions.

The second issue is timing. That is, how soon after marriage the births occur. A woman, for example, could give birth very soon after marriage and have all of her children close together. If a large number of young women are marrying in the same year and having all their children close together, there will be a small baby boom because so many children will be born in the same year. And it is true that Mexican-American women tend to have their first child very shortly after marriage; and their peak fertility occurs in their early twenties. That is not different, however, from the peak among other whites and blacks in the United States. It is earlier than that for Japanese or Chinese in the United States. So, in terms of timing, it would seem that early births would contribute to the baby boom.

The third issue is the total number of children. If all women have only two children but they have those two children close together, there will be a baby boom. But if women have three or four children there will also be a baby boom. I think the kind of baby boom we will expect from the Hispanics is the one that will result from having fewer children closer together, rather than having more children. In 1960–61, Mexican women in the United States were having an average of 4.6 children throughout their lifetime. By 1970, this was down to 3.3 children. And it appears to be converging rapidly to the more typical 2.2 or 2.3 found in the rest of the white population.

On the other hand, because of the large number of Hispanics who will be bearing children, even that number of children will contribute to what will seem to be a baby boom. But I want you to understand that that baby boom is in terms of timing, and not necessarily a baby boom in terms of number of children. Differential fertility has a way of becoming a political issue. That's particularly true when you're talking about minority groups who tend to be disproportionately on welfare.

Mexican-Americans do not tend to be disproportionately on welfare. Puerto Ricans do, however. And so I would like to see these aspects of fertility distinguished because of the great nervousness among some politicians when you talk about welfare mothers having children. I would like them to understand that in terms of number of children we may not be distinguishing the Hispanic populations from other populations.

However, as Professor Estrada points out, Hispanic immigrants to the United States, who often tend to be young, are bearing more children than native-born Hispanics. So my guess is that there will be an increase in recorded Hispanic births for the next fifteen years. That means that the chief impact on the schools will occur within the next twenty-one years. School systems in cities that currently have an Hispanic population can expect to have a larger Hispanic population entering their schools around the turn of the century.

But the third point I was going to discuss was the increase in the Hispanic population that is achieved solely through redefinition. In 1970 there were an estimated 9.1 million Spanish-origin persons in the United States. In March of 1973 the number was 10.6 million. But I think a change in procedure, in the way we counted them, contributed to that increase. The 1970 census used self-enumeration and permitted parents to report whether their children under fourteen were of Spanish origin or not. About 378,000 children had Spanish mothers and non-Spanish fathers. Of those children, their parents identified 61 percent of them as non-Spanish. In the March 1973 Current Population Survey, the government classified children under fourteen as Spanish if at least one parent was Spanish. There were about 400,000 children who were classified as Spanish because they had a Spanish mother but not a Spanish father. I estimate that about 20 percent of the children under fourteen enumerated as Hispanic in that survey would not have been counted in that manner if their parents had been of any other origin. Now there had been concern in 1970 that there was an undercount of Spanish origin persons. The procedures that were used in the Current Population Survey in 1973 were designed to make that undercount less likely. This is certainly an important objective. On the other hand, these procedures are an administrative identification process that treat Hispanic exogomy (that is, the marriage of an Hispanic to a non-Hispanic) differently from the outmarriage of other ethnic groups. The potential error becomes larger when you consider that the Hispanic exogamy rates seem to be increasing.

These procedures also affected adults, who were classified as Hispanic if they had one Hispanic parent. If the adults in the survey reported that their parents were from other backgrounds, such as one

English and one French parent, then they were reported as "other." But if they had one Spanish parent and one French parent, they were reported as Spanish. So the adults did not always determine their own identification. It was possible in this survey for a fourteen-year-old child to be identified as Hispanic if that child had one Hispanic grandparent. That is exactly the same definition that was used for quadroons after the Civil War in the South.

Let me remind you of a famous case, *Plessy* v. *Ferguson*. Decided in 1896 by unanimous vote of the Supreme Court, this case involved an octoroon who wished to ride in the white section of a railroad car in Louisiana. Most of us remember this case because of the Supreme Court's decision that separate but equal facilities were not inherently unconstitutional. But that wasn't what the plaintiff originally asked for. What the plaintiff originally asked was that octoroons be considered white. The Supreme Court's decision in effect said no, that the state of Louisiana had the right to determine whether a person was white or whether a person was black, and to do so on the basis of parentage. It looks to me as if, through their procedures, the United States Census Bureau has also decided that it has the right to determine whether someone is Spanish, even if the parents of a child no longer consider that child to be Spanish. At least the Germans could cease being German, but I am not sure the Hispanics are going to be permitted to cease being Hispanics.

Now there is one final area of government policy that I'd like to talk about—the service functions of the government. Just yesterday I received a letter that the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund had sent a request to the Office of Management and Budget asking that census questionnaires be published, not in separate Spanish and English forms, but in a combined Spanish and English form. The reason given for this was that there are many Americans of Hispanic origin who rely partly on Spanish and partly on English, and are partly literate in both; they need to see the question phrased both in Spanish and in English to give an appropriate answer. If they see only the Spanish questionnaire, or if they see only the English questionnaire, it will not be sufficient. I think this is an appropriate request, and I hope the Census Bureau will respond favorably to it. But it reinforces my worry that unless bilingual education systems are excellent systems, and provide truly good training, we may have an increase in the number of people who require a questionnaire in two languages because they are not completely sure of themselves in either one.

But I would like to talk now, especially with respect to Pastora Cafferty's remarks, about a life cycle perspective. One of the things that Professor Estrada showed in his paper was that younger Hispanics are

more likely to speak English. A report that was published this month by Alejandro Portes of Duke University, and his colleagues, indicates that the knowledge of English is negatively associated with age for recent immigrants as well. What that means is that young, recent immigrants to the United States—in this case from Mexico and Cuba—are more likely to speak good English than the older immigrants. So, both in the immigrant population and in the indigenous population, it appears that younger people are more likely to speak English.

Portes demonstrates that knowledge of English is positively associated with income aspirations for Mexicans. The better a Mexican knows English, the more likely he is to expect to earn a high income in the United States. Portes's data further indicate that that is a reasonable expectation. Mexicans with a good knowledge of English appear to get better jobs and earn higher wages. On the other hand, among the Cuban immigrants, knowledge of English is negatively associated with income aspirations. It is those Cubans who speak the least English who expect to earn the highest income, and those who speak the most English who expect to earn the lowest income. As it turns out, the Cubans overestimate by a factor of three the income they can expect to earn in the United States. This unrealistic aspiration is at least partly influenced by their knowledge of English. Portes concludes that it might not make much difference for the Cubans because in Miami, where most of them are concentrated, there is a large Spanish-speaking enclave and it may not be necessary for them to learn English.

Portes does not mention that those Cubans who continue to serve the Spanish-speaking community tend to earn lower wages, even in the same occupation, than those who serve the larger community. So the choice to remain within the Cuban enclave in Miami may be costly in terms of potential income. Therefore, both in terms of indigenous Hispanics and in terms of immigrants, we know a little something about their knowledge of English. This is important because in talking about bilingualism we have tended to emphasize schools and tended to underemphasize the transition from school to work and the later work career. We know that people of Spanish origin in the United States are somewhat more likely to drop out of school at an early date. In 1975, 8 percent of the 16- and 17-year-old Hispanic males, and 15 percent of the 16- and 17-year-old Hispanic females had already dropped out of school. For students who are expected to become literate in two languages, this cuts short their education by two years and perhaps makes it even less likely that they will have achieved literacy. This also makes it less likely that they will have a smooth transition to the world of work.

An issue that requires further study is what happens to monolinguals, or to some bilinguals, when they enter the work world. It

is certainly true that for those of us who have professional and technical jobs knowledge of Spanish is an asset. Even for those who are working with the public daily, in positions such as sales work, a knowledge of Spanish is probably an asset. But my impression is that in some Southwestern states, particularly Texas, the case with which I am most familiar, monolingualism has been used as an excuse for paying lower wages and for denying access to certain jobs. In the construction industry in Austin, Texas, for example, there are basically two markets. There is the unionized Anglo construction industry which earns union scale and works on large public works. And there is the mostly Spanish-speaking small construction industry, which earns far less than the union scale.

Now I do not think this argues that we should maintain monolingualism, nor do I think that the immediate assumption is that we should have a bilingual school system. I think, instead, it argues that we need to analyze the world of work more intensively. I tend to think that one of the most helpful things we could achieve, rather than bilingual schooling, would be a nightly newscast by Walter Cronkite in Spanish and perhaps Sunday afternoon broadcasts of soccer games with both Spanish and English commentary. That would have the benefit of teaching the people in the United States the joys of soccer. It would also give both groups a chance to become familiar with the language in use.

The life cycle perspective reminds us that there is more to be concerned about with Hispanic citizens than their association with government. That comes sporadically, maybe once or twice a year, in the form of voting registration, or possibly an encounter with a traffic policeman, or maybe an encounter with a school principal. That is another reason why a concentration on government policy is misleading. It might not be the most important thing; it would divert us from more important issues. For my money, the important issues remain transition to work and the world of work, about which we know considerably less. It is easy to find out information about schools because schools are administered by the government and are required to produce statistics as a by-product. It is a lot harder to find out about the world of work because we do not have those available by-products to use.

BRIAN BARRY*

Ethnicity and the State

Ethnicity, Language, and Culture

The narrowest (and etymologically primitive) definition of an ethnic group would make it equivalent to a tribe, in the sense of "the largest social group defined primarily in terms of kinship" (Anthony Smith, *Theories of Nationalism,* p. 180). I shall extend it to include (as the Greeks came to do) a group defined by descent without requiring (even the myth of) common descent from a single ancestor. Ethnicity is thus to be understood as a sort of extended analogue of kinship (e.g., the references in the British press to Rhodesian whites as "our kith and kin" at the time of UDI). The essence is the conception of oneself as belonging to a common "stock" or "race" (either in the contemporary sense or the older sense in which people spoke of French and English "races" in Canada). Needless to say, conceptions of ethnicity have usually been tied up with phony biology, sociology, and history, but (unless one wants to load the dice—which it appears many scholars do) there is no need to include any of these notions in the specification.

As far as endogamy is concerned, it may be legally enforced (as in South Africa), strongly socially supported (as with interracial marriage in the United States and intercaste marriage in India) to the extent of being almost universal, or merely customary. Endogamy need not be part of the definition, but of course if intermarriage increases beyond *some* point the whole conception of a separate ethnic group will lose coherence (though there is no reason as far as I can see for expecting this to be a generally-applicable rate: a lot must depend, for example, on how children of mixed marriages are classified).

The significant point about ethnicity is negative: that it is not (generally speaking) possible to join an ethnic group by an act of will. An

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Indian who spoke perfect English, acquired a good knowledge of the classics of English literature, etc., did not thereby become English but, on the contrary, had to be all the more firmly put in his place (as *A Passage to India* illustrates).

It should be pointed out that the definition of ethnicity in terms of descent is quite compatible with the emphasis of much recent scholarship on the mutability of ethnicity: that ethnic identities can be created, can merge into more inclusive ones, can be differentiated (e.g., the differentiation of Serbs and Croats along an Islamic/Orthodox line). The plasticity of ethnic identities that we find in eastern Europe in the nineteenth century and in post-Second-World-War Africa is not a chance for the *individual* to choose his ethnicity (or only very exceptionally). The Serb/Croat distinction, for example, would be quite misleadingly assimilated to a question of "religious preference," like being a Methodist rather than a member of the Church of England in England (as against Wales), since what we're talking about is a long-maintained division into two territories.

Nothing said so far is, of course, to deny that ethnic groups are often identified by traits such as language; but the point is that the language in question is not the one the person actually speaks but (as it's revealingly called) the "mother tongue." More generally, it is a commonplace to observe that language is:

a. the mode of transmission of distinctive cultures (experience of bilingual people that their ways of thinking and even personalities change as they switch languages);
b. intimately connected with descent insofar as language is acquired within the family; it is notoriously almost impossible to become completely accentless in another language later, so assimilation is more difficult than (say) with religion;
c. an inescapable aspect of all social interaction—any conversation must be carried on in *some* language (or if each speaks his own language that involves a decision, too); the fact of difference is therefore inescapably kept on the surface (again in contrast with religion). (This implies that a permanent Spanish-speaking population in the United States would be likely to form a distinctive ethnic group in a much stronger fashion than the "ethnic groups" formed by the rest of the descendants of those who came speaking languages other than English.

   Spanish films and books (some overlap with translations and subtitles), Spanish newspapers and periodicals, Spanish television stations, Spanish schools—all of these already exist, of course, in the United States; the question is one of institutionalization.

   Clearly, this would produce the possibility for a sustained di-

vergence from the rest of the population in culture and outlook, as well as the simple point that language is a much bigger barrier to association across ethnic lines than the other "ethnic" differences.)

It should be emphasized that cultural diversity *as such* has no political significance. (For example, if different groups in a single country have different tastes in food and drink, enjoy different recreations, tend to marry and associate within the group, that is not in itself any problem.)

It darkens counsel to lump together all kinds of bases of group differentiation as "subcultural," as, for example, Dahl does in *Polyarchy*, in the chapter on "Subcultures, Cleavage Patterns, and Governmental Effectiveness." Dahl (p. 106) talks of "other differences [i.e., besides class] that give rise to durable subcultures into which individuals are socialized: these are differences in 'religion, language, race, or ethnic group, and region.' " There then follows a footnote:

> Subcultures may of course be formed around economic or social "classes" or "statuses" (as these are variously defined) or around occupations, educational levels, or other characteristics that need not be strictly related to ethnic, religious, or regional characteristics. As used here, however, the term subcultural pluralism refers to the presence of ethnic, religious, or regional subcultures. One can think of subcultural pluralism as a hypothetical dimension for which a measure can be constructed in order to compare the relative "amount" of subcultural pluralism in different societies.
>
> One might protest that it is redundant to include the term "ethnic group" in the list of characteristics on which an ethnic subculture can be based, since it is hard to imagine an "ethnic" identification not based, at least remotely, on one of the other differences, i.e., religion, language, race, or physical stock. There are problems of precise definition here that I am deliberately trying to skirt. However, the terms ethnic subculture and subcultural pluralism are intended to be broad enough to extend to groups for whom objective differences in language, religion, race, or physical stock have been attenuated by time but whose identification with the "historical" group nonetheless remains rather strong. Examples might be nonreligious Jews in the United States or certain other groups with distinct regional roots whose attachments are at present not merely to a region but to a historically developed identity, such as English-speaking Scots, Welsh, or Protestant Irishmen in Great Britain or Scandinavians during periods when one of the Scandinavian peoples was subject to the rule of another without yielding its own separate identity as a people. (fn. 1., pp. 106–7.)

Comments:

a. The idea of lumping all these into an "amount" of "subcultural pluralism" is a monstrosity—the political implications of each is different and so a single index would be quite useless; and, in any case, the degree of difference may have no significance in itself—it all depends on what claims on the polity it gives rise to (see page 35).

b. *Class*. Three possibilities:
   i. "Objective" class, i.e., the construct of an observer (on whatever basis).
   ii. Recognized collective interest based on common economic position (Marxist "class for itself"). N.B.: This does not entail either cultural similarity or common ethnic identity (hypothetical example would be *gastarbeiter* from different countries in Switzerland or Germany cooperating to improve their lot, perhaps by organizing strikes or demonstrations).
   iii. But a class may form a group with a sense of common descent—for example, a peasantry in a country; maybe one could say the industrial working class has approximated it in some West European countries at times.

c. *Race*. Same tripartite division:
   i. "Objective," that is, divisions on physical measurements, blood groups, etc. (N.B.: Picking certain characteristics as basis of "race" may of course be the "scientific" version of socially-defined racialistic thinking; but equally "objective" conceptions of class usually incorporate some kind of theory—for example, that members of an "objective" class *ought* to recognize their common interest).
   ii. Insofar as "race" (some kind of phenotype/descent criterion) is actually a basis for differential treatment, there is a basis on which members of the same socially-defined "race" have an interest in cooperating to maintain or upset the racial system, without necessarily ceasing to maintain separate, more narrow ethnic identities—for example, English-speaking whites and Boers, Xhosa, and Zulu, in South Africa.
   iii. But race may also *coincide* with ethnic division, or the actual experience of being treated similarly (and of organizing together) may produce a sense of ethnic identification which is not further subdivided. (Blacks in the United States offer an example—original identities in Africa more or less completely obliterated, common identity based on shared history, treatment, etc. (N.B.: not purely "race," since an African who comes today isn't a member of the group of black Americans.)

d. *Region*. Same kind of analysis:
   i. region as area on a map,
   ii. region as area within which common interests are recognized, *vis à vis* other areas or more inclusive areas,
   iii. area as site of a group with common descent, i.e., an ethnic group.

e. *Ethnicity.* Note that in each case above, (iii) has not required the stipulation of some distinctive cultural (or other, e.g., phenotypical) basis for an ethnic group. Dahl's puzzles about this are entirely induced by his using the term "subculture" as a generic term—for obviously if ethnicity is a case of a "subculture" it doesn't seem to make sense to say that it can exist without some cultural peculiarities. Rather, cultural homogeneity (and distinctiveness from others) is often an *expression* of ethnicity rather than the *basis* of it (Smith, pp. 149–50)—for example, the more or less synthetic creation of a number of Eastern European languages out of a number of dialects in the nineteenth century, the Gaelic revival movement in Ireland (and the subsequent encouragement of Gaelic in Eire), the decision to use a re-created Hebrew in Israel, the move in Norway to purge the language of Danish borrowings, etc. Similarly, the conception of the Ibo as an ethnic group preceded the creation of an Ibo language: "the Ibo language has not been effectively standardized and many of its dialects are mutually unintelligible." (Crawford Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism.)*

(The title of Young's book, incidentally, illustrates the point I have been making in relation to Dahl, since the use of the term for ethnic divisions carries the constant implication that ethnic conflicts must be *about* culture, whereas culture may often simply be the way of identifying the parties.)

Sources of Conflicting Claims on the Polity

There is a fundamental distinction to be made between two sources of *substantive* claims that groups may make (or that may be made on behalf of groups) on a polity:

1. claims about the distribution of things that are valued by members of both groups: jobs, educational opportunities, access to public facilities, food, housing, or more abstractly, income or status.

2. claims arising from the specific values which are not shared by the other group but which define, wholly or partially, the distinctive character of the group concerned.

The distinction may be most easily clarified by some examples:

a. In Northern Ireland the conflict is misleadingly characterized as religious, though the parties are identified as "Protestant" and "Catholic." Substantively, what is in dispute is the distribution of jobs (for example, the nonemployment of Catholics in shipbuilding or by many local councils), the distribution of council housing, and so on. Issues based on religious values (for exam-

ple, the opening of museums on Sundays) are distinctly secondary, and perhaps surprisingly, the issue of state financial support for parochial schools has not been an important topic of contention. Contrast with this a situation that could correctly be described as one of religious conflict (for example, the dispute about the state financing of religious schools in the Netherlands before 1917). The point here is that the question wasn't of the distribution of the (equally valued) good of "education" but arose from the *different* values different groups attached to *different forms* of education.

b. In Belgium, conflicts between Walloons and Flemings over the distribution of funds for economic development between *areas* are not linguistic disputes, though the protagonists are identified by language; whereas the question of the language of instruction of schools in the Brussels agglomeration *is* a linguistic question.

Four comments:

i. At some suitable level of abstraction, one can, of course, say that type 2 is a competition for the "same thing"—for example, education in one's own religion or language. But this shouldn't obscure the fact that the religions or languages are *different;* whereas if the claim is for more jobs or houses, the *content* of the claims is the same.

ii. There is a temptation to think of the distinction between the kinds of issues as one between "real" and "symbolic" matters. It's true that some type 2 issues *are* symbolic (for example, the Sunday opening question) but some type 1 issues (for example, "badges of inferiority" like riding at the back of the bus or stepping off the sidewalk to make way for a member of the other group) are also largely symbolic—they are ways of reinforcing differential status. Other type 2 issues are not in any reasonable sense symbolic. (And in any case symbolic issues aren't unimportant.)

iii. A rather common recent view (see Richard Rose, *Governing Without Consensus*) is that type 2 issues are necessarily more difficult to resolve than type 1 issues because they are "inherently zero-sum." This is a gross oversimplification. In principle, any issue can be approached either by asking "Is there any mutually advantageous move from the status quo?" or "Out of all nondominated deals (all points on the pareto frontier) which one shall we settle on?" It is true that the possibility of the first approach depends on the status quo not being on the pareto frontier itself, which requires

that the issue must have a certain capacity for being split into subissues so that each side can trade something it values less for something it values more. But this can happen with type 2 issues (see Zolberg's analysis of the Brussels language question). Issues of type 1 can certainly be approached in a zero-sum way, that is, as questions of pure distribution on the pareto-optimal frontier, and indeed economic issues rather lend themselves to that. The real point (which is a different one) is that issues that pit groups against one another are potentially politically explosive, and issues of type 2 have a built-in "groupiness" that in the case of type 1 issues has to be constructed (for example, creating class consciousness among those whose individual interests might be advanced by collective action).

iv. The same demand may on occasion be supported on grounds corresponding to type 1 or type 2, and it must be admitted that the relation can become complex. (This discussion of the point needs a good deal more refinement.) Thus, the demand for a division of the University of Louvain into a Flemish-speaking as well as a French-speaking university could be presented as an equal-opportunity question or as a question of cultural-linguistic development.

In the United States, the case for "bilingual and bicultural education" is usually presented in terms of "equal opportunity" to gain "education" (that is, as a type 1 question), which is understandable since the country is officially committed to it. But, in fact, some of the arguments cannot be supported on the basis of providing a good "education," neutrally defined in terms of range of skills, employability, etc., but depend on a type 2 notion of the value of Chinese or Spanish culture and language (and not for everybody, but for children of Chinese, Mexican, Puerto Rican, or Cuban ancestry). An amusing example of the length these contortions can go to is provided by the argument (found in *A Better Chance to Learn: Bilingual and Bicultural Education*, pp. 78–9) that:

> Many communities want to preserve their language and culture and take measures to do so by sending their children to after-school classes for instruction in the native language and historical traditions. These communities place an extra academic burden on their children, who would fare better if such instruction were included in the regular school curriculum in the form of a bilingual bicultural program.

Obviously, the same logic would entail that *anything* a group

of parents wants their children to learn (for example, birdwatching) must be put into the school curriculum for the sake of "equal opportunity," since otherwise the children will suffer from the "burden" of learning something after school hours. Naturally the reply would be made that language and culture are different from birdwatching: precisely.

In this section I have been discussing substantive conflicts, that is, conflicts over actual policies. Nonsubstantive conflicts are conflicts over (a) the definition of political units and (b) the decision-making procedure to be used for making policies binding on the unit. The basis for a position on either may be instrumental (that is, adopted with a view to its effects on the polities likely to come about) or principled (for example, national self-determination, democracy). (N.B.: If the procedure is going to be one in which majority preferences are ultimately decisive, the boundaries of the political unit largely determine outcomes.)

Two remarks:

1. In the last two centuries the vast majority of "deadly quarrels" involving, say, ten or more fatalities have been over nonsubstantive issues: political boundaries and regimes.

2. The political importance of ethnicity may be appreciated by observing that ethnic conflicts can be, substantively, of both types 1 and 2, in virtue of that instrumentally nonsubstantive (on both units and procedures) and in addition principled nonsubstantive (especially on units).

Ethnicity and the State: Three Models

Any typology is bound to be crude but strictly for the present purpose it may be useful to distinguish three ideal types:

1. the monoethnic state
2. the polyethnic state
3. the nonethnic state

A brief explanation of each:

1. As an ideal-type this would be the instantiation of the kind of nineteenth-century national independence movements that were recognized in the Versailles Treaty: the dissolution of the union between Sweden and Norway in 1905 or the creation of Poland out of the Austro-Hungarian empire in 1919 might typify actions in accordance with its demands. The idea is that a "people" exists and has some kind of collective right to have a state to itself. (See for an illustration the proclamation of the Easter Rising in Dublin in 1916.)

2. As an ideal-type, the polyethnic state is one that also recognizes ethnicity and uses its ethnic groups as building blocks within a single state. Belgium and Canada have both in the last ten years moved increasingly towards explicit conformity with this model. Switzerland

and, until recently, Lebanon are other often-cited examples. (However, all of these cases invite qualifications—see below.)

3. The third ideal-type is a state that does not start by identifying its members as a "people" (or as two or more "peoples") defined by common descent, laying claim to some territory as their "home." Rather, it starts from the territory and defines citizenship by residence rather than descent (which doesn't, of course, entail that it doesn't control the process of becoming a resident). If we treat this as a residual category, and don't look too closely at the specifications, the great majority of people in the world live in a state that falls in the third category: China, the Soviet Union, the United States, India, most of Latin America, the Middle East and Africa, and much of southeast Asia.

The only state that is strictly ethnic in that it makes descent a condition of citizenship is Israel. (The expulsions of Asians from East Africa have been confined, I believe, to those who chose upon independence to retain British citizenship rather than take the citizenship of the successor state. And the case of Israel is peculiar in that most of the world's Jews live outside it.) If we extend from this to include states that compromise with the principle of territoriality to the extent of admitting the possibility of naturalization, but still claim territory on the strength of its being the historic home of a "people," we can add a number of states like Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and Ireland, which have been or are subject to territorial disputes based on precisely the criterion that territory should go with ethnicity, so that, for example, any area where there are Hungarians, so long as they've been there long enough, should be part of Hungary. If we look for ethnically homogeneous states (in the first two cases as the result of population transfers), we could add Greece and Turkey and Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland. The list is not a lot longer than that. (All the larger Western European states present problems.)

It is in the nature of the case that ethnic *groups* demanding statehood—Kurds, Palestinians, etc.—should define themselves in descent terms but compromise with territoriality if they once succeed.

If we look closely at polyethnic states, we find that none of the most usually cited examples is really a case where the state could be accurately described as the home of two or more ethnic groups. Switzerland is not simply a combination of French, German, and Italian ethnic groups: for there are larger numbers of each outside Switzerland. We must therefore say that it is a combination of *Swiss* French, German, and Italian ethnic groups. This entails that Switzerland as an entity be given explicit recognition: over the centuries the original fragments of larger linguistic/cultural groups have developed a common nationality as Swiss.

(N.B.: This means that we have to be prepared to talk about nationality in a sense not identical to ethnicity. In my view we cannot make sense of the phenomena unless we do. I shall expand this in the next section.)

The same goes for Belgium: Belgium is not just a combination of French and Dutch, but of *Belgian* French and Dutch—Walloons and Flemings. No doubt Belgium was originally an arbitrary creation—an artificial buffer-state brought about by balance-of-power considerations—including a chunk of territory on either side of the linguistic border. But it now has a reality as a source of identification to the point where, even if it were to break up, there are, as far as I know, no demands on either side for *enosis* with France and the Netherlands.

(The process of developing a nationality can be seen in Austria [W. T. Bluhm, *Building an Austrian Nation*]—where opinion polls show more and more people all the time claiming to belong to the Austrian "nation" rather than to the German "volk." However, on my definitions the two self-conceptions would not be mutually exclusive.)

As far as Canada is concerned, the official theory of a few years back that Canada is the site of two "peoples," of French and English (and Scottish) descent is obviously false. The alternatives are: (1) to say that there are *many* ethnic groups that make up Canada, French and English/Scottish being just two; or (2) to say that Canada consists of one ethnic group—the French in Quebec and a few other places where they form a local majority—surrounded by an ethnically mixed, English-speaking majority. (For a critique of the first variant, see the essay by John Porter in Glazer and Moynihan, *Ethnicity*.)

Like it or not, the best example of a polyethnic society in the world—where purity of descent has legal sanctions—is South Africa. Apart from that, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia both come closer than the usually cited examples to a state of affairs in which the constituent ethnic groups can be defined without immediate reference to a current political boundary—but of course if we went back to look at the creation of the current ethnic groups, we'd have to talk about *past* political boundaries (as Weber noted).

The general upshot is in any case that, even if we accept quite imperfect instantiations of the ideal-type, the number of cases of polyethnic states is quite small.

Ethnicity, Nationhood, and Statehood

The point has already been made in passing that ethnicity and nationhood are different concepts. All actual monoethnic states are nation-states. This is not a matter of definition. There could in principle be a state made up of people who recognized one another as members

of a common descent group—a "people"—but did not have a common sense of nationality. (A hypothetical example might be the reunification of Germany in a few decades' time, or a new Anschluss between Germany and Austria.)

The converse proposition, however, does not hold: a polyethnic state may be a nation and so may a nonethnic state. To say that the existence of a nation is a matter of psychology is to make it sound too much like an act of will—Renan's "daily plebiscite." If nationalism is, as Weber defined it, "a common bond of sentiment whose adequate expression would be a state of its own, and which therefore normally tends to give birth to such a state" (Smith, p. 174), that doesn't make it something people just happen to have. Loyalty to a nation—a wish for it to have a state if it doesn't have one, a wish for it to continue to have one if it does have one, and a willingness to make sacrifices to those ends—tends to grow out of a habit of cooperation between different groups within the nation, which gives rise to stable expectations about their future behavior, and especially to some degree of trust that a concession made today without a precise *quid pro quo* being specified will be reciprocated at some future time when the occasion arises.

Scholars who have packed into the concept of the "nation-state" such things as an integrated economy, common social institutions, and a single status of citizen have often been motivated by suspect ideas about "political development," but I think we can say simply that the lack of such factors—feudal relations, an estates system, or a Furnivall-type "plural society," for example—must inhibit the development of habits of cooperation, mutual trust, or fellow-feeling. The same goes for such matters as common language or common culture: they are predisposing conditions but not necessary conditions. (As Napoleon said of his Alsatian marshall, "Il parle en allemagne mais il sabre en français.") It is a commonplace that trust and cooperation are facilitated by communication—which is not only a question of language but of shared outlook. (Thus, Robin Dawes has shown that letting people—more precisely Oregonians—talk together about anything at all before playing an n-person prisoners' dilemma game increases cooperation.) We can also understand how it is that the sheer survival of a state over a long period tends to bring about a sense of common nationality among those within its territory. The experience of cooperation tends to create a preparedness to cooperate in the future. (Nations without states often formed political units—or more precisely were formed by political units—at some time in the past.) But just as Homans had to modify the proposition (in *The Human Group*) that interaction brings about liking to allow for the fact that people who are forced to interact against their will may finish up disliking each other

more, so here the proviso must be added that the coerced participation in common institutions may lead to a blowup. (But it doesn't always. What are the conditions? See studies on the effects of integrated classrooms on attitudes.)

I think that it is important to keep clear the distinction between nation, state, and ethnic group (even though the three can coincide in a monoethnic nation-state). There is a tendency in the literature, I find, to assimilate the nation to either the state or the ethnic group. (Smith, p. 176.) Both ways of reducing the number of elements to two have strange consequences. Thus Reinhard Bendix, in *Nation-Building and Citizenship*, appears (although I can find no explicit definitions) to regard a nation-state as a state that successfully claims sovereignty in the Bodin/Hobbes sense (see especially Chapter 4). A nation-state is, it seems, one with "a minimum of long-run stability, that is, minimal agreement concerning the rules that are to govern the resolution of conflicts;" but it should be noted that this "agreement" is hardly equivalent to what I am calling a sense of nationality, for Bendix also writes just before that: "Only the total disloyalty or ostracism of a section of the population is a genuine hazard to the underlying agreement of such a community, though coercion can make a nation-state endure even in the presence of that hazard to its foundations, as South Africa demonstrates" (p. 22). If South Africa constitutes a "nation-state" then indeed the idea of a "nation" has no independent content. A nation-state is simply a state in which the government is able to make its writ run within its territory.

The assimilation of nationality to ethnicity is illustrated by Orlando Patterson's recent book *Ethnic Chauvinism*, though he confuses the issue even further by identifying ethnicity with cultural characteristics, thus finishing up with the assertion that "the idea of the nation-state is the view that a state ought to consist of a group of people who consciously share a common culture." Therefore, in terms of this definition, "Britain, the United States, Canada, and Switzerland are not nation-states. Ireland, France, and most of the other European states are nation-states; so is Japan" (p. 80). Again, "Britain was never a unified tribal or cultural entity" (p. 75); but this is not equivalent to denying that Britain has been a nation, except on the basis of Patterson's peculiar conception of nationality. Similarly, if America and Switzerland aren't nations, what are they? They are of course states, and that would apparently be Patterson's answer; but surely that isn't all we can say about them. To share a state with someone is after all merely to recognize a legal fact. Surely Swiss or Americans share more than that. What they share is precisely nationality.

Patterson's list of "nation-states" is also dubious. Presumably even he

couldn't face the paradox of denying that France is a nation; but it is hardly a monoethnic state, and even on the criterion of common culture it was a nation before it could seriously be described as culturally unified:

> In 1876, a student at a Teacher's College in Limoges couldn't say more than two words about Joan of Arc; as late as 1906, only one military conscript in four could explain why July 14 was a national holiday. When the Marseillaise was written, most Marseillais barely spoke French. At the time of the Third Republic's founding, French was a foreign language for over one-quarter of the population. . . . (Peter Gourevitch, review of Eugene Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914*, p. 1140.)

For the reasons already set out, one would indeed expect an increase in cultural unity to bring about a higher level of identification with all one's fellow countrymen and a tendency to weaken loyalties to smaller units. The only point to make is that cultural unity is not *identical* with nationhood. As far as Ireland is concerned, it is important to recall that Irish nationalism in the nineteenth century was focused on all the people of Ireland, and there were Protestant as well as Catholic Irish nationalists (including Parnell and Yeats) though the mass of votes came from Catholics. The effort to create an Irish nationality failed, of course, and politics in Ireland developed along ethnic lines, producing the Ulster problem. But it is, in my view, too easy to say that it was bound to fail. Again, we need, in order to talk about the phenomena, to be able to distinguish between nationality and ethnicity.

We can see how both the statist and the ethnic definition of nationality bedevil analysis by considering the new states in sub-Saharan Africa that inherited the boundaries originally imposed by the colonialist powers by drawing lines on a map. What would be involved in making these into nations? According to the statist conception all that is needed is that the successor regime should succeed in filling the shoes of the colonial administrators by maintaining "law and order" and suppressing separatist movements. According to the ethnic conception, on the other hand, creating a nation, so far from being relatively easy, is impossible. The whole idea is an absurdity. According to Patterson, "the idea of the nation-state was . . . an astonishingly stupid one in these states" (p. 82). Obviously, if nationality is the same as ethnicity, this is undeniable. But rather than lunge around in this way, I suggest that it would have been better to ask whether the stupidity does not lie in Patterson's interpretation.

Patterson's alternative to the nation-state is what he calls the juridical state. He claims that such a state could have "referential symbols": "A state's flag is such a symbol. So are symbols such as a monarch, or titular head of state, or such ritual symbols as independence day cele-

brations." But a symbol presumably must be a symbol *of* something. Why should anybody form an attachment to an administrative apparatus with a monopoly of legitimate force within a certain territory? Symbols like this would be infused with life only if they became symbols of the nation rather than symbols of the state: what is important is that people should have a sense of shared political destiny with others, a preference for being united with them politically in an independent state, and a preparedness to be committed to common political action. Such a sense of nationality may sustain a particular state or it may undermine it. Charles de Gaulle symbolized the French nation against German occupation. And, even if the rulers are indigenous, the state may still be attacked as an inadequate representative of the nation. The connection between nationalism and populism is not accidental. States can be criticized *qua* states for being too expensive for what they do or for failing to administer equal justice, and so on, without any reference to nationality. According to a school of antinationalist liberals running from Acton through Popper and Kedourie, that is indeed the only basis on which a regime can legitimately be criticized. The only ground for opposition to a colonial regime is that some indigenous successor would, to put it crudely, be better at making the trains run on time. The same goes for claims to a state on behalf of an ethnic nation: liberal unionists argued that the elimination of substantive abuses like rack-renting removed the case for Irish independence. So, presumably, Somalis seeking a Somali state or Kurds seeking a Kurdish state could not make any claims simply on the basis of a desire to determine their future collectively, but would have to say that such a state would provide better administration. It should indeed be recognized that the concept of a nation is incompatible with the extreme individualism that denies the legitimacy of any attempt to use the political process to put into effect collective ends for a society, relegating to the state the role of enforcing property rights. (To the extent that I have doubts about the existence of an American nation it is not in virtue of its ethnic groups but in virtue of the continuing appeal of the strange idea that there is something wrong in people getting together to create the kind of society they want rather than standing by helplessly and accepting whatever happens to be brought about by the workings of individual and corporate greed.)

* * *

For those who like boxes, we can create twelve of them out of the discussion so far:

	STATE		NON-STATE	
	Nation	Nonnation	Nation	Nonnation
Monoethnic				
Polyethnic				
Nonethnic				

Not all the boxes are filled. For the present purpose the important ones would form a sort of continuum: nonnational ethnicity, monoethnic national state, nonethnic national state, nonnational state.

Ethnicity, Language, Culture, and Politics in the United States

Ethnicity in the United States is quite straightforwardly a matter of descent (subject to the usual qualifications about "passing"). Its "rediscovery" seems to turn on contrasting the actual level of endogamy and cultural distinctiveness with an ideal-type on the lines of the quote from Crèvecœur (1782) that opens the last chapter of Glazer and Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot:* "I could point out to you a family whose grandfather was an Englishman, whose wife was Dutch, whose son married a French woman, and whose present four sons have now four wives of different nations. *He* is an American, who leaving behind him all his ancient prejudices and manners, receives new ones from the new mode of life he has embraced. . . . Here individuals of all nations are melted into a new race of men. . ." (p. 288). (See Andrew Greeley and William C. McCready, "The Transmission of Cultural Heritages: The Case of the Irish and the Italians" in Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, *Ethnicity.*) Compared to this model of total assimilation, a few percentage points of difference in response to survey questions become significant. For example, Italian-Americans and Irish-Americans score higher than Anglo-Saxon Americans on 'fatalism', which is constructed out of the following terms:

> To what extent would you say you are to blame for the problems you have—mostly, partly, hardly at all?
>
> Do you feel that most of the things that happen to you are the result of your own decisions or things over which you have no control?
>
> When things go wrong for you, how often would you say it's your own fault?

> How often do you feel that you are really enjoying yourself?
> How often do you feel bored with everything?
> How often do you feel guilty for having done something wrong? [p. 232.]

But:

a. these kinds of statistical differences could almost certainly be found between appropriately chosen subgroups in even the most "assimilated" populations, like England;
b. these kinds of statistical differences are not at all the same as the differences in Europe between Irishmen, Italians, Czechs, Croats, Swedes, Englishmen, etc.;
c. in any case, if the object is simply to establish the persistence of ethnic *identities*, the demonstration of such statistical differences in "culture" is neither here nor there; and
d. if, on the other hand, the focus is on cultural diversity in the United States, the question is why one should look at ethnicity rather than class and region, which, I would be pretty confident, are more significant sources of variation.

It is worth emphasizing a point made earlier apropos of ethnic identities in nineteenth century eastern Europe and postwar sub-Saharan Africa: ethnic identity is not simply the passive correlate of cultural differentiation. It is a two-way street and in some circumstances the cultural differentiae may be created to mark off a separate ethnic identity. I would guess that ethnic groups will survive in the United States just so long as it is a source of satisfaction and pride for people to emphasize their relation to some nationality elsewhere in the world—and their cultural distinctiveness (not so much in Greeley's statistical sense but in terms of public manifestations) will be a function of that desire. A good illustration of this point is the dramatic de-emphasis of German ethnicity during the First World War, including the disappearance of the German-language press.

The implication I would draw is that the maintenance of a Spanish-speaking population, patronizing a Spanish press and other Spanish institutions would similarly be both cause and effect of a lively sense of ethnicity. As far as "the question of national identity," which I was asked to address, is concerned, I have already argued that nationality should not be equated with ethnicity. On the other hand, as I observed in the first section of this paper, a group with a different language from the rest obviously has a real possibility of sustaining a different way of looking at the world, and this could create greater problems in building consensus than there would otherwise be (though whether greater than other sources of dissensus is another question).

As I see it, the biggest political problem stands to arise where people start demanding equal opportunity for those who wish to use Spanish

rather than English not only in school but across the board: in terms of my discussion in the second section, a type 1 demand piggybacking on a type 2. Suppose that schools were set up so that one could graduate from high school with fluent Spanish but with English only of the usual quality of American foreign-language capacity. It is, of course, an old American tradition to use the schools as the repositories for values that nobody cares to try at large (for example, busing children as a substitute for integration in real life). But the trouble comes when the artificial environment of the school is left. There is, it seems to me, absolutely no serious prospect that anyone lacking fluent English is ever going to get far in the higher levels of employment, except for the few who go into the small minority of Spanish-speaking undertakings and, of course, teaching in the schools. The example of Quebec, where the government has introduced stringent requirements on firms based in the province, so as to remove the disadvantages that French-speaking Quebecois have previously encountered in gaining promotion in white-collar and managerial jobs, simply does not seem to me relevant. Spanish-speaking Americans do not have a Quebec, and even if they had a majority in a state, they would be able to do little without running into constitutional prohibitions or finding that the mobility of capital in the United States rules out any vigorous action. (Quebec has, of course, lost firms like Sun-Life but with about a quarter of the Canadian population and a large and quite well-endowed area it is clearly in a relatively strong position to face such withdrawals so long as they are spread over decades, as seems to be the case.)

The other side of the question would, I take it, be a brutal but plausible argument that, if the prospects for the children of poor Spanish-speaking immigrants are going to be no better (or perhaps worse) than those of inner-city blacks, why should they accept the type 2 disadvantage of switching to English? If the only jobs available are going to be menial ones in which Spanish is no disqualification, why give up something and get nothing in return? In the face of the current backlash against affirmative action and the cry for fiscal restraint to combat inflation at a time when the unemployment rate among minority youth is so high, I must admit that I would personally find it hard to sell the advantages of moving into the English-speaking mainstream to anyone who attached great value to the maintenance of a Spanish-speaking community.

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Social and Political Implications of Language Policies: Observations on the Canadian Experience

Abstract

Language policies can vary along several dimensions. The following are among the most important: (a) policies may aim at unilingualism or at bilingualism; (b) policies may treat language as a phenomenon of the private sphere or as one that should be incorporated in the public sphere; (c) policies may incorporate two or more languages in parallel systems of activities or in integrated systems; and (d) policies can be designed to be applicable in institutionally or in geographically defined domains.

In Canada, there are several language policies which differ in one or another of these respects, even in relation to the same language. They vary by regions which represent different configurations of demographic, sociopolitical, ecological, and economic characteristics. They also vary by the levels of government since each level may not be attempting to deal with the same issues or may adopt different solutions. A possibility to consider is that policies may be mutually reinforcing or contradictory to each other.

The social and political consequences depend on the type of policy as well as the social context in which it is implemented. In many ways, language policies are like other kinds of policies. They operate to determine, in part, the set of opportunities and constraints that people face in the pursuit of their individual and collective objectives. They also have a distributional impact: all groups are not affected in the same way by a given policy.

Since language is an instrument of communication, language policies may affect the distribution of access to opportunities; since it is an em-

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bodiment of values and a symbol of group membership, policies may have an impact on the distribution of status or recognition among groups as well as on the processes of group and community formation and on the character of the boundaries between groups.

After a brief description of the policies dealing with the English and French languages in Canada, some of their consequences at the individual level and at the level of the language communities are identified. Attention is also given to their implications for intergroup relations and for the cohesion of the society as a whole. Moreover, the fact that the language communities are not ethnically homogeneous—anglophones, in particular, are of several ethnic origins—is taken into account.

A couple of decades ago, manifestations of discontent, frustrated ambitions, and new aspirations on the part of francophones, particularly those in Quebec, began to increase and to take new forms and substance. Demands for all sorts of change began to find political expression. Constitutional (including partial or complete secession from the rest of the country), economic, political, cultural, and linguistic changes were sought. Many features of Quebec's own institutions and culture were objects of dissatisfaction, but so were several aspects of the relationship of the francophone community with the rest of the country. The demands were articulated and/or supported by groups in different parts of the social structure such as the political elite, the small but growing indigenous bourgeoisie, the growing class of bureaucrats (public and private), certain categories of professionals, managers, intellectuals, artists, labor union leaders, students, journalists, and other media professionals.

The organizations and social formations through which these various groups expressed themselves included governmental institutions, political parties, secessionist and nationalist associations, terrorist organizations, public demonstrations, and the media.

The sources of this increase in discontent and especially of its public expression were varied. There were significant changes in the composition of the francophone labor force which included a rapid increase in the number of people with degrees and diplomas; increases in fields which had traditionally attracted few francophones, such as science and business; and increases in the percentage of (French) unilinguals, or, at least, of francophones less willing to work in English.[1] These changes in the characteristics of the francophone labor force were accompanied and partly determined by rapid economic growth due to the massive investments, largely American, that followed World War II.

The growth of the "welfare state" was another factor. It occurred in

Quebec as it did in the rest of Canada and much of the western world. Government institutions grew in importance not only because they were expected to manage the economy but also because they were increasingly expected to provide the conditions necessary for citizens to pursue their individual goals (Janowitz, 1976:3). The state replaced the church as the dominant public institution. It assumed control of many organizations which were previously under the authority of the church as well as of new ones. These developments opened new opportunities in a wide range of social and economic domains.

The changes in the characteristics of the labor force and the transformations in the public sector raised the awareness of and impatience with the constraints to francophone mobility in the private sector, especially those pertaining to language. In particular, the difficulty of being fluently bilingual in more highly skilled occupations became a growing cause of frustration.

Perhaps the change in identity was the most important transformation to occur. It underlies all the others. The change was from a collective self-perception as a minority group to that of a people and the accompanying desire to be recognized as such. When the way people think of themselves changes and when the new identity is supported by social movements and institutions, something very basic has happened—something that is likely to ramify in many areas of behavior, particularly those involving relationships with the other language community. This, as will be seen, is indeed what has been happening.

Early in the 1960s, some of the political authorities, with supporters from both language groups, felt that something had to be done. There was a feeling that many of the demands and aspirations were justified; that some positive response was required. This does not mean, however, that there was agreement on the exact nature of the problem, let alone on what was to be done about it. I think it is fair to say that there was consensus only on the existence of a problem, of a basis in reality for the discontent, a legitimacy to the expressed ambitions and aspirations. But that consensus was the origin of a long public debate about what the issues really are and what solutions should be adopted. The debate is still going on. It involves contradictory views, incompatible ideologies, and conflicting interests. It is carried out with intense emotions. It would be more appropriate to refer to what is happening as a series of sociopolitical conflicts rather than as an ongoing public debate.

These conflicts over issues and possible solutions frequently involve, in one way or another, the matter of language as such. There is a basic reason for the emergence of the language as an object of debate and conflict that needs to be underlined. Language is an instrument of

communication. Contrary to many other elements of culture, language has an instrumental dimension. If two people speaking different languages meet, one or both must be bilingual if communication is to take place beyond a few gestures. This is not the case with differences in dress, eating habits, child-rearing practices, religion, and lifestyle: although such differences may affect the interaction between people, they do not prevent communication.

Moreover, a choice is always made. The language of one or the other of the two parties (or a third one) will be adopted (or imposed) as the language of communication. Because of this, there usually is a certain asymmetry in the relationships between members of different language groups (the asymmetry is prevented when a third language is adopted as lingua franca). Also, the more the content of the communication is involved and complex, as in exchanges between professionals, technicians, and managers, the more competence in the other's language becomes important and the more the asymmetry is likely to be felt. In short, it is impossible to avoid the language question in the relationships between linguistic groups such as English- and French-speaking Canadians.

The last two decades, then, have witnessed an increase in demand for change in various institutional arrangements having a bearing on the relationships between anglophones and francophones. Many issues and possible changes have been objects of controversy. Because of the critical role of language, the issues and policies have, in one way or another, frequently concerned language as such.

As an introduction to the analysis of issues and policies and of some of their consequences, it is useful to review briefly a few of the features of Canadian society and its institutions that are of particular relevance in this context as well as some of the ways in which language policies can vary either in what they attempt to do or in the mechanisms they set up for that purpose. With this background, the remainder of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the policies related to the English and French languages at the federal and at the provincial levels.

Some Features of Canadian Society

Like most countries, Canada has more than one level of government with some areas of jurisdiction that are distinct and others that are shared. Both the federal and provincial governments, the two levels of primary interest here, have dealt with the language question. As a result, there is not one set of language policies but at least two which are partly similar and partly different in their objectives and in the institutional arrangements they establish with regard to language.

Canada is also a regionalized country, one manifestation of which is

the existence of ten provinces and provincial governments. Each province has its own language policy.[2] In some regards, they differ significantly from each other. Due to past and present demographic circumstances and configurations of sociopolitical forces in each province, the issues are different, the controversies vary in content, and the policies that eventually emerge represent different patterns of compromise. So it can be said that there are not two but eleven sets of language policies in operation.

Second, the two language groups differ in size and in geographic distribution. The proportion of French-speaking people[3] in Canada as a whole in 1971 was 25.7 percent. The proportion varies considerably from one province to another, as the following table shows:

	Total Population	French-speaking Population	
		Number	%
Newfoundland	522,100	2,295	0.4
Prince Edward Island	111,640	4,405	3.9
Nova Scotia	788,960	27,220	3.5
New Brunswick	634,560	199,085	31.4
Quebec	6,027,765	4,870,100	80.8
Ontario	7,703,105	352,460	4.6
Manitoba	988,245	39,600	4.0
Saskatchewan	926,240	15,930	1.7
Alberta	1,627,870	22,695	1.4
British Columbia	2,184,620	11,505	0.5
Yukon and Northwest Territories	53,195	715	2.4
CANADA	21,568,310	5,546,025	25.7

Source: Census, 1971, bulletin 1.3-5: Table 27

A first observation from the table is that in the provinces where the population is small, a low percentage of French-speaking people yields a very small number of francophones. This is worth noting as both absolute and relative numbers have relevance for policies. Another observation is that francophones are concentrated in three provinces as far as absolute numbers are concerned and, if we were to look at the geographic distribution within Ontario and New Brunswick, we would observe a concentration in areas contiguous to the Quebec borders. Similarly, anglophones are geographically concentrated within Quebec. Moreover, these patterns of concentration appear to be increasing with time as a result of two processes: linguistic assimilation in the case of

the French outside Quebec and, in the case of both francophones and anglophones, geographic mobility into or close to areas in which they are a majority (Joy, 1967, 1978).

Third, Canada is a segmented society along language lines. The degree of segmentation has important implications for language policies and vice versa. Segmentation refers to the degree of social enclosure and of compartmentalization that exists between ethnic or linguistic communities.[4]

Enclosure refers to the structure of social relations among the members of a society, to the existence of separate networks of social relations. It refers, first, to the existence of social boundaries between groups and to the mechanisms for the maintenance of these boundaries. Second, it refers to a particular pattern in the contours of such boundaries. Indeed, enclosure involves a certain superimposition of social boundaries, or perhaps more accurately, the containment of the many networks of social affiliations within the boundaries of an inclusive system of ethnic boundaries. The limits of various social networks tend to coincide with the more inclusive ethnic boundaries.

If enclosure refers to the structure of social relations, compartmentalization refers to the related structure of institutions and organizations, to the extent to which each ethnic community has a set of institutions of its own. It refers to its degree of institutional completeness (Breton, 1964). This does not necessarily imply culturally distinct institutions and practices. Compartmentalization is not a statement about cultural pluralism; rather, it is a statement about the locus of the institutional authority and clientele. For example, the concept of parallel educational structures refers to the fact that there are at least two sets of educational organizations serving ethnically different elites. Since both the clientele and the elite are defined in terms of the lines of ethnic segmentation, the processes of compartmentalization and of enclosure reinforce each other.

The degree of segmentation or of parallelism in societal networks and institutions can vary considerably. When it is very high, we essentially have subsocieties in relation to one another; when it is very low, we have ethnic social formations on a purely situational basis. The communities existing as subsocieties tend to have continuity and tradition, autonomy, organization, and common affairs (Smith, 1974: 93–94). Those existing as situational formations tend to be based on personal experience and therefore lack historical continuity; to exist within larger units and therefore to lack autonomous organization, and to have few, if any, common affairs. There are perhaps few ethnic communities to be found at each of these extremes; but most tend to come closer to one of the polar types than to the other.

The anglophone and francophone communities exhibit a high degree of parallelism or institutional completeness. Within each of them there is considerable ethnic heterogeneity. Each contains people of different ethnic origins. Their communities have comparatively very low degrees of social and institutional completeness. The ethnic diversity is substantial among anglophones since immigrants have tended to integrate themselves economically and socially into the English-speaking community. (In 1971, 34.4 percent of those whose language most often spoken at home was English were not of British origin.)

Possible Variations in Language Policies

There are several dimensions along which language policies can vary. A basic dimension is whether the policy is aimed at unilingualism or at the accommodation of two or more languages. Governments and other institutions in the society, such as the educational system or business firms, usually choose one or the other of these alternatives—explicitly or implicitly. One can sometimes observe, however, in the same institutions some items of policy aimed in one direction and others oriented in another.

Within this broad classification, several variations can occur. Policies aimed at unilingualism can, at one extreme, be definitely assimilationist. This occurs when one cultural group, through its elite, attempts to impose its own language as the language of the society on both the public and private spheres of activity. Those who assimilate are properly rewarded and sanctions are imposed on those found using another language. The imposition of a language is part of the "nation-building process" in countries consisting of several language groups. "Nation-building" need not necessarily involve such a process, but it frequently does or, at least, it is attempted. Linguistic (and cultural) assimilation was the wish of the British administration in Canada for some time after the conquest. It was not realized for the country as a whole, but it was in certain parts of the country.

Less extreme is a policy that tolerates other languages in the private sphere but not in the public sphere. People are allowed the use of another language in their homes, neighborhoods, voluntary associations, cultural activities, and churches (when there is separation between church and state). But only one language is accepted in activities of public institutions such as government, education, business, and industry. In other words, when people participate in common institutions, the dominant language must be used; when they function in associations and social networks specific to a group, they may use their "minority" language. In short, there is the imposition of one language in the public sphere and laissez-faire in the private domain.

Further along the continuum, one observes not only a relaxation of constraints, but some positive recognition of one or more other languages. But as long as unilingualism is sought in the public domain, the recognition is given to other languages simply to facilitate the process of assimilation into the dominant language and culture. A number of years ago, studies revealed that children in schools learn the dominant language faster if they are initially instructed in their own "minority" language. In other words, people learn more quickly and comprehensively about a different cultural environment if they can understand the language in which they are instructed. (One wonders why studies were required to establish such a proposition!)

Further along this same line are policies that go beyond the toleration of cultural expression and maintenance among minority groups and which provide measures to encourage such phenomena. But the encouragement is for expression in the private sphere only. A notion underlying such policies is that a climate of respect and social acceptance of the culture and language of minorities is more conducive to their integration into the mainstream of culture than policies which ignore them or treat them as inferior in one way or another.

At this point, we are at the border line between policies of unilingualism and those that begin to incorporate two or more languages in the public domain. Such incorporation can take a variety of forms which, in some ways, correspond to differences in degree. A minimum level of incorporation is achieved by a policy of translation. The organizations of the public domain operate in the dominant language only, but some recognition is given to linguistic minorities by translating documents in their language or by permitting interpreters in certain circumstances (such as in courts of law).

Beyond this minimal level, perhaps the most critical distinction to be made is between policies which incorporate bilingualism in parallel domains of activity and those which build it into integrated or common domains. In the parallel mode, one organization of a particular type operates in one language and another operates in the other language: this can occur in radio stations, schools, businesses, government agencies, churches, and so on. Bilingualism under this approach consists of two parallel unilingualisms. In such situations, a small number of bilingual individuals is required since interaction between language groups occurs almost exclusively at the level of the elites. The domains may be defined geographically rather than institutionally. One language is used in certain districts, regions, or provinces while a different language is used in other areas.

It is not always easy or even possible to establish parallel organizations. In Canada conflicts occurred primarily in situations where it was

practically difficult or impossible to duplicate and have one organization operating in each language (a clear instance of this being the case of airports).

When activities are integrated, however, bilingualism occurs at the level of day-to-day operations. Two languages are used in the functioning of the organization. Such situations require a larger number of bilingual individuals. A policy based on the postulate that two languages will be in use in an organization, be it a government department, an insurance company, a department store, a factory, or an airport, will usually, implicitly if not explicitly, define the roles in the organization which require bilingual individuals and specify the circumstances under which one or the other language may or should be used.

Of course, a laissez-faire policy may be adopted. Such a policy, in effect, authorizes those with power in an organization to define the rules of the game. And, indeed, what usually happens is that those in subordinate positions learn the language of those in authority. Another common occurrence is that the supervisory and middle-management positions are staffed with bilingual individuals who act as intermediaries between groups of unilinguals.

A non-laissez-faire policy, on the other hand, attempts to specify, in more or less detail, the language rules to be followed at all levels of the organization and/or in different categories of activity. In addition, the policy may attempt to promote bilingualism on the part of one or both language groups in an organization or in an area. The rules specified or the degree of bilingualism sought may be different depending on the district, province, or region in which the organization is operating.

Language policies, then, can vary by levels of government, by regions of the country, and in terms of what they attempt to do. Because of these variations, it seems appropriate to discuss the policies according to the level of government that implements them. The following section will deal with federal policies. Those of the Quebec government will then be considered. The analysis will then move to the other provinces. In a final section, some of the contradictions and mutually supporting features of the policies of the various governments will be discussed briefly.

The Language Policy of the Federal Government

With the expressions of discontent beginning to manifest themselves in the early 1960s, some of the federal authorities, together with other social and political leaders, began to feel the need to reassess the linguistic situation thoroughly. The need for a new *problematique* began to be felt. Generally speaking, the *problematique* identified two main sources of problems. On the one hand, socioeconomic inequalities be-

tween anglophones and francophones and between the regions in which each group is concentrated were identified as a cause for serious concern. On the other hand, many institutions that were meant to have a national character were, in fact, anglophone institutions with very limited francophone participation. Especially troublesome in this regard was the situation of the institutions and agencies of the federal government itself.

In terms of seats in Parliament, francophones were well represented; similarly in the Cabinet, although frequently as ministers of less critical departments. However, the bureaucracy was heavily anglophone and the language used was English. Moreover, the federal government was perceived by many in Quebec as pursuing policies that were, by and large, in the interest of the anglophone majority, whether they be economic, monetary, fiscal, or international trade policies or policies dealing with immigration, health, and welfare.

Many anglophones, especially in the social and political elite, began to realize that the allegiance of the francophones in Quebec to the federal government was weak and that to a dangerous extent it was shifting to the provincial government—a realization confirmed by the growing independentist movement. The national political institutions were facing a problem of legitimacy. At the symbolic and at the operational levels, the central government was an English-Canadian government; French-Canadians in Quebec were seeing it less and less as their government.

The Official Languages Act adopted by the federal Parliament in 1969 was one of the measures designed to deal with this question of legitimacy. It attempted to do so through changes in the linguistic character and composition of federal institutions. The main features of this act are as follows:

a. The act adopts the principle of equal authority of legislative texts regardless of the language in which they were written. There is no question of giving priority to the language in which the law has been written or to the language used to debate that law in the House of Commons.
b. Any document emanating from Parliament or from the government of Canada by a judiciary agency, a quasi-judiciary agency, an administrative agency, or even a Crown corporation must be written in both official languages.
c. Concerning tribunals, the act requires that the procedure be written in both official languages. Testimonies can be given in either language, the choice being left to the person who has to testify. Written judgments must be in both languages.
d. Departments and agencies of the government of Canada must en-

sure that one can communicate with them in either of the two official languages, particularly if they are situated in the national capital, if they are a head office, or if their offices are situated in a bilingual district.

e. Bilingual districts must receive all services in both official languages. They can be created when the two following conditions are met: (a) if both official languages are the languages spoken by the residents of the area; and (b) if at least 10 percent of the residents speak one of the official languages as a mother tongue.

As can be seen, the act aims at institutional bilingualism. One of its basic premises is that members of each language community should be able to relate with the central government in their own language—whether that relationship be in the employment, welfare, income tax, or other offices of the government; through its literature and public pronouncements; through the symbols that the government adopts and uses on signs, advertisements, cheques, and so on; in public ceremonies and events; or in terms of the possibility of a career in one's language in the civil service. The objective of the act was not to promote bilingualism in the population, as many Canadians thought (and many still think). Rather, it was to create a bilingual capability in the governmental institutions at the federal level.

Before commenting on the implementation of the act, it should be noted that the act itself is a symbolic gesture which represents a profound change in the collective definition of the situation. It does, indeed, represent a recognition that the French in Canada are not an ethnic minority in the sense that is commonly understood in North America but that they constitute a people, a national group.[5] Ethnic minorities are, by and large, expected to adapt to the mainstream culture and institutions of the society. But with national groups, the common institutions are expected to adapt and incorporate each of them. Otherwise, the possibility of secession will surface regularly (as it has in Canada) and the cohesion of the society will be weak.

In the past, anglophones usually acknowledged the fact that Canada consisted of two language groups, two cultures, "two founding races." But whenever French and English met, the French were expected to adopt the language and modes of functioning of the English. This was true at both individual and organizational levels of behavior. But as the French were not assimilating to any significant degree (especially in Quebec and New Brunswick) and as they became more assertive as a result of events such as those mentioned earlier, attitudes began to change. Perhaps the most important social and political implication of the act is to have explicitly and officially adopted this new attitude vis-à-vis the francophones. It is saying explicitly: there are two lan-

guage communities in this country and the institutions common to both of them must be such as to be representative of each, to meet the needs and aspirations of each, and to allow members of each community to relate to them in their language. The act is institutionalizing a change that had already begun to manifest itself and is attempting to promote it further.

Embedded in the act is also a conception of the two language communities. Specifically, it defines both the francophone and anglophone communities as existing in all regions of the country; it adopts a Pan-Canadian or coast-to-coast view of the boundaries of the two language groups. It will be seen later that there is a competing view which defines the francophone community as located in Quebec and its border areas and the anglophone community as located in the rest of the country.

One of the consequences of the policy is to change the relative status of groups in the society. Perhaps one should say that it attempts to effect such a change because it is far from obvious that it will succeed in doing so. There is indeed considerable resistance to its implementation. By declaring that Canada is a two-language country and that this should be effectively reflected in its central institutions, the act offends that segment of the anglophone population that has always seen Canada as an English-speaking country. Giving symbolic recognition to the French culture and language is perceived by many as demeaning the British heritage in the country. Moreover, by wanting to give additional recognition to the francophones in all regions, it offends many anglophones, especially those of non-British origins, who always saw the French as just another minority group. In regions where the francophones constitute a smaller proportion of the population than people of some other ethnic origins, the policy of official bilingualism is especially irksome.

Much of the resistance, not to say outright opposition, to the language policy of the federal government is a reaction to a loss of sociopolitical and cultural status, relatively speaking. The groups already preoccupied with their social status and social acceptance, such as a number of ethnic minorities, are particularly sensitive to the special treatment given to the French and their language. Many who resist the policy are not directly affected by it in their daily lives. They do not have to learn French; their situation at work is unaltered; their schools remain the same. It is true that a slightly larger fraction of their taxes go to the cost of operating federal departments and agencies in two languages. The biggest difference, however, is that they have to see a number of signs (names of buildings, checks, stamps, posters, advertisements) in both English and French. For many, these signs are a

constant reminder that a group that they perceive as a minority is given a special status and they resent it profoundly. The objectives of the act are distorted and exaggerated ("French is being rammed down our throats"); hostility is expressed both publicly and privately; mistakes in the implementation of the act are exploited as a justification for their opposition; those who have promoted the policy are seen as having evil intentions that they conceal from the population.

Since institutional bilingualism requires a certain degree of individual bilingualism, some people are immediately or potentially affected. Indeed, in order to implement a policy that would render the federal political institutions better able to relate with the members of each language community, certain measures and rules had to be adopted regarding recruitment and language requirements prevailing in the federal government and its agencies favored the anglophone majority. Obviously, changes aimed at a more representative bureaucracy that could serve the public in either language were going to favor francophones and bilinguals. (These two terms, incidentally, have to be distinguished logically, but it should be noted that, in fact, they referred to the same individuals. By and large, it was francophones who were bilingual.)

Various steps were taken: recruitment of francophones and bilinguals; definition of certain jobs as requiring English only, French only, or both;[6] establishment of work units operating in each language; programs for teaching the two languages to civil servants wishing to take immersion courses (that is, courses given in an all-French environment such as Quebec City).

Some of these measures disrupted or were seen as potentially disruptive to certain career lines and, therefore, the career prospects of a number of people in or aspiring to enter the civil service. The measures did bring about a considerable amount of change. By 1976 the proportion of francophones in the federal civil service was about what it is in the population. There has been much dissatisfaction with the policy and resistance to it, but this was to be expected. Indeed, the question that should be raised is why, given the magnitude of the change, the resistance was not stronger and did not lead to more serious conflicts than it did. A good part of the explanation can be found in the fact that the measures were implemented during a period in which the economy and the number of jobs created in the public as well as the private sector were increasing rapidly. This expansion allowed the recruitment of francophones and bilinguals at many levels of the bureaucracy with a relatively low level of social strain.

The impact of language policies dealing with the composition of the bureaucracy is not limited to possible changes in career lines and prospects. It may extend to the structure and value of social networks. This

stems from the fact that social networks are a source of organizational power. Indeed, one's capacity to achieve particular objectives is partly related to the contacts one can mobilize. The government bureaucrat is in a better position to get what he wishes for himself, his branch, or his department if he is well-connected inside as well as outside the government. Similarly, the businessman, the leader of the labor union, or the representatives of other kinds of interest groups can frequently achieve their objectives more easily if they are well-connected with the government bureaucracy. Such networks constitute an important component of one's organizational power. This is illustrated by boards of directors which are composed of people selected in large measure because they are valuable linkages to other commercial, financial, and industrial organizations. The importance of networks is not limited to boards of directors of companies. A person's capacity to act in organizational contexts depends on his contacts with others who can bring about certain results.[7]

It was indicated earlier that Canada is segmented along language lines and that one dimension of this segmentation is the existence of social networks constructed within each language community with few linkages across the communities. It is quite possible, in such a situation, that a language policy aimed at increasing the francophone presence in the federal bureaucracy will have the effect of connecting the bureaucracy more extensively with francophone interest groups and relatively less well with anglophone interests. It is indeed easier for an anglophone businessman or a corporate lawyer, for example, to establish contacts with anglophone than with francophone civil servants in Ottawa. The costs of building the trust necessary for such contacts to be effective are higher across language boundaries than within them.

To the extent that this is the case, the language policy may change the value of certain anglophone social networks. The "old boys' network" is not as effective as it used to be since some of the possibilities of action in the bureaucracy are now controlled by francophones. This is especially the case at the level of the elite, but it is not restricted to that level.

Such a change, or anticipated change, in the value of one's network of contacts—or, to put it differently, a change in the costs, both social and monetary, of constructing an effective network—may account, to a degree, for the fairly common feeling among anglophones that the French have taken over the federal government, that they occupy the majority of positions or the most important ones in its bureaucracy. The frustration that is voiced is partly due to a loss of status, as discussed above; but it also appears to be due to the fact that many see themselves as less well-connected with Ottawa than they used to be. For

people in certain regions, such as the West, the frustration is worse since Westerners have always been poorly connected with Ottawa in comparison with Central Canadians and Ontarians in particular. The fact that the federal government's policy attempts to improve the connections of francophones with the central government while apparently neglecting to do the same for the West is perceived as "adding insult to injury."

Thus the recent language policy of the federal government has been perceived as bringing about a redistribution of status and recognition, of access to careers, and of organizational power in favor of francophones. To an extent, the perception is accurate. A degree of redistribution has, in fact, occurred. And this redistribution, frequently perceived as more extensive than it really is, has generated a certain amount of dissatisfaction, resistance, and hostility. One could argue that such negative reactions were to be expected, that change always upsets some interests, that the negative effects of a policy cannot be avoided. But the fundamental question is to assess the benefits or positive results of the policy in relation to the negative ones. One must consider whether or not the language policy did increase the legitimacy of the federal government. This is difficult to establish given the evidence available. The allegiance to and identification with the central state does not appear to have increased, but the secessionist movement in Quebec does not seem to be gaining any significant momentum either.

One reason why it is difficult to assess the impact of the language policy in these respects is that it is virtually impossible to know what the situation would be had the policy not been adopted. My suspicion is that the feelings of alienation in Quebec vis-à-vis the central state would be increased, that the irrelevance of that level of government in the eyes of francophones would be greater, that the perception of the federal government as an obstacle to the socioeconomic development of the province would be more frequent—in short, that the situation would have deteriorated.

Finally, it should be mentioned that in its Pan-Canadian conception the federal policy included measures to improve the viability of francophone communities outside of Quebec. This took the form of grants for cultural activities, radio and television stations, and education in French. This was part of the special treatment given to the "official language minorities" in the different parts of the country. Did such measures have any effect? It may again be argued that the policy slowed down their demise through assimilation, but it is difficult to establish such a proposition. It seems, however, that the policy has not been sufficient to counter the effects of factors such as the critical importance of fluency in English for socioeconomic mobility, the migration of fran-

cophones toward Quebec and the Ottawa region, and urbanization together with the forces toward acculturation and exogamy that it involves. Linguistic assimilation and exogamy appear, indeed, to be on the increase in recent decades among francophones outside Quebec. Moreover, there appears to be no significant migration of francophones from Quebec toward the rest of the country (except, perhaps, toward the Ottawa area). In short, the viability of francophone communities outside of Quebec has not increased nor has their attractiveness for most Quebec francophones. The present policy is insufficient in the face of forces in the opposite direction.

In order to proceed further in the analysis of the impact of the federal government's language policy and of the dynamics of the conflicts accompanying its implementation, a discussion of the language policies at the provincial level, especially in Quebec, is necessary.

The Language Policy of the Quebec Government

The diagnosis formulated by the Quebec elite is different in many regards from that of the federal government. What it defined as problematic and requiring action was not the same. One element of the diagnosis was the perception of a demographic threat. On the one hand, the birth rate had been quite low since the late 1950s and, on the other, the propensity of immigrants had been to integrate into the anglophone community. As a result, the possibility that the francophones would become a further minority in Canada generally and in Quebec in particular (especially in the socioeconomically critical Montreal area) became a matter of concern.

Another element of the diagnosis of the Quebec elite pertained to the socioeconomic status of the francophones. The existing subordinate status in a region where the group constituted a majority was becoming less and less tolerable. There were two aspects to the subordinate status. First, a layer of jobs in the occupational structure had been significantly more accessible to anglophones than to francophones. The rising education and aspirations of francophones made this situation increasingly less acceptable. Second, the dominance of economic institutions by anglophones frequently located outside of Quebec and of Canada became more and more an object of dissatisfaction. One could perhaps say that individual aspirations for better jobs and incomes had risen and that collective aspirations for the control of organizations in the province had emerged. In other words, while the occupational aspirations of an expanding middle class were increasing, a new elite was appearing on the scene with aspirations for organizational power in an institutional domain from which they had, by and large, been excluded, namely the economic sphere of activity.

In short, what was seen as a problem was the disproportionate influence of the English language, culture, and institutions in Quebec, a province with an 80 percent francophone majority. The issue was to reduce that influence and increase the influence of the French language, culture, and institutions, to shift organizational power from anglophone to francophone hands.

Many policies and measures, some dealing with language, have been adopted in recent decades to deal with aspects of these situations. With respect to the language dimension of the issues, the last ten years in particular have witnessed intense controversies over the appropriate steps to be taken. Bills have been submitted to the National Assembly and later withdrawn. Laws have been adopted and later modified. It is not possible to deal with all aspects of the language policies in this paper, let alone with the history of the changes they underwent during the last decade. The existing legislation and programs deal with several matters such as the language of the courts, advertisements, education, professional bodies, work, and public administration. Only a few key features of the legislation will be discussed. They are as follows:

a. The act declares that French is the official language of Quebec.
b. The act recognizes certain fundamental language rights, namely:
   the right of every person to have the civil administration, semi-public agencies, and business firms communicate with him in French, and to speak French in deliberative assembly;
   the right of workers to carry on their activities in French;
   the right of consumers to be informed and served in French;
   the right of persons eligible for instruction to receive that instruction in French.
c. The act makes French the language of the civil administration.
d. The act requires employers to draw up their written communications to their employees and their offers of employment or promotion in the official language. An employer is also prohibited from making the obtaining of an employment or office dependent upon the knowledge of a language other than the official language unless the nature of the duties requires the knowledge of that other language.
e. The act prescribes that the instruction given in the kindergarten classes and the elementary and secondary schools be in French. Children will be able to receive their instruction in English if they meet certain conditions having to do with the language of their parents, the province in which the parents received their instruction, or with the fact that one was already being instructed in English when the act came into force.[8]

Through these provisions, the act does several things. First, it re-

duces the status of the English language. When negotiating the confederation agreement, the English made sure of protecting their situation in Quebec by establishing, among other provisions, their language together with French as an official language. Up until recently, Quebec was the only province that was officially bilingual. (In 1969, New Brunswick also became officially bilingual.) With the adoption of Law 22 by the Quebec National Assembly in 1974, the situation changed: Quebec became officially unilingual. The recent act (101) affirmed this decision. It gives special recognition to English, but not an official status.[9]

Second, it makes French the language of operation in all activities in the public sphere: public administration, business and commerce work, professional services, and public education. Third, the act moves toward unilingualism within Quebec. The bilingualism accepted for the public sphere is what was referred to earlier as "translation bilingualism" except when it is essential for certain tasks such as those involving relationships with the "outside world." Otherwise, bilingualism is relegated to the private sphere.

Throughout the act there are special provisions for the use of English. Because there is a substantial anglophone population in Quebec, these provisions allow a number of anglophone organizations to exist parallel to the francophone ones. Schools and universities are cases in point as well as newspapers, radio and television stations, hospitals, and social service agencies.

There are a number of views or "social theories" underlying the diagnosis and the proposed remedies. It was seen that the federal analysis was based on the view that the francophone and anglophone communities both exist "from coast to coast." In contrast to this Pan-Canadian view, the Quebec analysis is based on the premise that Quebec is the homeland of the French in Canada, that it is not realistic to expect the French language and culture to survive and develop elsewhere in Canada given present-day circumstances (except, perhaps, for one or two exceptions such as in New Brunswick). This view could be called segmentalist: it sees one segment of the country as francophone and the others as anglophone (Breton, 1978a & b).

A few corollaries of this view are worth noting in the context of this discussion. One is that the sociocultural milieu in which people function is critical: it must be as francophone as possible in all areas of activities. Another is that bilingualism is unnecessary, except for that portion of the elite who relate to outside organizations. More than that, some consider bilingualism as a danger since it is an open door to anglophone cultural influences. It is seen as a first step toward anglicization. A third related proposition is that nonfrancophones in Quebec must learn to function in the language of the majority; that it is not fair that it be

the other way around. In other words, anglophones in Quebec are a minority and should be treated as such. Of course, it is a special minority because of its size and of its historical role in the province, but it is nevertheless a minority.

Another view underlying the diagnosis and the policy is that the control of institutions should be in the hands of francophones. This refers primarily to economic institutions since most others are already under francophone control. It is not expected that this will be achieved by means of a language policy alone, but the language policy is definitely seen as an instrument for that purpose. In fact, this view is articulated in the white paper that preceded the submission of the bill to the National Assembly. That document makes it clear that an objective of the language policy is to weaken progressively the institutional system of the anglophone community on the one hand and to take control progressively of most of the economic institutions now under their control on the other.[10]

The main components of the legislation follow these general orientations. It includes steps to make French the language of the public sphere and English a private-sphere language. It has measures to make the sociocultural milieu of Quebec as French as possible. It directs the linguistic integration of migrants toward French, whether they are from another country or from the rest of Canada. It also makes it impossible for francophones to have their children instructed in English public schools. By making French the language of work, it attempts to facilitate the mobility of francophones into the upper echelons of financial, commercial, and industrial organizations.

Since the policy is fairly recent, it is difficult to assess its consequences. They will no doubt extend to many aspects of the social structure and of intergroup relationships. A number of observations can be made, however, about what is happening and on what can be expected to happen if certain circumstances prevail. Attention will be given to the impact of the policy for anglophones and francophones separately.

How are anglophones reacting and how will they react in the future to the new linguistic norms? As indicated, the status of English has been reduced within Quebec while it remains the dominant language in the rest of Canada and North America and the lingua franca of economic and scientific exchange in the world. Under such conditions, one would expect many anglophones to leave Quebec as they perceive opportunities elsewhere. It appears that some are, in fact, leaving for reasons related to language. These are individuals who do not want to bear the psychological, mental, and financial costs of learning a second language. The importance of this migration flow is difficult to assess because there have always been migrants in and out of Quebec. Even if

survey results existed, they would not be very useful as many people are reluctant to declare that they are moving or intend to move for a language-related reason.

Another possible reaction is retaliation. Anglophones are powerful. They control a considerable amount of resources. They could attempt to use this power to "bring the Quebec government to its senses." A company may move or threaten to move some or all of its operations elsewhere or there may be a freeze or the threat of a freeze on new investments. There is evidence that such behavior is taking place, although it is difficult to establish that the moves are primarily consequences of the language policy. Publicly, such decisions are usually explained in terms of purely economic considerations unrelated to language. There is only one instance where the decision to move the head office to Toronto was openly attributed to the language legislation by the president of the company—the case of the Sun Life Assurance Company.

But there are economic considerations related to the language policy that may underlie the negative reactions observed. Such are the constraints that derive from the legislation for the recruitment of skilled labor or the costs pertaining to language acquisition and translation. But the reactions may also be motivated by frustrations due to the loss of status. There may also be fears of discrimination, fears that the policy is a major step toward political secession, fears of possible excesses on the part of a majority in the assertion of what it considers as its collective rights and in the imposition of its language and culture. Because of their past histories, some ethnic minorities are particularly sensitive to such possibilities.

But there are positive responses as well. Many anglophones find it legitimate that French be the dominant language in Quebec. These anglophones agree with the segmented view of Canada: French in Quebec, English elsewhere (with a few exceptions perhaps). They are prepared to make the transition if given some time and reasonable facilities for learning the language. In the case of companies there is a willingness to adopt French as the language of work if costs can be spread over a reasonable number of years and if the transactions with the rest of the country or continent are not disturbed.

At the individual level, one could argue that the flow of migration will become more selective in this particular respect. Anglophones who are prepared to accommodate will stay in Quebec or, if living elsewhere, will accept a transfer to Quebec, while those who do not want to live in a French environment will move out or stay away. At the organizational level, firms with interests in Quebec will attempt to negotiate a schedule for the transformation of their operations in order to accommodate the

legitimate claims of francophones and in this way avoid other kinds of costs (legal fees, social unrest in their plants and offices or in the community at large).

There is evidence that such accommodations are in fact taking place. Individuals learn French; many make sure their children will be bilingual. Some companies organize language courses for their employees. Moreover, in its program of francisation, the government has provided for negotiations with individual companies. This process has just begun, but according to a few company representatives and government officials, the process is taking off well and will proceed smoothly. One item of evidence suggesting that the process of francisation is well under way is the emergence in recent years of a number of consultant agencies and of voluntary associations to assist companies in the transition by providing related research, educational, administrative, and personnel management services.

Finally, there is the issue of the impact of the language policy on the long-term viability of the anglophone social institutions such as its educational system, hospitals, and other health organizations. To function at an adequate level, organizations need a sufficient population base. There may come a point at which the organization will either become mediocre or will not have the "critical mass" required to survive. Because of this, the organizations which depend on a population with specific cultural characteristics, such as schools, are particularly vulnerable. However, it is still too early to be able to detect any weakening trend among anglophone organizations. The sense of vulnerability, however, appears to be increasing in recent years.

What are the consequences of the language policy for francophones? Does it facilitate their upward mobility in the private sector? A large portion of the upward mobility of recent decades has been, as already mentioned, in the public sector. Will the policy open up avenues of mobility in the private one? Will the language policy help the occupational promotion of people of French origin or will the higher levels in organizations remain occupied by people whose main language is English but who have become bilingual? In other words, will we observe a transfer of organizational power as a result of the francisation of industry? Will positions of organizational control be transferred to people whose main language is French?

Usually, people do not easily abandon the power they have; they usually put up an appropriate amount of resistance. On such grounds, one should expect little change in the *ethnic* distribution of organizational power. However, it is possible to argue that the issue is not one of giving up power but of sharing it. More specifically, the issue is whether people of French origin will be admitted in the circles of power. Will

Anglo-Saxons more readily admit French Quebecois in the middle and senior management circles as a result of the language change? Will the abolition of the linguistic barrier eliminate the ethnic barrier as well? Another way of putting the question is to ask whether the elimination of the language barrier will allow the building of interpersonal networks based on trust between French and Anglo-Saxons or people of other origins. It is too early to tell whether or not this will occur.

Conclusion

By way of conclusion, a few questions can be raised concerning the impact of the language policies for the character of Canadian society as a whole. It seems that the effect of the Quebec language policy is in the direction of the coexistence of two parallel unilingualisms with a few exceptions such as the region of the federal capital and New Brunswick. But there is the policy of the federal government to consider in this connection. One premise of that policy is that the presence of viable communities of anglophones in Quebec and of francophones outside of Quebec is essential for the unity of the country. In recent decades, the elites in anglophone provincial governments seem to have accepted that premise and have accordingly begun to give some recognition to French and to provide some services in French. For instance, toward the end of the 1960s, several provinces began to improve the facilities for education in French. The speed at which the provincial governments can move is constrained by the small size of the francophone population in many provinces and by the resistance mentioned earlier on the part of anglophones of different ethnic origins.

It was seen that there are forces toward a greater linguistic homogeneity in each of the two main linguistic segments of the country. These forces are partly the result of past policies—when other provinces underwent a process of anglicization similar to the process of francisation now attempted in Quebec—and partly the result of industrialization and urbanization and of demographic factors. Whether the policies of the federal governments and of governments in anglophone provinces will be sufficient to alter the long-term trend toward two unilingualisms is impossible to tell at this point. When the dust settles, what appears may indeed be two unilingual communities each giving special status and services to its "official language" minorities; that is, two communities in which the language of the public domain is English and French, respectively, but in which the other language is encouraged and supported in the private (and semipublic) sphere.

Notes

1. It should be noted that it is more difficult to be fluently bilingual in professional and managerial occupations in comparison with low-skill ones. The linguistic competence required to be successful is much greater.

2. In a society with more than one language group, not doing anything about the status and use of the languages is a choice; it is itself a laissez-faire or nonintervention policy.

3. In using statistics about language groups, different classifications are sometimes used. Some use data by French, English, and other origins. Some use data by mother tongue which is defined by the census as the language learned in childhood and still understood. The classification adopted here is in terms of the language most often spoken at home.

4. These concepts are similar to those used by Van den Berghe (1969:67) to define a "plural society." See also Schermerhorn (1970).

5. National groups identify with a particular territory, have a history as a collectivity on that territory, and have an institutional system that allows them to act as a collectivity.

6. In 1974, 19 percent of 281,664 positions were defined as requiring both English and French, 60.2 percent as requiring English, 12.6 percent as requiring French, and 8.2 percent as requiring one or the other language (See Coulombe, 1977:265).

7. The importance of social networks for the distribution of organizational power in a society segmented along linguistic and regional lines is examined in Breton and Breton (forthcoming).

8. The specifications are as follows: The following children may receive instruction in English at the request of their father and mother:

   a. a child whose father or mother received his or her elementary instruction in English in Quebec;
   b. a child whose father or mother, domiciled in Quebec on the date of the coming into force of this act, received his or her elementary instruction in English outside Quebec;
   c. a child who, in his last year of school before the coming into force of this act, was lawfully receiving his instruction in English in Quebec in a public kindergarten class or in an elementary or secondary school;
   d. the younger brothers or sisters of a child described in paragraph c.

Also, English-speaking children coming from a province which has concluded a reciprocity agreement with Quebec and certain categories of persons in Quebec temporarily or their children.

9. In this regard, the language policies of the federal and provincial governments move in the same direction. Both are attempting to raise the status and the use of the French language. This generates a double frustration for many anglophones: While French is being "imposed" on them outside of Quebec, the Quebec government is "kicking their language out of that province." To many, this supports the view of a conspiracy on the part of francophones to take over the country.

10. In its first version, the bill (Bill 1) referred to the "francophonization" of work organizations. Because of the civil rights problems this raised, the bill was withdrawn and resubmitted (Bill 101) in terms of "francisation."

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SIGMUND DIAMOND*

Discussion of Barry and Breton Presentations

Professor Barry began with an attempt to make certain definitions and to clarify certain concepts. People who begin that way run a great risk. Erasmus once said: "Every definition is a disaster. Inquire if you must, but never define."

There is one point, early on in the list of definitions and illustrations, in which Professor Barry speaks of Poland after the First World War as an example of a monoethnic state. One wonders, in that case, what all the fighting was about in 1939 over the German minorities in south Poland and also in the Polish Corridor. There is also a statement about Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States, as examples of nonethnic states, states in which citizenship is a matter of residence rather than descent. Well, that citizenship is a matter of residence in the Soviet Union is true, but I wonder why it was that, when I was there a few years ago, everybody carrying an internal passport also had evidence of his nationality or ethnicity on it. Jews had passports indicating that they were Jews; Ukrainians had passports indicating that they were Ukrainians, etc.

There is also a statement that the only state that is strictly ethnic, in that it makes descent a condition of citizenship, is Israel. I assume by that he means you have to be a Jew to be a citizen of Israel. It is not so. Arabs are citizens of Israel. Jews are citizens of Israel. Christians are citizens of Israel. And so are Bedouins citizens of Israel. There is an important problem there, as in a great many other countries, of the particular relationship between citizenship and ethnicity or nationality, but ethnicity is not a condition of citizenship.

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Finally, with respect to the early discussion of concepts and definitions, there is a statement about the United States and Switzerland that to share a state with someone is, after all, merely to recognize a legal fact. Surely Swiss or Americans share more than that. What they may share, or what they do share, may be precisely nationality. But I wish he would be a little bit more precise about what American nationality is.

The question of what constitutes Americanness has long been a problem—not something upon which there has been agreement, but something upon which there has been fundamental disagreement. One does not have to go back into the far past to find that there were even, as we all know, legislative inquiries on American activities and un-American activities to determine what the essence of Americanness is. Let me give just a few examples, which can be drawn from a great many, that would illustrate the same point. Speaking to a group of Cleveland steelworkers during World War I, Captain J. C. Curran, of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, said to his immigrant audience: "In looking over this sea of faces I notice that quite a number of you come from lands beyond the sea. You are welcome in America, no matter what country you come from. But remember this much, as you have all the privileges of the native-born American, you have likewise the same obligations. . . . You are expected to fight by their side, and if you are not willing to do that, then damn you, go back to the country from whence you came."

During the great steel strike of 1919, a subsidiary of the United States Steel Corporation asked each employee of the company to sign a "Pledge of Patriotism for loyalty to our country, and to the company for which I work." A steelworker in that same company said, when the strike was broken and the workers had to go back to work, "Have you heard it? That great piece of rotten trickery that the employer is using? No man can be a loyal American worker unless he is a scab." These are quotations which don't prove a point; they simply illustrate it. The point they illustrate was neatly made by a magazine in the 1920s: "You cannot be against the capitalistic system and still for America; you cannot apologize for that system or feel ashamed of it and still be a good American. You cannot indeed be a good American in the sense of being loyal to American traditions, unless you are proud of the capitalistic system." The point I am trying to make is that the definition of what constitutes Americanness has not been something which has been laid down once for all in the Declaration of Independence, in the Bill of Rights, in the Constitution of the United States. It has been a changing definition, something which has been problematic, not only over time, but even at any given moment in time. I was reasonably sure that

would be one of the leitmotivs of the conference. After having heard the discussion this morning, it seems to me clearly that one of the aspects, one of the dimensions of our problem, is different perceptions of what it means to be American.

Fairly recently I began to read again that absolutely remarkable series of studies on citizenship that was carried out under the direction of Professor Charles Merriam at this University fifty years ago. It seems to me to be appropriate to read just a few things that were said in a couple of volumes in that series. I won't read very much of it, just enough to give you a flavor of the concern of some very great scholars of the late 1920s and early 1930s with the problem of language and education on the one hand and citizenship and public policy on the other.

This is from the volume on *Civic Training in Soviet Russia* by Samuel Harper, who was Professor of Russian History at this University: "Language has been utilized as a technique to evoke responses in several interesting respects." He's talking now about the Soviet Union, post-Czarist Russia. "The idea of the unity of the political community has been promoted by the fact that Russian as the official language of the Old Regime had reached out into all groups, supplementing the native tongue. Russian logically became the official language of the Soviet Union also; it is sometimes characterized as 'the language of the Revolution.' At the same time the local use of the language of each national minority is actively promoted. General cultural and political consciousness is thus developed through the wide and official use of the native tongue."

Merriam himself wrote the final summary volume, which brought together, presumably, all of the findings, together with his ruminations, of the separate volumes dealing with the United States, England, Switzerland, the Soviet Union, Italy, France, the Duk Duk, and a number of other peoples and places. He said, "The role of language and literature in shaping group cohesiveness and loyalty has long been recognized. It is more effective in molding the political group than any other with the exception of the cultural group termed the 'nationality' or 'nation.' It carries a double appeal, to the understanding and to the emotions as well. A common language is a medium for the interchange of ideas in their many finer nuances, and makes possible a discussion of common interests and policies. At the same time the familiar sound of one's own language contrasted with the barbarity of all other tongues constitutes a bond of union."

Again, "One of the first symbols of the emancipation of a group is the restoration of its language to a position of priority. Linguistic differences are found in the United States, but they are the survivals of immigrant groups, and the language scarcely endures to the second

generation. There is perhaps no country in the world so nearly unilingual as the United States."

The truth of any of these statements is not something that I am particularly interested in; I am interested in showing the way in which these scholars thought about the problem. "The presence of a common language," I am still quoting Merriam, "is still one of the most common agencies in the growth of a cultural community, and likewise, community of language is a factor of inestimable value to political unity. . . . Of course, a system of education in bilingual form might reduce the distinctive and isolating nature of any single tongue. There are signs of such a development, more promising than are the indicia of a new language." The signs of the new development that he was speaking of then was a reference to Ogden's vocabulary of six hundred words in basic English.

"In the older states, such as Britain and France, it is clear that the linguistic differences are on the wane, as they are slowly elided in the great process of assimilation, which goes steadily forward. In newer states, the linguistic factor tends to exert a far more powerful influence than in the older, and often becomes a chief rallying point for national culture."

Then, summarizing what he calls the general trends in civic education, "An examination of the various techniques employed in civic training indicates that fundamental and far-reaching changes are likely to be made in the future by such experimenters as are concerned with the reorganization of the process of producing citizens. . . . The newer techniques of civic education are the use of the press, the political parties, the special patriotic organizations, and, far more important, the employment of the formal school system of the political community for the development of the political community.

"On the whole, the school emerges as the dominant figure in the new process of civic education, and in all probability, will continue to hold this position for some time to come, and to strengthen its influence with the adoption of more scientific methods of analysis and instruction. Here will center the struggle, scientific and political, for the control of social and political behavior, at one time or another, centering around the family, the army, the church. The state-builder of the future will address himself to this strategic point in the organization of political interest, allegiance and ideals. To be sure, the school cannot be effective unless it is integrated with the life of the community, and supported by social morale and a sense of political and social values outside the educational institution. But assuming that the school and society are not too far apart in their codes of behavior, the educational organization under such circumstances will wield enormous power over the on-

coming generation in the formation of interests, drives, attitudes and skills. . . ."

Now clearly, for Merriam and for the analysts who agreed with him, or who looked at problems in similar ways, language policy and the schools in general were important primarily as variables or agencies affecting the cohesiveness of the state. That the schools still affect the cohesiveness of the state is, I think, perfectly obvious. But I think it is probably also pretty obvious that the value of the cohesiveness of the state is not as great any longer to large numbers of people as it was to Charles Merriam and the people of his generation.

To exert a claim against the state, or to use some agency of the state in order to exert a claim against some other group within the state, has become for large numbers of people in this country and in other countries at least as important as, if not more important than, to enhance the unity of the state. Hence, for that reason among others, bilingualism need not be seen (as Merriam would have seen it) as something which might be detrimental to the unity of the state, and therefore to that extent, to be looked at with suspicion. If you don't care very much for the unity of the state, if something is more important to you (something to do with exercising a claim against the state which you feel has not treated you as well as you deserve to be treated up to this point), or if you see an opportunity to use an agency of the state to increase your degree of power against some other group within the society, then your attitude toward the teaching of languages and of what languages and, indeed, toward the whole school system will be different from what it was for Merriam and his associates.

A language policy, like any other kind of policy, is a prescription about what needs to be changed. But like any prescription about what needs to be changed, it also implies a diagnosis of the nature of the illness.

Let me give just two illustrations of what I mean when I speak about a policy being a prescription for the future based upon some diagnosis of past and present illness—two examples which do indeed have to do with language though not taken from the history of the United States. The first one interests me particularly not only because of the material that it deals with but also because it is an illustration of the persistence of language even when there is not a policy to encourage its persistence. All during the Middle Ages, England was what the great historian Marc Block calls hierarchically bilingual, that is, two languages were spoken, French and Anglo-Saxon: the upper classes spoke French and the lower classes spoke Anglo-Saxon. All during that period, and even as late as the seventeenth century, there was a body of ideas in England that together are called the Norman Yoke.

Now the Norman Yoke was at one and the same time an interpretation of history and a program for what ought to be done in the future. It was a prediction of the future as well as a reading of the past. The language in which it circulated was Anglo-Saxon, the language of the lower class. The bundle of ideas that altogether made up the notion of the Norman Yoke was that England once had been a free country in which only Englishmen had lived, but now it was a conquered country. The foreign French had conquered it. And they had imposed not only their traditions and their law but their language; they were the rulers. But some day the people would throw them out and would once again have the rights of free-born Englishmen. This was, as I say, an attitude, a vision, which at one and the same time encompassed an interpretation of the past and a galvanic call for action for the future. It is a body of ideas expressed in one of the two languages which coexisted in England at the time. It survived, not as a result of encouragement, not as the result of any kind of policy—there wasn't a governmental school system—but out of the will of its believers.

The other example that I want to mention to you about policy and language has to do with Canada. In the seventeenth century, before the English were there and when Canada was French, the French authorities adopted a policy toward the Indians which they called the policy of "Francisation," the "Frenchification" of the Indians. The policy of "Francisation" included three or four major points. One of them was that the Indians, instead of roaming, hunting, and fishing, should be fixed on the land and converted into, essentially, an agricultural labor force.

Number two, they should wear French clothes. Number three, they should be converted to Catholicism. And number four, they should be forced to learn French. It would be very difficult in reading the seventeenth century documents dealing with this policy to decide which of the last two—in the eyes of the French authorities—was the more important: conversion to Catholicism or the requirement that the Indians learn French. Incidentally, if you go now to the great cathedral of Chartres, you will find some offerings made of wampum given by the Abenaki and Huron Indians to the cathedral. The documents dealing with these offerings are written in French and in Latin. The Indians learned the lesson very well.

By the nineteenth century, the French were a conquered people, and a minority population in all of Canada. By this time, they would, I think, have been very well satisfied with bilingualism in the sense of allowing French to be an official language in Canada, or even in Quebec. But now in Quebec the situation has gone beyond that. French once more is to be, or at least there are strong indications that it is to be, the only

language in Quebec. Is there now to be a return to the process of what in the seventeenth century was called "Francisation?" Are they going to "Frenchify" the Anglos the way the Indians were Frenchified?

Now there is a connection, I think. Language policy does have a political component, and a very important one; that was perfectly evident in what was said here this morning. But it also has, it seems to me, a technical component. I don't know anything about this, but I would like to hear something said (if we know anything about it) about whether education in the bilingual fashion improves the performance of students in other respects. That is what I mean by the technical, educational aspect of it rather than the political. I think both of them need to be talked about, but I think it is very important that they be kept separate. Not that one is more important than the other but that, unless they are kept separate, I think the goals—both sets of goals, the educational as well as the political—are in jeopardy.

If we want to talk about, and I hope we will continue to talk about, the political character, the political context, the political importance of bilingual education, then I think we might well spend a good bit of our time on what are the political tactics that are most likely to maximize the possibility of obtaining these goals. Since public policy is an issue here and since we know that fear plays a very important role in the determination and discussion of public policy, I would hope very much that those of us who would like to see something done along the lines of bilingual education could spend more time perhaps than we have up to now discussing how fears might be allayed.

Professor Breton's paper seemed to me a model of what a paper on an occasion like this ought to be. It took a problem, laid it out, and, informed by a great deal of detailed knowledge of the situation, looked at it very, very broadly. He made only one mistake. He whetted my appetite to know something more about this subject, and so I have four questions that I would like to ask. These are in no way criticisms; I simply want to know more.

I would like to know, for example, what his assessment would be of the possibility of working out a peaceable solution to the problem that arises from the fact that there are fundamental differences between the national, or the federal, proposed solution and the Quebec solution. That is, will the continued existence of a Quebec situation and program that is different from the national make it more difficult to solve the problem nationally?

The second, again with respect to the problem of context: What does he think would be the effect on the achievement of some kind of peaceful solution of the fact that, in the year 1978 and for some time now, the situation with respect to the French language and French culture in

Canada is assimilated into a liberation struggle which is international? To what extent will the continuation of that struggle on the international stage feed the local Canadian version of it?

A third question, or a third point that I would like to get more information about, is this: there is a difference between a language policy which aims at cultural supremacy and a language policy which aims at recognition of a culture. It seems to me that the point has probably been reached with respect to policy in Canada that what is really involved is cultural supremacy and not simply cultural recognition.

A final question: Professor Breton had a good many things to say about demographic aspects of the problem. And this morning, in some of the papers, there was also some discussion about the demographic aspects of the problem of the Spanish language in the United States. This perhaps might seem like a far-fetched question, but I have special reasons for being interested. Some of my students and I have been interested in the question of what might be called: "When is a problem?" How do you know you have a social problem? When do you become aware of it? What do you do about it? And what are the forms in which it first appears? And so I would like to ask Professor Breton what connections he sees as an analyst, and what connections, if any, are made by the protagonists in the situation (in this case, the French Canadian separatists) between their language policy and policy with respect to, let us say, abortion and birth control?

Now a special reason I have for asking that is that in the United States, as you probably know, up until about the 1830s abortion was not a crime. Under the common law, abortion—the killing of the fetus within the first three months—was perfectly permissible. Abortion became a crime in the United States when a number of states began to pass statutes making it illegal. And presumably this was done for all kinds of medical reasons. Abortion was presented at the time as a medical problem.

There is a very good reason to believe that, though indeed there were medical aspects to it, one of the problems which concerned the doctors who were very much behind the "medicalization" of abortion was that Catholics were having many more children than Protestants, and that, if abortion were permitted, that population imbalance would become even greater. And so I would like to know on what basis, if in any way, is the population-control question related to the language question in Canada? The question is particularly important because, in the current period, the leadership in the struggle for cultural autonomy in Canada is no longer, as it was in the nineteenth century and in the early part of this century, the monopoly of the church. Separatism and the nationalist movement are now secular rather than clerical. And not only are

they secular rather than clerical but the movement runs from the center to the left—and sometimes to the very far left. Now, does this create any kinds of problems within the movement?

This morning, I spoke of an episode about French language policy in the seventeenth century which seemed to arouse a certain amount of interest. I have another one about the same period. It has to do with the relation between language policy and population policy, particularly with birth control. And I mention this story to indicate that the connection that I'm making between the two is not a connection in my mind only, or in the minds of other analysts, but it was also in the minds of the people involved in the program.

In the middle of the seventeenth century, the great civilian intendent of Canada, Jean Talon, the greatest civil authority that the French had in Canada all during their period of domination, was confronted with a very important task. The greatest single need of the French authorities in Canada was to increase population. He wrote an absolutely extraordinary report on the subject, to no less an authority than the great minister Colbert himself. He investigated every aspect of what could be done to increase population in Canada. Among other things that he recommended was an increase in intermarriage between the Indians and the French. In order to make this possible, he recommended not only all of the things I spoke about this morning under the general category of Francisation, but he also recommended that the Indians be given French citizenship so that they would have the legal rights of the French.

And then he said that he had undertaken an exhaustive investigation of the child-rearing habits of the Indians and had found that Indian women did not have as many children as they otherwise would have had because they nursed them too long. What he did not know was what many people now know—that prolonged breast-feeding is a folk device for preventing conception. But having made the discovery that they were not having as many children as possible because they nursed their children too long, he said, disposing of the whole problem: "This can be corrected by a police regulation."

Now there is a very revealing and a very important problem involved in that statement. It is evidence of the belief that every social problem is accessible to solution by rational analysis. And it also assumes that no matter what the rational analysis tells you the right solution ought to be, a regulation will suffice. Those who are concerned about problems of public policy have to be concerned, it seems to me, that there are almost always unanticipated consequences with respect to the policies that we propound. It seems like a far cry from a language policy to being concerned with abortion and birth control, but they may, never-

theless, be related. And if they should be related, what are the unanticipated consequences of trying to handle the second problem and the successful prosecution of the program that you want to enact with respect to language?

I would like to go back to something that was said this morning because it has been a motif of the entire discussion. I would like to read a quotation from a book published in 1912. A young girl had come to the United States from Poland, and she was subjected to much of the patriotic excesses we have heard about: "This George Washington, who died long before I was born, was like a king in greatness, and he and I were Fellow Citizens. . . . It thrilled me to realize what sudden greatness had fallen on me, and at the same time it sobered me, as with a sense of responsibility, I strove to conduct myself as befitted a Fellow Citizen. . . . What more could America give a child? Ah, much more. As I read how the patriots"—this, remember, is a Polish girl—"planned the Revolution, and the women gave their sons to die in battle, and the rejoicing people set up the Republic, it dawned on me gradually what was meant by my country. The people all doing noble things, and striving for them together, defying their oppressors, giving their lives for each other—all that it was that made my country. . . . The Country was for all the Citizens, and I was a Citizen."

A few years ago a book by a woman named Rosa Cavalleri was published. She was a cleaning woman, an Italian immigrant cleaning woman in Chicago and she had dictated the book to somebody. It deals with an earlier period but was published a few years ago. She told the person who was interviewing her that she had only one more wish before she died. She was an old lady. "I'd love to go in Italia again before I die," she said. "Now I speak English good like an American I could go anywhere—where millionaires go and high people. I would look the high people in the face and ask them what questions I'd like to know. . . . I would go to Bugiarno [where she came from] and see the people and talk to the bosses in the silk factory. . . . I wouldn't be afraid. They wouldn't dare hurt me now I come from America. . . . That is what I learned in America: not to be afraid."

Well, clearly, the things which were of value to Mary Antin (the young Polish immigrant) and to Rosa Cavalleri are different from what is of value to many of you. I'm not saying that one is right and the others are wrong. Not at all. The values are quite different. It is also obvious that a policy which would be based upon one of these sets of values would be very different in content and consequences from a policy that would be based upon the other set of values. That is also obvious, but perhaps worth pointing out; for I wonder what reason we would have for believing that that set of values, on the basis of which

we are being asked to make a policy now, is any more likely to endure than the other set of values? Might there not be some danger in tying a program, any program at all, concerning bilingualism to any set of values which is so closely tied to the political conditions of the immediate present?

NOEL EPSTEIN*

Bilingual Education in the United States: The "Either/Or" Mistake

I

A good deal of American social policy is based on what I have called the Columbus Complex. This is the urge to sail off in a new direction in the belief that, at some point, we are bound to bump into *something*. While the exploring spirit is of course always to be encouraged, troubles arise when we are unsure of where we are headed or why. Such is the problem we have been facing in the United States in the area of bilingual and bicultural education.

That we have set full sail in this area there can be little doubt. National legislation, chiefly the Bilingual Education Act dating from 1968, has provided more than three-quarters of a billion dollars so far for bilingual and bicultural instruction; in the 1979 fiscal year this voluntary program funded more than 575 projects involving Spanish and sixty-seven other languages and dialects, ranging from Arabic, Cherokee, Chinese, French, Greek, Italian, Japanese, and Korean to Navajo, Polish, Portuguese, Punjabi, Russian, Tagalog, Yiddish, and Yup'ik.

Atop of this we have had both judicial and regulatory actions. In *Lau* v. *Nichols*, the Supreme Court in 1974 issued a ruling which bilingual-bicultural advocates have been relying on heavily, and the Health, Education and Welfare Department's Office for Civil Rights has told more than 300 school districts across the nation that they must begin bilingual-bicultural classes or face a potential loss of their federal school aid. These federal actions, moreover, have helped trigger additional bilingual education laws or spending in at least twenty-one

*The Washington Post.

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states and the District of Columbia; in the 1975–76 school year alone, for example, those jurisdictions spent nearly $70 million of their own on bilingual classes.

But despite all this, despite years of declarations that bilingual and bicultural education are the answer, many people have been scratching their heads and asking: But what was the question? Where are we headed?

The fact is that we have been struggling to go in different directions at the same time. Essentially, on one side of this struggle are those who view bilingual-bicultural education as a transitional teaching device, hopefully leading to an improved education in English for low-achieving pupils who have little or no command of the primary language of 96 percent of our population. On the other side are bilingual-bicultural advocates who insist that equal importance must be given to maintaining the native languages and cultures of these students, a position that is central to their broader vision of how language and cultural "pluralism" should be redefined in America.

In both cases, however, the politics and emotions of the issue have resulted in misleading ideas and claims about research evidence, about legal requirements, about loosely used terms such as the "melting pot" and "cultural diversity," and about other important aspects of this policy. We have often lost sight, for example, of one of the most basic questions for a drive fueled chiefly by Washington: What is the federal role in the classroom, and particularly in determining what should be taught in such sensitive areas as language and history?

But one thing, I think, is clear, and it is this that I would like to stress: it is a terrible mistake to think that Washington or the states or local school systems must make the "either/or" choices that so many people imagine. There is no need to choose between this or that method of helping language minority students learn English and subject matter. Equally important, if not more, there is no need to choose between helping these pupils into English classrooms or maintaining their native tongues. There is a way, I believe, in which both of these aims can and should be accomplished—and without giving cause for the kind of inflammatory remarks we have heard more than once from both sides on these issues.

But if this is to be accomplished, we will have to reach beyond the politics of bilingual education, at least for a while. We will have to define the questions involved more calmly and carefully. That would be no small feat, given the volatility of the issue, and some may consider the suggestion naive. But if we are to avoid needless misunderstandings and antagonisms, if we are to concentrate on how to best help all the children involved, we have no choice but to try.

II

In strictly educational terms, the evidence suggests that many people have been asking misleading questions since the Bilingual Education Act was created in January 1968 as Title VII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. That was a small, exploratory measure aimed at "limited English-speaking" pupils who were falling badly behind in school or dropping out altogether.

There has never been a reliable count of "limited English-speaking" students in this country. The law, moreover, was revised in 1978 to cover pupils with little or no ability to read, write, or understand English as well as those with a limited ability to speak it. This is to recognize that those who speak another language are often not literate in it. Spanish, for example, is more a spoken than a written or read language in this country, and many Spanish speakers are in fact more literate in English, and even speak better in English, than in their native tongue. A striking 1979 study in California by Bloomsbury West, Inc., for example, found that 84 percent of students identified as needing bilingual education in a school district in Santa Clara County—and about half of those in other school districts in Los Angeles, Santa Barbara, and Riverside counties—actually spoke better in English than in their native language. Similarly, in one Colorado court case, *Otero* v. *Mesa County Valley School District No. 51*, a federal district court judge held that the Chicano students involved were generally not deficient in English and that those who were also had a deficiency in Spanish.

At any rate, the latest Office of Education estimate, based on the old and loose "limited English-speaking" definition, indicates that up to 3.6 million pupils might be covered by the bilingual act. By far the largest number, a roughly estimated 2.1 million, or nearly 70 percent, speak varieties of Spanish, the most widely used non-English language in the United States. A tragically high number of such students have been encountering severe problems in school. More than 30 percent of pupils from Spanish-speaking homes wind up two years behind their age group by the end of high school—if they go that far. Many do not. About 45 percent of Spanish speakers between the ages of fourteen and twenty-five are dropouts.

It was because of these students, those falling behind or dropping out, that the federal government became involved in bilingual education. The assumption was that the language barrier was the students' chief problem. As the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare put it, these children were "educationally disadvantaged because of their inability to speak English."

The 1968 act called for the development of "research projects, pilot

projects," curricula, teachers, and aides to demonstrate the best ways to help these students. Considerable leeway was given in what could be tried, including establishing closer relations between home and school, developing adult education projects, and imparting to the children a knowledge of the history and culture associated with their primary language (essentially the intent of "bicultural" instruction). But the emphasis, as the name of the act made clear, was on language, and this is what the Office of Education concentrated on.

It pinned its hopes on a technique that had long been tried elsewhere and that had begun to draw attention in this country in the 1960s: trying to help the students keep up with math, reading, and other subjects in their native tongues while they were also being taught enough English to transfer to regular classrooms.

Thus far the hopes have not been fulfilled. After more than a decade, the Title VII program has not demonstrated whether such instruction makes much difference in the students' learning of subject matter, in their acquisition of English, or in their attitudes toward school. Most bilingual education supporters have acknowledged this. Dr. Jose A. Cardenas, a leading adviser to HEW, to the courts, and to others on this issue, has remarked: "I think that you cannot find proof at this time about the success of bilingual education." Dr. John C. Molina, former head of the Office of Bilingual Education, which administers the Title VII program, has said: "We have wasted a lot of time, and we've got to have some answers. We must know that bilingual education does indeed provide equal educational opportunity."

A much-disputed study of more than thirty Title VII programs, conducted for the Office of Education by the American Institutes for Research, has left matters as uncertain as ever. Bilingual education advocates have vigorously challenged the study's methodology and its conclusions, particularly its findings that in English language arts students in Title VII projects were actually doing worse than comparison students of Hispanic descent in regular classrooms and that Title VII students' attitudes toward school were scarcely different from those of non-Title VII students (bilingual-bicultural advocates have relied heavily on their belief that such instruction would have important psychological benefits, making students feel more accepted at school).

But regardless of the dispute over that study, the point is that the bilingual program created as a demonstration effort has certainly not demonstrated what it intended. As the General Accounting Office found in an earlier and more limited study, the government "has made little progress in achieving the program's goal of identifying effective educational approaches, training bilingual education teachers, and developing suitable materials."

All this, it must be emphasized, does not mean that the transitional bilingual technique can be judged a failure. The meager results so far may reflect in part the fact that bilingual programs have been poorly implemented, that qualified teachers and adequate curricula have indeed been in exceedingly short supply, and that little attention has been paid to local project evaluations and even less to seriously controlled research on individual projects.

But transitional bilingual education is facing a more fundamental problem than poor implementation. It is beset by the fact that there has never been reason to believe that it could "solve" these students' difficulties. Contrary to popular assumptions, the evidence indicates that the language barrier is not necessarily the chief source of the pupils' problems to begin with, that too great a burden is being placed on language instruction.

Dr. Joshua A. Fishman, a sociolinguist who is among the most forceful advocates of bilingual education, notes that the transitional technique has been used for centuries, "most particularly in Europe since the Reformation, wherever the expansion of educational opportunity (or obligation) was stymied by the fact that the official language of education was not always the mother tongue of students new to the educational system." While there certainly have been circumstances in this country as elsewhere where the claimed benefits have been supported, the available research, he states, indicates that "on the whole, bilingual education is too frail a device, in and of itself, to significantly alter the learning experiences of the minority-mother-tongue-poor in general or their majority-language-learning-success in particular."

The research that has been available, much of it from abroad, is fragmentary, uncoordinated, in many instances of poor quality and, importantly, reflects different political and social contexts in different nations and settings. One 1975 review of the research by Patricia Lee Engle, for example, asked precisely the questions American policymakers have been asking: "Will a child learn to read more rapidly in his second language if he is first taught to read in his primary language?" And "Will the child achieve greater general knowledge of other subject matter areas in his second language if he is taught these subjects first in his native language?"

She examined twenty-four studies done in nations ranging from the Philippines to Mexico, Uganda to the United States, South Africa to Ireland. But the studies went both ways, some finding that students learned better if first taught in their native tongues, others that they did better if first taught in a second language. "The twenty-four reports summarized varied in every conceivable way, and most provided no substantial answers to which approach is better," she concluded.

Probably the most influential and carefully done second-language-learning study, and one of value to American education, was conducted at the St. Lambert School in Montreal in the context of Canada's bitter battle between its French-speaking minority and its English-speaking majority. This experiment was initiated by middle-class, English-speaking parents eager to improve relations with French speakers. Beginning in kindergarten, their children were taught subject matter entirely in French, a language they initially did not know at all, though the students at first could ask questions of the teacher in English. English also was introduced later as a separate subject.

The results were remarkable. The English-speaking students learned as well in French as their English-speaking peers learned in English, and they also became near-native speakers of French. Moreover, they learned the English language, their native tongue, as well as those being taught in English. This immersion-bilingual approach was duplicated in three other programs involving working-class, English-speaking students in the Montreal area, producing basically the same results, and as of May 1976, more than fifty similar programs had sprouted across Canada. In this country, the technique is being used in a handful of communities, including San Diego and Culver City, California, and Silver Spring, Maryland, where English speakers are learning subject matter in other languages.

What the history of bilingual education and the immersion bilingual and other studies have made clear is that the language barrier per se cannot account for the school difficulties of children with little or no command of English. Numerous researchers have made this point, though their comments imply different degrees of importance attached to the language factor. Development Associates, Inc., a Mexican-American and Puerto Rican consulting firm, says, "Language, it seems, is not in and of itself sufficient explanation for the lower achievement of the Spanish-cultured students." Dr. Christina Bratt Paulston of the University of Pittsburgh aptly states, "The only conclusion must be that we ask the wrong questions and that language is not the casual variable in successful school achievement."

What are the other questions to be asked, the other factors involved? One obvious answer is that students with limited ability in English usually are also poor and come to school with the same well-documented disadvantages as poor English-speakers do. They will have as difficult a time learning, say, Spanish and in Spanish as poor English speakers will have learning English and in English. Dr. Paulston is among those who have stressed socioeconomic causes, stating that "social class is the one overruling factor" in the studies she has examined.

A striking illustration of the class effect comes from a Miami bilin-

gual effort that once drew considerable attention. When that program at the Coral Way Elementary School began in 1963, about half the students were children of middle-class Cubans who had fled from Castro, and the other half were middle-class whites. Both groups received half a day's instruction in Spanish and half a day in English, and the effort was widely acclaimed. The middle-class students from both groups, however, have since left the school neighborhood, and the Coral Way population is now made up overwhelmingly of children from poor Latino families. The Coral Way principal confirms the not surprising fact that student achievement has declined in the process, stating: "We have maintained a comparable position with nearby monolingual schools [teaching only in English] with about the same percentages of Latin students from roughly similar socioeconomic levels."

Beyond the class effect are additional social and psychological factors. One is the appalling discrimination and humiliation that often have been heaped on such students. This has been especially true of Chicano children in the Southwest, who were long segregated in "Mexican schools" or "Mexican rooms" and punished for speaking Spanish anywhere around school. As late as 1970, Charles E. Silberman reported: "In a South Texas school, children are forced to kneel in the playground and beg forgiveness if they are caught talking to each other in Spanish; some teachers require students using the forbidden language to kneel before the entire class." It may help to understand the anger of many Hispanic-American leaders of the bilingual movement today if we realize that a good number of them suffered from such cruel treatment as children.

In the early 1970s, the United States Civil Rights Commission also uncovered another form of discrimination. Mexican-American students, it discovered, were receiving less praise and encouragement in class than their white, English-speaking classmates. But in this instance it was chiefly Chicano teachers who were discriminating against Chicano children, the commission found, and it suggested that "Mexican-American teachers, as well as Anglo teachers, need training in dealing with the two groups."

There is no doubt that more sensitive teachers, of whatever background, can make a difference. Development Associates has even speculated that "It may be that better prepared and more sensitive teachers who do not have low expectations and negative stereotyped views of the children they serve may produce results better than or equal to those produced by bilingual-bicultural education programs."

It has, in short, become widely accepted that poverty and discrimination are powerful deterrents to the learning of children who also have a limited ability with the dominant language of a society. The United

States Civil Rights Commission, in a report which argues for bilingual education, nonetheless acknowledges: "When discrimination and negative socioeconomic conditions do not exist, children are more likely to show no linguistic or cognitive deficit when being instructed in the medium of a second language."

Another factor that must be understood is the psychological aspect of second-language learning. The immersion-bilingual programs in Canada and the United States, it will be remembered, have been for speakers of the dominant language, in these cases English. English has been the language of the rest of the school, of the community, and of the nation. The thrust of these efforts essentially has been similar to that of traditional foreign language programs—to give the students access to other worlds, to add richness and diversity to their lives.

Language minority children who are forced to learn in the language of the majority society and to adapt to a new way of life obviously face a much different and more difficult situation. This emotional experience can be hard for both children and adults, even if young children do appear to have a remarkable facility to adapt to new languages and cultures. The need is for sensitive treatment by teachers, though often the problem is other children, not uncommonly from the same ethnic group but already speakers of the majority tongue, who ridicule the new student.

The strictly educational question, then, is not whether transitional bilingual-bicultural education can "solve" the students' problems; there is little reason to believe it can. Nor must we make an "either/or" choice between different methods. The question is, Which approach can provide the most help for which students under which circumstances? This suggests that serious and sensitive *comparative* research needs to be done with the transitional approach, with the immersion-bilingual approach, and perhaps with other approaches.

The problem is that bilingual-bicultural advocates tend to express strong opposition to including any test of the immersion-bilingual approach despite the promise it holds for a good number of children, especially those from more fortunate socioeconomic backgrounds. They generally misunderstand this approach, seeing it as a way to "wipe out" the native language. That is not the case, and I, for one, would certainly not like to see it become the case.

III

All this raises questions about the separate Office for Civil Rights (OCR) policy telling 334 school districts that they must begin transitional bilingual-bicultural classes or face a potential loss of all their federal school aid. Not only is there no reliable evidence about how to

best help students with little or no ability in English—nor any reason to believe that there is one best way—but there also is no national legal requirement for schools to provide bilingual or bicultural education.

OCR's position stems from a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 barring nation-origin discrimination by those receiving federal funds. In May 1970, OCR issued a memorandum defining language as basic to national origin and requiring schools to take "affirmative steps" to correct the English language deficiency of many children in order to provide them with equal educational opportunity. Nearly four years later, the Supreme Court upheld OCR's interpretation in the *Lau* v. *Nichols* case involving Chinese-speaking students in San Francisco. A unanimous Court held that "there is no equality of treatment merely by providing students with the same facilities, textbooks, teachers, and curriculum" since "those who do not understand English are certain to find their classroom experiences wholly incomprehensible and in no way meaningful." *Something* additional had to be done.

But the court neither required bilingual education as the remedy nor favored it over other approaches, and its ruling did not deal at all with bicultural instruction. Courts in general understandably have been wary of becoming involved in curriculum issues, and the Supreme Court, which was not asked to supply any solutions in this case, left the remedy to the local school district. It stated: "Teaching English to the students of Chinese ancestry is one choice. Giving instruction to this group in Chinese is another. There may be others."

After the *Lau* decision, however, OCR assembled a task force which turned out to be composed of bilingual-bicultural supporters. The members drew up what are known as the "Lau Remedies," which were issued in the summer of 1975. These "remedies"—they are neither regulations nor law—declare that if school districts found in violation of *Lau* have twenty or more students from any non-English language group, they must provide transitional bilingual-bicultural education to all elementary school children who primarily speak the native tongue. In addition, the task force said, similar instruction must be given to all intermediate-level pupils who do not speak English. Ignoring the Supreme Court, the task force asserted that special instruction in English was "not appropriate" by itself for children in either category.

There are many problems with these "remedies," educationally as well as legally. Not the least is the fact that they seek to identify students with what the Court called "linguistic deficiencies" in English by relying on which language the students chiefly speak. In fact, they prescribe a complicated procedure calling for school officials to listen in on student conversations in the cafeteria or the hallways to help determine language dominance.

But the question raised by *Lau* is not which language students speak on different occasions or whether they speak another language more often than English. As Dr. Gary Orfield, a prominent civil rights advocate, states, "The basis for the *Lau* right vanishes once a student can function effectively in the normal English curriculum" regardless of whether the student also speaks another language. What *Lau* appears to call for, first and foremost, is a test of English abilities to discover if there are "deficiencies" there. If there are, a test of the native language would logically be in order to determine which language the pupil is better equipped to learn in.

The *Lau* task force members, also supporters of bicultural instruction, prescribed in general terms what should be done in this area as well: "Required courses (example: American history) must not be designed to exclude pertinent minority developments which have contributed to or influenced such subjects." They did not say who would decide which developments contributed to or influenced American history, a question on which historians, needless to say, do not always agree. The implication was that OCR would make these judgments or, in any court action intended to enforce the "remedies," that judges would become the community's historians.

In April 1976, OCR recognized that, in fact, it had no direct authority to require schools to provide bilingual or bicultural instruction, and it reminded its own regional enforcement offices that the "Lau Remedies" were "guidelines only." But there was a catch. Affected school systems which did not choose to begin bilingual-bicultural classes would have to prove to OCR that whatever they proposed to do would be "effective to cure the violation." Dr. Paul McRill, another bilingual-bicultural advocate and former coordinator of bilingual programs for the Seattle, Washington, school system, asks the obvious question: "How can you prove something is equally as good as something else which nobody has proved the worth of?"

If the national government has spent more than three-quarters of a billion dollars without demonstrating the effectiveness of transitional bilingual-bicultural education, it seems fair to wonder how Washington can ask school districts to prove that something else would be as effective. As often happens in civil rights cases, the issue is really decided by which side must prove the unprovable. Unless school systems can shift the burden of proof back to the government, the "Lau Remedies" are much more than "guidelines only."

What is particularly troubling here is not only that the government cannot say with confidence how best to help these students but that it is also presuming to speak for their parents on matters in which the parents frequently disagree with each other. There is a widespread

popular impression that ethnic, language, or racial groups are generally united bodies, but few ideas could be farther from reality. Dr. John W. Oller, Jr., a University of New Mexico linguist, observes that there "... are probably as many differences within cultures as there are across cultures." Or, as social historian John Higham puts it, "Pluralism encourages the ... illusion that ethnic groups typically have a high degree of internal solidarity. Actually, many of them are unstable federations of local or tribal collectivities which attain only temporary unity in the face of a common enemy."

The cultural, political, economic, religious, and social differences within groups—and the widely varying degrees of ethnic attachments among group members—create exceedingly sensitive questions for government policies in this area. A dramatic illustration of this point where bilingual education is concerned comes from Chicago, where a voluntary, state-funded program triggered a bitter battle in the Greek-American community. Greek-American parents opposing the bilingual program in the Lincoln Square neighborhood boycotted the school involved—the Lyman A. Budlong Elementary School—for four days in 1973. Police had to break up a conflict among Greek-American parents at a school council meeting. Some Greek-American parents ended up moving from the neighborhood.

"The strain became so tremendous that former friends and acquaintances found that getting together was uncomfortable and often abrasive," reports Martha S. Alexakos in the draft of a doctoral thesis done at this University. "People tended to greet each other with stony silence or open insults, and in some cases children of former friends no longer played with each other."

In other words, what is cultural "pluralism" to some is ethnic "conformity" to others—a drive to help ethnic leaders bring about more conformity among very different individual group members. Harvard sociologist Orlando Patterson, for example, has attacked our general ethnic resurgence as "un-American"—not because it poses a threat to national unity but because of "its preference for conformity over individualism."

The question raised for OCR policy, then, becomes clear: if the agency cannot say with confidence how to best help students who have little or no command of English, and if parents disagree with each other on this issue, why can't it require school systems to offer a variety of methods and allow the parents to choose from among them? Why must it, too, attempt to make unnecessary "either/or" decisions? OCR has been promising for several years now to propose actual *Lau* regulations, and we may know more about its policies in 1980.

There is an important irony in all this: bilingual education leaders

tend to dislike the very transitional bilingual-bicultural programs that have sprung up in the wake of their drive. They oppose the idea of using native languages only temporarily as bridges into English instruction. Dr. Josue M. Gonzales, expressing the prevailing sentiment of the movement, has complained that this approach "helps maintain the outdated 'melting pot' syndrome which discourages cultural pluralism in American society." He, like most other bilingual-bicultural advocates, wants to continue teaching the students partly in their native languages and about their own ethnic groups after they become fluent in English. If policy judgments are to be made in this area, it is essential first to understand what is meant by the "melting pot" and "cultural pluralism," terms which can be used to fit almost anything you might want them to.

If the "melting pot" is intended to mean pouring all Americans into the same mold, creating a look-alike, "homogenized" society, it is accepted by many that this has not occurred and is not likely to occur. Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan stressed this fifteen years ago: "The point about the melting pot is that it did not happen. . . . The fact is that in every generation throughout the history of the American republic, the merging of the various streams of population differentiated from one another by origin, religion, and outlook has seemed to lie just ahead—a generation, perhaps, in the future."

If anything, of course, we have been in the midst of an ethnic resurgence, reflected in books, in ethnic airline ads urging trips back to nations of origin, in ethnic magazines, ethnic television shows, ethnic conferences. Many complex reasons can be offered for this search for identity, roots, and purpose, but it is no accident that the ethnic phenomenon has accelerated as confidence and faith in American society have been shaken by political assassinations, race riots, Vietnam, campus upheaval, Watergate, a jittery economy, the energy crisis, and much else in the past fifteen years. In fact, there appears to be little need to battle the "homogenization" idea today. Some observers see the opposite problem. Gunnar Myrdal, in a 1974 essay called "The Case Against Romantic Ethnicity," for example, wrote: "What is obviously needed in America is a much higher identification with the nation as a whole, not merely people identifying within their separate ethnic groups."

Supporters of bilingual-bicultural maintenance programs, however, are not concerned about romantic ethnicity. A private rummaging through ethnic memories is not what they mean by "cultural pluralism." They are striving to protect *existing* language and cultural communities, not memories, and their efforts are not in the private realm. The critical distinction in their drive, in fact, is that they are seeking *government-financed* and *government-promoted* ethnic identities through use of lan-

guage and culture in the public schools, a policy that might be called "affirmative ethnicity." They want Washington to sponsor student attachments to their ethnic languages and histories while these pupils also go through the normal process of learning the common English language and the common national history.

Their efforts also should not be confused with another long-standing version of "cultural pluralism" in the schools—efforts to teach "each about every," to promote greater tolerance and respect across ethnic and racial groups. That was long the aim of the "intercultural" or "intergroup" education movement which dates back to the 1920s, and it has, of course, been central to school desegregation efforts. Perhaps the clearest reflection of that movement today is in pressures on publishers to include passages about more and more groups in American history texts. But while the bilingual-bicultural maintenance movement is certainly concerned about cross-cultural understanding, its chief thrust is on teaching "you about yours." In the view of the bilingual-bicultural movement, the "melting pot" philosophy actually means the absence of public funding for this purpose.

The question here, then, is not whether one favors "pluralism" or "diversity" or "cultural democracy," but who pays for pluralism, how the money is distributed, what underlying social goals are being sought, and how much official status should be given to other languages and their cultures. The question is not about the undoubted importance of ethnicity in individuals' lives any more than it is about the importance of religion in their lives. The question is not about the right or the desirability of groups to maintain their languages and cultures; they have long had that right. The issue is the role of the government, particularly the federal government. The overriding question is whether Washington is responsible for financing and promoting student attachments to their ethnic languages and cultures—jobs long left to families, religious groups, ethnic organizations, private schools, and others.

Within this question are a number of others. The drive for language and cultural maintenance programs, for example, raises a painful dilemma for the bilingual movement itself. This is because any federal funds spent to maintain the native languages of students who have become proficient or dominant in English means that these limited resources must be taken away from students who cannot learn in English and who therefore are most in need.

Although bilingual-bicultural advocates do not want to make a choice of this kind, it is inescapable. While the three-quarters of a billion dollars spent so far is a substantial sum for what began as a federal demonstration effort, the annual Title VII appropriation, of course, reaches only a fraction of all the students who might need such help. Bilingual

advocates suggest that existing programs reach only 2 to 3 percent of them. To the extent that some of this money is being used to maintain the languages and cultures of students who can learn in English, it is being taken away from those with a greater need. The 1976 General Accounting Office report, for example, found that many Title VII programs were made up largely of English-dominant students of Hispanic origin, and it urged that English speakers "should be limited in some way so that available program services are concentrated on the target population."

The maintenance issue also creates another in turn: the separation or segregation question. Separating students temporarily in basic skills classes in the native tongue has been justified on both compensatory education and civil rights grounds; the aim is clearly toward integrating these students into regular classrooms. But keeping such students separated to maintain their native languages and cultures for a significant part of the school day cannot be so justified.

Political scientist Orfield says of maintenance programs: "There must be sober investigation of the possibility that this method may increase community segregation and generate the kind of bitter linguistic politics that often overwhelm Canada, Belgium, India, Cyprus, and many other societies." He is *not* suggesting that a Quebec-style movement toward political secession might develop among Hispanic-Americans in this country. There is scarcely any reason to believe that the bilingual-bicultural movement has political secession on its mind or that it could make much headway if it did. What Dr. Orfield means by "bitter linguistic politics" is that "language could become a major point of cleavage in state and local politics in many areas, in educational institutions, in job qualifications, and in general social relations."

Dr. William G. Milan, who formerly directed one of the nine "Lau Centers" established by HEW after the Supreme Court ruling—and who favors maintenance programs which include native English-speakers as well—has been distressed by what he has seen in some pilot maintenance programs he visited:

> . . . maintenance bilingual programs in the public sector usually end up as ghettoized, ethnically identifiable, educational nuclei (sort of a system within a system) that very seldom offer the same quality education that is available to the rest of the district's population. . . . What is truly alarming about maintenance bilingual education in the public school system is that it is often *used* as an instrument of segregation in disguise, and that it too often sets as its primary goal the preservation of the mother tongue at the expense of a good quality education that will enable the members of the marked [language minority] group to compete in an unmarked [English] job market.

IV

How has the federal government dealt with "transitional" and "main-

tenance" questions? The Title VII legislation has been subject to various interpretations. In a 1971 manual for project applicants, for example, the government suggested that an equal command of two languages was the aim of Title VII. The manual stated that "it must be remembered that the ultimate goal of bilingual education is a student who functions well in two languages on any occasion." But in a December 1974 HEW policy memorandum, then Undersecretary Frank Carlucci stressed the opposite position. He remarked:

> The cultural pluralism of American society is one of its greatest assets, but such pluralism is a private matter of local choice, and not a proper responsibility of the federal government. . . . It is clearly the intent of Congress that the goal of federally-funded capacity building programs in bilingual education be to assist children of limited or non-English speaking ability to gain competency in English so that they may enjoy equal education opportunity—and *not* to require cultural pluralism.

The Title VII legislation adopted in 1978 emphasizes further the transitional nature of programs funded by that measure. This is reflected, for example, in a new requirement that students in Title VII programs be evaluated in English after two years to determine if they should move into regular classes. But, as in the past, much will depend on how the law is administered. In July 1979 the United States Office of Bilingual Education proposed regulations letting participating school districts decide how to measure when a student is proficient enough in English to learn in that language. Obviously, the definition of how "proficient" a student must be in English will determine how long a student will remain in the program.

To date, the evidence suggests that Title VII funds have been used on occasion to maintain the native languages of students who could learn in English, at least at the elementary school level. This was indicated in the General Accounting Office study. It was also suggested by a 1974 survey of Title VII projects done by the National Education Task Force de la Raza. "A very large percentage—87 percent—of the programs surveyed," it found, "considered their programs to be a language maintenance program rather than a transitional program." Finally, it was suggested by the disputed American Institutes for Research study of Title VII programs. That study found that, as measured by teacher judgments (whether these judgments are accurate is one of the chief points of contention), about 70 percent of the students were dominant in English, not Spanish, for the purpose of taking written exams. It also reported that 86 percent of the Title VII project directors interviewed said they had a policy of keeping students in such classes after they could learn in English.

The maintenance issue also has arisen in the regulatory and court

contexts. Although the *Lau* decision was intended to help students with deficiencies in English, the task force set up by OCR urged the agency to support maintenance programs as well. While OCR could not directly require any particular kind of program, let alone maintenance efforts, the "Lau Remedies" nonetheless state that it is "acceptable" for affected school systems to provide programs in which "the end result is a student who can function, totally, in both languages and cultures" or "in more than two languages and cultures." Since the *Lau* decision does not raise this question, it is strange for OCR to answer it at all. Again, we must await OCR's promised new policies to see where that issue will end up.

In the courts, the maintenance issue has come up most notably in the *Lau* case itself. After that decision, the San Francisco School Board appointed a task force of local citizens from language minority groups to draft a plan that would satisfy the Supreme Court ruling. The board also contracted with the Center for Applied Linguistics in Arlington, Virginia to provide technical assistance, and the center worked with the citizens' group.

There was a problem, however, about what evidence would be cited in the proposed plan. The citizens' groups did not want the center to list any studies which raised doubts about the effectiveness of bilingual education. "Our instructions from the task force were to give them positive instances," recalls Dr. Roger Shuy, a Georgetown University linguist who is associate director of the center. "We told them that in terms of reading, there wasn't much evidence to show that bilingual education helped. But they didn't want us to say anything like that. They had a political job to do."

As a result, the opening "Rationale" section of the plan listed seven fragile studies which could be used politically to support bilingual education; no unfavorable studies were included. The listing, however, was followed by this caveat: "This survey has focused on projects which have shown (or have tried to show) that bilingual or vernacular education really works." Dr. Shuy says: "It was a concession getting that statement in to protect my integrity."

After thus creating some illusions for the court, for the school board, and for the parents of the affected children, the plan went on to detail a "full 'maintenance' bilingual-bicultural" program for all major language groups in San Francisco. In October 1976, the federal district court issued a consent decree ordering the plan implemented.

It is abundantly clear, however, that language and cultural maintenance programs are not required of any school district. San Francisco chose to have one, and the court accepted its plan. But the chief questions before the courts are not about maintenance; rather, they are simi-

lar to those facing OCR. Courts do not have reliable evidence on how to best help students with a deficiency in English. Parents of these children will inevitably disagree, practically and philosophically, over this issue. And the courts have been reluctant to become involved in making curriculum decisions.

The court situation, moreover, has been complicated by the potential conflicts between bilingual education and desegregation. Bilingual-bicultural education tends to require keeping students of the same racial and language group together, while desegregation requires that they be dispersed, although some bilingual advocates contend that the two are not really as incompatible as they seem. This conflict was nevertheless sharply defined, for example, in the Denver school desegregation case, *Keyes* v. *School District No. 1.* There the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund sought to secure pilot bilingual programs and other instruction tailored to Chicano culture, race, and class in four heavily Mexican-American schools. Although the district court accepted this plan, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected it on two grounds. First, it said, bilingual education "is no substitute for desegregation." Second, it held, the plan approved by the lower court went "well beyond helping Hispanic school children to reach the proficiency in English necessary to learn other subjects. Instead of merely removing obstacles to effective desegregation, the court's order would impose upon school authorities a pervasive and detailed system for the education of minority children. We believe this goes too far."

V

The drive for maintenance programs raises a second important irony: If such efforts were to succeed, they would be just as likely to help erode ethnic languages and cultures in America as to nourish them. As Dr. Fishman comments, research "has conclusively demonstrated—in the U.S.A., in Ireland, in Wales, in Israel, in Scotland, in Friesland, and elsewhere—that the school is a rather unreliable ally of language maintenance, leading appreciably and frequently in other directions, i.e., toward the 'wider' language of marketplace, of industry, of government and of scholarship."

This seeming contradiction is not difficult to understand. If students with little or no command of English were to become well-educated in English as well as in their native languages, most probably would find English the more useful language in our overwhelmingly English-speaking society, and there would likely be a steady attrition in use of the native tongue. That, in oversimplified form, is the pattern Dr. Fishman is referring to in this country and elsewhere.

Although it is popularly believed that the "melting pot" mentality

chiefly forced the decline or disappearance of ethnic languages and cultures in the United States, that generally has not been the case, at least for immigrant groups. Cruel antiforeigner and antiminority forces have, of course, played prominent and disgraceful roles in American history. But, as Dr. Fishman found in a pioneering study, *Language Loyalty in the United States*, which he headed in the early 1960s:

> By and large, more linguistic and cultural treasures have been buried or eroded due to permissiveness and apathy than would ever have been the case had repression and opposition been attempted. Immigrant minorities were never forbidden to organize and maintain their own communities, organizations, schools, or publications. . . . The examples of American life and of American ideology which immigrants encountered all around them have themselves usually been sufficient to weaken and overcome any sentiments or habits of separateness and retentivism harbored by particular groups or particular elites.

In other words, the chief "Americanizing" forces in the past have been access to opportunity, a desire to be part of the nation and its ideology, and a declining commitment among ethnic group members to their ethnic languages and cultures once they have moved into the mainstream. This has been evident in the history of many groups. As just one example, Irving Howe notes in *World of Our Fathers*, his eulogy to the Yiddish culture which East European Jews transplanted to New York's Lower East Side:

> How to educate immigrants in both the English language and American customs became an issue that agitated the East Side for decades. A clean, ruthless sweep of everything they had brought with them? A last-ditch resistance to each and every new influence they now encountered? . . . Step by empirical step, the immigrant community moved toward biculturalism, though its shrewdest spokesmen, like Abraham Cahan [editor of the *Jewish Daily Forward*], understood that even if achieved, this equilibrium between past and present could not be maintained for very long.

Indeed, a similar problem confronted the Pilgrims. After they fled from England to Holland, as Dr. Lawrence A. Cremin puts it, they "realized there that the price of toleration might well be their eventual assimilation into the Dutch population. . . . In effect, the Pilgrims came to America as a community seeking to preserve its religious and cultural integrity. . . ." The point is worth emphasizing: the Pilgrims first arrived on these shores to escape tolerance, not intolerance.

This is not intended to equate the experiences of European immigrant groups with each other or of white immigrant groups with racial minorities who have suffered from abuse and exclusion long after others have overcome high barriers. Nor is it meant to equate the histories of immigrants with those of conquered peoples or "involuntary" Americans. The point is simply that reducing discrimination and increasing opportunity in the general society have tended to lead to a decline in

loyalties to ethnic languages and cultures. Dr. Fishman and others who are deeply devoted to language and cultural diversity worry that this might happen to Hispanic-Americans and other language minority groups today—unless their languages and cultures are regularly reinforced in the wider community. Dr. Fishman warns that if this wider reinforcement does not occur among such groups, "bilingual education will not only do nothing for them: it will do *less* than nothing." In a very real sense, this view suggests that bilingual-bicultural maintenance efforts, in school and out, are needed to save group members from themselves.

Although the drive for language and cultural maintenance programs is linked to such desires for a broader "pluralism" in America, there is no clear definition of what this pluralism means. Some see it emerging in newspapers and on television. Some see the need to use native languages in local economies to assure that group members will have to use the native tongue. Some would welcome it if other cities followed the example of Miami, which became officially bilingual six years ago. In March 1974 congressional testimony, Dr. Gonzales suggested that the United States as a whole might soon have to consider making Spanish an official language, as French is in Canada. He stated:

> In Canada in 1969 the legislature of that country passed the Official Languages Act. That statute requires that the government of that country make available all of its services in either English or French, the two official languages of that country, as may be requested by an individual citizen. Perhaps it is a bit too early to think seriously about a comparable bill in this country. But if the present rate of growth of Spanish-speakers continues, it is not unlikely that we will soon have to consider that as a very definite possibility.

Dr. Gonzales' 1974 statement is particularly noteworthy because he is now director of the United States Office of Bilingual Education in charge of administering the Title VII program. Today he says: "I'm still committed to the notion that languages constitute a resource which should not be discarded. I'm also committed to the notion that communities, parents, and school boards retain the right to teach as many languages as they want to for as long as they want. But the Title VII legislation is restrictive as to how much of that the Title VII law will pay for." He adds: "I don't see any inherent contradiction between what the Congress wants to do and my own philosophy."

Many bilingual-bicultural supporters believe that, regardless of what the government does, use of Spanish, in particular, will continue to be reinforced, as it has been in the past, by other factors. These include the legal and illegal immigration flow from different Hispanic nations, our proximity to Mexico and Puerto Rico, return migrations or frequent visits back to friends and relatives, commercial and diplomatic rela-

tions, and discrimination in American society that curbs contact with the majority society. But others, such as A. Bruce Gaarder, former chief of the Office of Education's modern foreign language section, are convinced that these and other factors cannot prevent the decline of the Spanish language here. In a paper examining the fate of minority languages around the globe, he assesses all the forces favoring the maintenance of Spanish in this country and concludes that "it is illusory to suppose that the language(s) of dominated people(s) can be protected without legal recognition and protection of some form of cultural—including linguistic—autonomy. Anything short of such autonomy means assimilation of the weak [language] to the strong."

The impulse of the bilingual-bicultural movement in this country, in short, is by no means unique—except in its contention that Washington is responsible for financing and promoting facility in and attachment to ethnic languages and cultures equal to English. Spanish-speaking and other persons are facing the same dilemma that has plagued all ethnic loyalists who have wanted their children to succeed in our English-speaking society but not to weaken or sever their ethnic ties in the process. It is a dilemma they did not have to worry about much so long as doors were more tightly closed to them, and some doubt that Hispanic-Americans will end up going through a process that is much different from what other groups before them have experienced.

Indeed, Gaarder believes that "What bilingual education is more than anything else . . . is a jobs program. I say this painfully, because I am one who has organized a league for the defense of the Spanish language. But it's a jobs program. It's fought for because it's a way of giving jobs and recognition and status to Spanish speakers, who traditionally have been at the lowest end of the socioeconomic pole. It's at that level that they fight for it and are going to keep on fighting for it."

There is no question that bilingual-bicultural education policy has been governed to a significant degree by the Hispanic-American quest for more political and economic power and prestige. Manuel D. Fierro, former president of a leading Hispanic-American lobbying group in Washington, has recalled: "Going back to the civil rights movement—you know we were very much excluded from that type of programming to a great extent. It was a black-white syndrome, and it has continued to be a black-white syndrome even today." Of Title VII funds, he has said, "As long as we get our 80 percent, the others can have their 20 percent—and the blacks can't get this money."

This does not mean that most bilingual educators are unconcerned about students' educations; on the contrary, they are deeply concerned. It is only to distinguish again between bilingual education and bilingual politics.

VI

Bilingual-bicultural proponents, who undoubtedly will continue to press for maintenance programs, advance a number of other arguments for such efforts. Some, for example, offer historical justice arguments. Every group can claim some degree of injustice suffered in the past and the present, and it would be impossible to examine them all here. Conquered American Indian nations and the descendents of blacks who were shipped to this country in chains, for example, obviously have higher claims than others. Mexican-Americans also were a conquered people, though there is more ambiguity about this claim. Joan W. Moore observes, for instance, that in California at least "most of the resident Mexican population approved of the idea of annexation by the United States." A similar ambiguity holds for Puerto Ricans; although they, too, clearly are "involuntary" Americans, they are not on the mainland involuntarily. They have come, like millions before them, in search of economic opportunity for themselves and their children.

Others who were neither conquered nor shipped to this country in chains have nonetheless suffered from severe discrimination, but this has not always resulted in poorer school achievement for such children. Professor L. Ling-chi Wang, for example, has stated before Congress:

> The Asians, and particularly the Chinese and Japanese, have been singled out as the most successful group in this country, and yet I do not think you realize how much we have had to sacrifice for some of us to be in that position, sacrifice our own heritage, our own history, in fact including our own self-respect, because we had to conform with everything that was demanded of us. We are people who are completely without any self-respect in terms of our cultural heritage.

Is the federal government responsible for maintaining the ethnic languages and cultures of exceedingly successful groups that have suffered from discrimination? Professor Wang does not consider the possibility that, as Dr. Fishman found, most members of ethnic groups themselves have not been committed to sustaining their native languages and cultures once they have moved into the economic mainstream; he blames all on the society. Is that an accurate reading of Asian-American history? Does Professor Wang speak for all Chinese- or Japanese-Americans when he says they are people "who are completely without any self-respect in terms of our cultural heritage"? Should the federal government encourage members of Asian-American groups to conform to what Professor Wang wants them to conform to? Or should individuals be free to make choices without Washington interfering one way or the other?

What of the Catholics or the Jews, the Irish-Americans, Italian-Americans, German-Americans? The anti-German waves surrounding the two world wars dealt a blow to German-American culture from

which it has never recovered. Is Washington therefore responsible for reviving or reinforcing the German language and culture in this country? If not, are the lines dividing the groups which do and do not deserve federal subsidies based more on race and class than on language and culture? Or should Washington reinforce the ethnic identities of all people, an expensive proposition as well as a controversial one? What about the many people who have multiple ancestries? Are they to be penalized because their parents or grandparents or great-grandparents intermarried? Those are some of the social justice questions which would have to be faced if the issue were to be seriously debated.

Others argue that maintenance programs would help improve the general academic performance of the affected students. This is not so much a theory as an article of faith. As Dr. Fishman states, "There is hardly any research evidence pertaining to such claims in conjunction with bilingual education, although the view itself is a long and well established one, particularly in the context of cultural pluralism and minority rights." It would have to be debated on those terms, not with claims of any proved benefit for students' general performance.

Still others, and particularly scholars, advance arguments concerning cultural relativism. Anthropologists, linguists, and others who are devoted by profession to building greater respect for languages and cultures have emphasized that, in themselves, all languages and cultures are equal. Typically, Dr. Rudolph C. Troike, an anthropologist, and Dr. Muriel Saville-Troike, a linguist, state: "No dialect is inherently better or more adequate or more logical than another, just as no language is inherently superior to another."

While all languages and cultures may indeed be "inherently" equal in the scholarly sense, they certainly are not equal in the political, economic, or social sense, whether one is considering English dialects among English speakers, Spanish vernaculars among Spanish speakers, or minority languages in the wider society. Are scholarly desires to preserve native languages and cultures a serious basis for national policy in this area? Do scholars—or for that matter ethnic leaders who are highly articulate in English—"represent" the views of all or most parents of poor, language minority children when they seek school programs placing equal weight on maintaining the native language? And, as Margaret Mead asked in the 1950s after studying a Southwest Pacific people who had chosen to modernize rapidly and happily: "How often has our Western attempt to preserve native dress, old customs, different styles of architecture, to respect native laws or customs, been only a thin disguise over an unwillingness to admit a people, newly entering into our way of life, to full participation in the culture which we

claim to value so highly?" These are some of the questions in need of debate about cultural relativism arguments.

But there is one argument advanced by bilingual education supporters which, I believe, is hardly debatable. It is simply that it makes no sense to ignore the native language abilities of these students once they have learned English—and then require them in later grades to study the language as a subject. Who can take issue with this? On what grounds? After all, we have long sought to teach languages other than English in our schools. We have, of course, usually done a miserable job of it. I know. I am one of the victims, one of millions of Americans with little knowledge of other languages. But there is no question that the goal is all but universally accepted. Why, then, has there been resistance to this idea?

The answer, I am convinced, is in the careless, even wild-swinging way in which many bilingual education advocates use the term "language maintenance." They often brandish it as if they meant giving Spanish equal status with English in this country when that is not what many of them mean at all. Students do not have to learn half their subjects in English and half in the native language in order to develop, let alone maintain, literacy in the native tongue. That is not what bilingual advocates generally are suggesting. In Massachusetts, Alex Rodriquez of the state Commission Against Discrimination has described the intent of a "maintenance" bill being sought there in this way: ". . .to allow a child in elementary or secondary education his voluntary choice to participate in a language maintenance program at the expense of some other field of study. We suggest . . . that that field of study be either that of music or art and that the language maintenance curriculum, since it is to be culturally associated, emphasize music and art."

I have not seen the actual Massachusetts legislative proposal. But as Rodriquez describes it, it merely asks that while the students learn almost everything in English, some be allowed to choose, if they wish, to take *one class* in the native language, learning in that language about some aspects of the native culture. While such a proposal might run into competition from other subjects in a crowded school curriculum, it is difficult to understand how it could be opposed on any other basis. It would just be a variation on existing foreign language programs.

Unfortunately, in many public arenas, this is often not how bilingual advocates describe their aim. Those who authored the "Lau Remedies," it will be recalled, sought to produce students "who can function, totally, in both languages and cultures." That obviously translates into: "We want to promote language equality in this country." The United

States Civil Rights Commission has talked of giving "equal prestige" in the public schools to the native language. That, too, reads "language equality." Many other bilingual education advocates have used similar terms.

It is clearly this that triggers the kind of appalling reaction we have seen in *Harper's Magazine* from Tom Bethell, who suggests that bilingual education reflects an American "death wish," that it is supported by those who "never did think that . . . the United States of America was a particularly good [idea] to begin with, and that the sooner it is restored to its component 'ethnic' parts the better off we shall be." Bethell and others of his view can hardly be reacting to the idea of a voluntary program in which a student can choose to take a single class each year in the native language. It makes no sense. Would they assail all existing foreign language classes?

What I am suggesting is an unhappy irony: one of the most difficult problems bilingual education faces in this country stems from a problem of language itself, from semantics, from the use and abuse of the word "maintenance." If it is made clear that continuing to develop the students' abilities in their native languages does not mean "language equality," that it can be done with one voluntary class, that an "either/or" choice is unnecessary, I believe this effort could attract wide support.

That does not mean that Title VII funds should be used to finance these efforts; those funds are intended to find the best way to help students who have little or no command of English, and I see no justification for taking money away from those children. Nor does it mean that HEW's Office for Civil Rights should promote these efforts in enforcing the *Lau* decision; civil rights enforcement under *Lau* provides no basis for such pressures on school districts. But there are other ways.

At the federal level, Washington has long assumed responsibility for promoting the study of other languages under the National Defense Education Act, to name one program. I know of no reason why funds for this type of effort could not be sought under that act. The state and local school systems also have long provided funds for foreign language programs. Why would these not qualify? It doesn't matter what such programs are called after all. What counts is whether the aim is accomplished. (And that aim, I would submit, should also be to provide more immersion-bilingual programs for English-speaking students if we are truly serious about promoting greater knowledge and understanding of other languages and cultures by American students in general.)

It should be understood that this approach could not prevent the attrition in use of the native languages and cultures that would likely

occur over time. Responsibility for that matter would remain where it always has been—with the family, the church, the private schools, the ethnic leaders, the local community in general and, most of all, the individual group member. Nor could all of this possibly satisfy those who truly are seeking much more extensive use of the mother tongue and culture in the public schools. Presumably, they will continue to press their case on individual school systems, and the choice will be up to local parents and educators, which, I think, is where it belongs.

But it would nonetheless be a significant step forward, one providing far more opportunity than generally is available now for public school students to develop and maintain a command of their native languages and cultures.

I am, of course, not predicting that this could be accomplished overnight or, indeed, that it will be accomplished at all. It is still unclear where the bilingual and bicultural education movement will lead us, whether we will end up bumping into more learning or less, more diversity or more conformity, more tolerance or more intolerance, more harmony or more discord in American society.

DR. HORACIO FABREGA*

Psychological Conflicts in Bilingual American Residents: A Case Study

Introduction

One basic aim of a policy regarding a second language is to promote the effective social functioning of individuals who speak it. Ideally this should be accomplished in a manner that does not generate social problems and/or disfavor those who speak only the primary or parent language of the society. Planners can develop an effective policy by learning how conflicts regarding languages affect the adaptation, motivation, and morale of bilingual residents. In this way, the psychological and social conflicts which bilinguals experience due to differences in language competence can be appreciated, thereby paving the way for prudent reasoning in policy formulation.

As a physician, my aim is similar to that of social planners who strive to promote the effective social functioning of individuals. Since my specialty is psychiatry, my efforts have been focused on individuals experiencing emotional problems as well as acute or chronic illnesses. As a bilingual, socially-oriented psychiatrist, I have been drawn to conflicts of individuals involving language and cultural differences. My contribution to this conference, therefore, is most properly centered on the psychosocial aspects of those conflicts which can be traced to the use of second languages. In order to facilitate the discussion I will pursue a medical approach by presenting a case history of a bilingual American of Spanish descent who experienced personal difficulties stemming from conflicts in language and culture. This will highlight some of the con-

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flicts of bilinguals and possibly point to problem areas that a policy should help resolve.

Case History

Mr. Hernando (hereafter, merely "H") is a middle-aged, white, male professional whose father was a native of the Republic of Panama and whose mother is an American who resided in the Canal Zone. Both parents were Catholic and bilinguals who spoke exclusively Spanish with each other. Mr. H's mother was of middle-class background by American standards and his father of middle to upper class by Panamanian standards. Although mother and father married and resided in Panama, Mr. H was born in the United States where his mother returned temporarily in order to be near her parents for the birth of her sons. In retrospect, it appears that this decision about birthplace expresses vividly basic conflicts between Mr. H's parents—conflicts conditioned by differences in their culture and nationality. Had there been no conflict about nationality or culture within this union, Mr. H probably would have been born in the country where his father and mother resided. Mr. H's birthplace made him an American citizen in addition to being a Panamanian citizen by parentage and residency. This duality played a key role in his relationship to his parents and to his friends and extended family in Panama, which in turn affected Mr. H's own social orientations. The most immediate social repercussions of birthplace took place among his Latin American relatives who saw him as a member of a different (in this instance, disliked) national tradition. This led to a measure of exclusion and isolation in his paternal family.

The first sixteen years of Mr. H's life were spent in Panama except for occasional brief trips to the United States when his mother visited her own parents. Mr. H spoke and has continued to speak English not only with his mother, but also with his father. Spanish was spoken between parents and with the housekeeper in the home. However, it wasn't until he was old enough to play and relate to persons outside the home (ages two to three) that Mr. H became intensively involved in learning and speaking Spanish. Mr. H has a brother one year younger (also born in the United States) and while growing up spoke mainly Spanish with him. Exposure to Spanish as a second language in infancy led to frequent errors in speaking either language and presumbly in thinking as well. Mr. H eventually learned to speak both languages fluently. The pattern of speaking English in the home with parents, Spanish with his brother, and Spanish with his friends, and with relatives continued throughout the period of residency in Panama.

Mr. H's first six years of schooling in Panama were in Spanish. At the end of this period, as he was beginning to learn effective writing in

Spanish, his parents decided to transfer him to an English-speaking school in the Canal Zone. Mother's wish for an American identity and way of life for H (and father's acquiescence to this wish) were family factors prompting this change. Another factor which may have played a role in the decision to shift schooling was that H (and brother who also transferred) were not performing at a sufficiently high level of competence in the Spanish-speaking school. This move, educationally, was difficult for H who upon entering junior high school had had no prior formal schooling in the English language. English reading and writing skills were grossly deficient, but with time he was able to accommodate to this and managed to do above average work, particularly in mathematics. H continued in American school in the Canal Zone until two-thirds of the way through his third (junior) year in high school when he, brother, and mother moved to the United States and lived with maternal grandmother.

Mother and father of H were white and of Anglo and Mediterranean Spanish physical appearance respectively. When young, Mr. H was light haired and of a distinctly Anglo appearance. The social environment of H's grammar school years continuing into adolescence, the existing attitudes and prejudices about race and national identity, and his own American physical appearance and Spanish name were factors that in combination contributed to substantial social and psychological difficulties and affected his developing sense of identity. In Panama his physical appearance seemed to symbolize Americanness and he felt himself the focus of prejudices against Americans or "gringos." He attempted to neutralize these feelings by emphasizing his Latin qualities principally through use of vernacular Spanish. His positive relationships with friends and especially cousins, his Latin name, and his competence with Spanish facilitated a measure of identification and adaptation in the nationalistic environment of Panama. In many ways he had come to view himself as a Latin. While he was attending school in the Canal Zone, he felt himself the focus of prejudice directed at Latins (e.g., "Spicks"). The social visibility of his Latinness was evident only among those who knew his name, parentage, and place of residence. His physical appearance and fluency with English allowed him in selected instances to "pass" as an Anglo. His growing competence with English, an awareness of the importance of his American citizenship, his relations with parents (especially mother), and decision of parents about schooling contributed to his growing feeling of being an American.

As stated earlier, Mr. H's mother moved to the United States where H graduated from high school. The move was a consequence of difficulties between parents and also their desire to facilitate the children's entry into an American college. While in high school in the United

States, Mr. H was frequently teased and made the object of ridicule for being from a "backward Latin country." Although his surname indicated his Latin descent, he acquired an Anglo nickname which together with his Anglo appearance allowed him to identify and "pass" as Anglo. In time Mr. H was able to do well academically in school and he also excelled in athletics which won him a college scholarship. While at college he found little evidence that his Latin descent was a source of stigma. Indeed, his background became a source of interest to classmates and, in this sense, almost a mark of prestige. He still experienced some difficulty with English but by graduation had learned to read and write with increasing competence. He did well in science and mathematics which enabled him to complete his four years of graduate education at a professional school.

Mr. H's undergraduate and graduate education in the United States provided him with a greater measure of identification with American culture. Whereas early in this period contemporary social and political events held little interest or meaning, he slowly began to learn about their significance which culminated in his registering in one of the major political parties and voting in all the succeeding national elections. He met and married a native American and fathered two children. His work eventually took him to Latin America (see below) where his wife (a language major in college) learned Spanish. Mr. H briefly considered speaking some Spanish in the home, but although he appreciated the value of fluency in two languages, he found it difficult and awkward to speak Spanish with wife and children. Spanish was a conversational language that "felt right and natural" when speaking with persons of Latin or Spanish descent. He viewed his wife as American and "felt American" with her, and this carried over into this attitude vis à vis his children. It is possible that if Mr. H had had no conflict about his dual background, he would have encouraged the speaking of Spanish in the home.

Mr. H's work took him to the American Southwest where his competence with Spanish facilitated his understanding of the culture and values of Americans of Mexican descent. He learned that in private settings recent Mexican migrants to the United States would converse with him freely in Spanish though this seemed to elicit awkwardness and embarrassment from *second* generation and more acculturated Americans of Mexican descent. Also it became very clear that in public places Mexican-Americans regardless of generation would not speak Spanish. Mr. H's obvious Anglo appearance, the difference of his Spanish dialect, and his unfamiliarity with and lack of belonging to the culture of this ethnic group were factors that made for some awkwardness when Spanish was spoken. An additional factor contributing to social ten-

sions when Spanish was spoken seemed to result from the fact that some Americans of Mexican descent viewed their Spanish as a stigma which set them apart and contributed to their estrangement from the dominant Anglo culture of the region. The Spanish language operated as a socially discrediting marker in the Southwest and this inhibited its use among Mexican-Americans, especially in public Anglo places. However, when speaking Spanish with individuals from other countries (e.g., Peru, Puerto Rico, Cuba, Spain, etc.) and in other areas of the United States, Mr. H encountered no such awkwardness. Mr. H's ability to speak Spanish proved advantageous for his work in countries of Latin America including Mexico and Peru where dialectical differences were substantial but where no social inhibitions or awkwardness attended the use of Spanish. These experiences illustrate the differential role which language, as a component of culture, can play in social participation or exclusion and the crucial influence which dominant political, economic, and cultural forces and traditions play in influencing language use and, with this, in generating psychosocial conflicts.

Mr. H's work as a professional has been clearly facilitated by his proficiency in two languages. His choice of work type and setting are highly consistent with his cultural and linguistic background. This background and his physical appearance as an Anglo-American have provided a measure of social achievement and acceptance among peers and in society. At the same time, Mr. H's name continually serves to distinguish him and at times seems to have generated stereotypical expectations from peers which often needed correction.

Discussion

The conflict suggested by circumstances surrounding Mr. H's birthplace points to a basic issue in the marriages of bilinguals whose languages are part of opposing/contrasting cultural and national traditions which are in contact. Language sharing, equivalent levels of linguistic competence, and (in this instance as well) the sharing of religious orientation can promote an effective communication which may conceal differences in value and culture orientations. The psychological significance of these differences is often not appreciated during courtship and early in the marriage. Differences in allegiance to those cultural-national traditions among the parents surface and can become polarized around key social biological events, such as birthplace of children. The decision about the actual birthplace of a child can activate the respective commitments and/or prejudices that the parents themselves have about each other, the marriage, and their children. Conflicts surrounding power and control in the marriage result. How this is resolved is a factor which in a symbolic sense has continuing influence among the parents and on chil-

dren as well. As an example, one can speculate that had parents decided on a Latin American birthplace the father might have played a more active role in the socialization of H and H himself would have developed a greater closeness to his Latin American relatives and, with this, allegiance to their national tradition. Given the enormity of the distance that cultural differences can create, one may suggest that in some instances a brittle integration exists among married bilinguals identified with contrasting national traditions; this integration is made possible by language sharing.

The pattern of language use by H during infancy and the early school period is significant in a social-psychological sense in a number of ways. The continued use of both languages defines H as a bilingual, capable of equivalent levels of linguistic and cognitive competence with either language. As studies in child development and neurology suggest, early use of both languages probably leads to the activation of a common neurolinguistic substrate by each language. A discussion of the long-term cognitive and intellectual effects of this bilingual pattern of language use is beyond the scope of this presentation. The social and cultural implications of this pattern of language use should instead claim our attention. Competence in two languages raises the question of priorities and regulations surrounding speaking. In Mr. H's case, no explicit rules or prohibitions were imposed in the home. The use of both languages by all family members albeit in different circumstances and in different dyadic relationships reflects an openness, acceptance, and relatively equal valuation of each. This pattern of intrafamily language use promoted comfort and lessened conflicts attendant to one specific language. In particular, since no rigid social rules seem to have been set up within the family regarding usage, H (and brother as well) did not acquire constraints or conflicts tied to a particular language usage; this may have mitigated polarization of images of parents. Moreover, although Spanish clearly was preferred (if not demanded) outside the home during the early period, the fact that *both* languages continued to be spoken in the home prevented development of unequal social valuations and psychological inhibitions. It is very likely that in situations of national/cultural contact, respective languages (and their social use) will acquire different valuations of appropriateness which can promote psychological inhibitions and conflicts. Differences in valuation of two languages are more likely to be learned (and their consequences experienced) outside the home though this can be reinforced in the home as well. If these differences are accentuated or polarized by the pattern of language use within the family, one may assume that speaking in a particular language mode will be associated with a specific constellation of values and psychological reactions (e.g., one language in the home,

another outside; we versus they, etc.). Language use might thereby acquire a greater boundary-maintaining function, in some instances promoting social integration and psychological sharing and in other instances a sense of social marginality and alienation and, with this, psychological difficulties.

Although patterns of language use in Mr. H's home may have helped prevent the development of strong inhibitions and conflicts associated with the speaking of English or Spanish, it is very clear that the pattern of H's early schooling contributed to cognitive and emotional difficulties in a number of respects. As already mentioned, Mr. H's early schooling was in Spanish, the parent language of the community where he lived. Socialization outside the home and cognitive development through school instruction were thus carried out in a psycholinguistically consistent manner. Both encouraged a cultural identification with national Latin American values and traditions. However, this identification was not fully reinforced; in fact, it was diluted by the pattern of use of languages in the home; that H's communication with parents was almost exclusively in English meant that there existed little basis for the sharing of Spanish language-based school experiences and problems in the home. His mother's schooling had been in English, thereby effectively sealing off her potential contribution to his Spanish education, something which served to restrict if not weaken her maternal role and modeling influences. A resulting sense of frustration may have led her in turn to progressively devalue learning experiences in school, in turn diminishing H's scholastic motivation and perseverance. The anomaly of a Latin American father with whom he spoke principally English may have led H to avoid his counsel regarding school problems tied to the use of Spanish. Mr. H's early performance in school was clearly below his potential and may have contributed to the development of a devalued sense of self intellectually. Had there existed a basis for intrafamilial communication in Spanish, H's performance in the Latin American school might have been higher, this in turn promoting a sense of intellectual accomplishment in Spanish and, with this, a growing cultural orientation which favored assimilation into Latin values and traditions.

The pattern of language use in school versus in the home was, therefore, a factor which hindered H's sense of identity as a Latin and contributed indirectly to his being transferred to the American system of schooling. Although this transfer was consistent with patterns and choices already developing in the family (e.g., choice of birthplace, choice of intrafamily language, etc.) the timing was problematic in a number of respects. In a practical sense, school calendars vary across societies so that transfers between the systems cannot be accomplished

without loss of time and/or scholastic achievement. Moreover, the rituals, values, modes of instruction, social prescriptions, and standards of behavior found within each school were representative of contrasting cultural systems. All of these factors occasioned problems of adjustment, but it was the timing of Mr. H's transfer which caused the major problem. His entering the American system in the seventh grade presupposed that he had mastered grades one through six in English; however, Mr. H's facility with English and its grammar had essentially been nil—a fact which hindered him severely in subjects requiring advanced English reading, composition, and written exposition. These scholastic interferences occasioned by the transfer, though partially neutralized by H's accomplishments in the linguistically more neutral "abstract sciences" of mathematics, algebra, and geometry, may have contributed to his diminished sense of mastery and confidence. Importantly one can note that scholastic deficiencies linked to differences in language competence hindered H from deriving full benefits from American acculturative experiences insofar as they prohibited full participation in school activities and more generally in the acquisition of knowledge of American culture (e.g., impairing his learning of the subtleties of American history and literature).

Initial deficiencies in writing thus kept Mr. H from learning about American culture and history. Lacking the background knowledge of classmates heightened his sense of distance and isolation from them. Although American by birth (and part parentage), Mr. H was exposed to the stress of partial participation in American culture and to the poignancy of marginality. Mr. H managed in time to overcome these deficiencies by assimilating American values and traditions. His period of late adolescence and early adulthood was one of continual but slow integration into American culture, a transition mediated by increasing proficiency in written English and the tangible educational attainments linked to this. His physical appearance and color as well as his socioeconomic status facilitated this integration. Shifting to and completing an American English language-mediated system of education, however, had the effect of distancing him from Spanish-mediated learning experiences (again, involving history, literature, etc.) and the rich interpersonal relations and institutional involvements which flow from this. What one could term an uneven level of involvement in Latin American culture resulted. Proficiency in spoken Spanish continued, allowing immediate communicational access to Latins, but a deeper and broader pattern of involvement was partially sealed off. Thus, although socially "retarded" in his level and rate of mastery of American culture, his mastery of Latin culture was aborted given the final shift to an exclusively English-mediated form of instruction.

The preceding discussion has pointed to the different kinds and levels of socialization and enculturation that result from competence in spoken as opposed to written language. It serves to emphasize particular kinds of conflicts of bilinguals who may or may not also be bicultural. There is first the obvious fact that spoken language competence is basic to communication and with this social participation. There are, of course, additional factors inherent in communication which include the subtleties in styles of verbal and nonverbal communication regulating the level of access one has to people and situations through spoken language. All of this provides one level of enculturation. It is a different dimension of enculturation into a modern society which I wish to emphasize also here—namely that provided by reading, writing, and more generally formal education. Differences in the implications of these two levels of enculturation are illustrated by Mr. H's initial scholastic difficulties in the American school, his initial sense of social marginality in American culture during late adolescence and early adulthood, his eventual professional attainment in America (at some psychological cost), and his lack of complete access to integration into Latin American culture (given his aborted education in Spanish-mediated schools). At the same time, Mr. H's ease of communication in spoken Spanish was a factor that obviously allowed him in time to make use of his American professional education in Latin American countries. His relative success in work illustrates the advantage of spoken language and the *cultural learning* provided by transfer of knowledge through language translation in bilinguals. In summary, spoken language competence promotes one type of assimilation, whereas written language competence another; moreover, each type of assimilation has linked to it a different level of enculturation which in turn can be bridged by language.

Several factors no doubt aided Mr. H in his efforts to assimilate into American culture. One of these was the distinctive pattern of language use within the home. In essence, while growing up Mr. H spoke freely with parents the language he was to use in secondary education and, eventually, professional education and work. Of course, it is controversial to reduce experiences of early socialization to a spoken language. Nonetheless, one notes that in Mr. H's case key aspects of personality development and functioning and definition of self all were "acquired through the language which was later to be critical in a socially instrumental sense. Two additional factors played critical roles. The first of these was provided by race and color. In the United States, Mr. H could "pass" physically and/or racially as a member of the dominant majority. Full mastery of English and the learning of American culture thus allowed the creation of an identity which was socially congruent with his physical one, thereby circumventing informal social prejudices and

formal institutional obstacles linked to physiognomy and color. Although the matter of how personal identity is constituted in bilinguals, binationals, and biculturals is very complex and problematic—there being many conflicts between the various rubrics of identity—we must nonetheless acknowledge the advantage accruing to Mr. H by virtue of his physical identifying markers. The second advantage provided Mr. H was that of socioeconomic status. The relatively high level of education and professional competence in Mr. H's immediate and extended family provided him with models of aspiration. As suggested in the case history, economic level per se was not the major factor influential in helping Mr. H's assimilation into American culture. Rather it was the motivation to succeed, coupled with models of how this could be achieved professionally, which proved advantageous in Mr. H's case.

Addendum

The bicultural/bilingual upbringing of Mr. H is relevant in helping us understand some of the difficulties which are experienced by young people of non-Anglo descent entering our country in order to participate in our culture and way of life. They must be able to function almost immediately in our language if they are to succeed in benefitting from the free schooling offered to all children up to sixteen years of age.

There are many differences as well as a few similarities when we compare the situation of Mr. H to the one experienced by the large group of minority language children who are currently attending school in hopes of becoming contributing and independent members of our society.* Mr. H is different from the majority of second language students entering our system today in the following ways: a first and most significant difference was his being a member of a relatively high socioeconomic family and extended family. His father and a great many of his relatives were professional people who had attended grad-

*In discussing Mr. H with respect to other language minority students, there is a question as to whether Mr. H was a true minority student within the respective schools he attended since he grew up with both heritages. Actually he shared many, but not all, of the dominant (depending on where he lived) culture's values, heritage, and societal experiences thus making learning somewhat easier for him than for the true minority student. His school attendance in English for the first time in his early junior high school years was somewhat more difficult for him than his earlier years in the Spanish grammar school in Panama. However, what he was learning in both systems had meaning and cultural relevance to which he could more easily relate by reason of his bicultural/bilingual parents. Cultural relevance was a positive factor in his adaptability to the system. Currently, as the latest bilingual/bicultural programs are being formulated, a positive effort is being made to present the classwork in such a manner that the minority language student can relate the content of the reading and history to his own life experiences which in turn facilitates his learning.

uate school and who expected their children to do the same. In contrast, today's minority student is mainly from the lower socioeconomic group. It has been found that relatively high socioeconomic level children "forced" (who chose or whose parents chose for them) to learn a second language do extremely well in their studies. Therefore, Mr. H had more in common with these latter children who may attend school in another language either by choice or by reason of their parents' temporary overseas assignment. A second difference was that when Mr. H was growing up in the 1940s, the problem of a second language involved at most a few individuals as opposed to the large number of minority language children today. It has been found in studies that the "total immersion" technique of introducing a second, new language to a few minority students within a group who are native speakers tends to be successful, but that as the number of minority students grows, the technique becomes untenable. Currently in many areas of the country there is too large a number of minority children trying to learn English (given the limited level of school facilities). The minority students eventually begin to use among themselves their native language rather than the language of the majority. A third factor which may have made Mr. H's situation different from the majority of second language minority children today was that he seemed to possess language aptitude, general intelligence, motivation, and a "non-negative" if not positive attitude toward the cultures (depending upon which school system and culture he found himself in). These factors have been found to be very significant in learning a second language. A fourth factor in his success was the fact that his language skill development followed what is considered a natural sequence (in both languages), starting with listening comprehension, then speaking, followed by reading, and finally writing. It has been found that this sequence facilitates language learning especially if the native language is learned first. (Actually he had two native languages.) A fifth factor which sets him apart from today's second language student was his growing identification with and desire to succeed in the dominant social group in which he found himself, be it English or Spanish. It has been found that this desire for a comfortable place in both cultures becomes the best motivation in becoming truly bilingual. His first ambition was to succeed athletically (which he accomplished) and this success led to his continued striving toward high academic achievement. A sixth factor making him different is the on-balance positive support he received from within the home. Despite the conflicts alluded to in the case history, he literally received a natural and spontaneous bilingual/bicultural education from his parents both consciously and unconsciously—somewhat akin to the type of program which is being developed in the schools. This pattern of reinforcement at home was a

very positive factor. The seventh and final difference was that he wasn't the object of economic or political discrimination. This prejudice whether manifested subtly or overtly from either the administration, teachers, or other students tends to inhibit the learning process.

Although Mr. H's situation showed some critical characteristics that were different from those of the minority student of today, his situation does share some basic similarities. First, he shared a low level of English reading, comprehension, and writing compared to his American classmates when he entered junior high school since all his early formal education had been in Spanish. He felt inadequate especially in literature, history, and English although his natural ability in math and science were not hampered by his lack of English. He had never studied formal English grammar; therefore, he encountered some difficulty in language skill development in written communication especially in high school and later on in the first few years of college. His English skills were not at a sufficiently high level to be comfortable with advanced reading assignments. A second factor of similarity was the school's (Spanish or English) ignoring of the other culture/language, given that instruction was naturally carried out in the language/culture of the country. The typical monolingual school in the United States generally excluded the second language to the detriment of minority pupils before the enactment of the Bilingual Education Acts of 1968 and 1974. A third factor in common was Mr. H's use of each language in a specific situation (speaking Spanish with brother, English with mother and father, Spanish with classmates in Panama and English with classmates in the United States). It was not comfortable to change from one language to the other except with close family since very few people have equal control in both languages. A fourth factor was discrimination (in his instance, limited) and stigma which Mr. H felt in entering the English school for the first time. Shifting from a Spanish system to an English one as a young teenager was very difficult and resulted in his experiencing some degree of negative self-concept. On comparing himself to his classmates he found not only his English skills, history, etc., below average, but, in addition, his unfamiliarity with the teen culture set him apart from his peers. He was only able to participate comfortably in their activities in sports. A fifth factor was the lack of a systematic approach to teaching/learning the language (English) and culture of the dominant country (United States). The school was only concerned with its single curriculum and there was no plan to help the few minority students. Having this systematic approach to learning has been found to be very important in helping the minority child learn the second language and culture. In summary, it was these five factors which Mr. H shared with the minority language student of today that are rele-

vant to promoting one's successful adjustment; they made Mr. H's experiences in school more difficult than they would have been had he been a monolingual/monocultural pupil in either country.

JOHN CARROLL*

Discussion of Epstein and Fabrega Presentations

It was with much hesitation that I agreed, on really relatively short notice, to be a discussant of Mr. Epstein's paper at this conference. I haven't been paying too much attention to general problems of bilingual education in recent years. I had thought that matters were well in hand, but it's very obvious that they're not. And for this reason, it seemed to me that maybe, in the light of my interest and background in language education—second language education—in various contexts, I ought to get into the act myself as to whether I could make any contribution at all in this area.

As I see it, Mr. Epstein has raised two major issues about current trends and activities under the Bilingual Education Act, and I'm going to separate them, although they are obviously very closely related. First, he asks, is some kind of bilingual education a proper and effective remedy for the problem of school failures of language minority groups? If so, what kind? And if so, to what extent is it a federal responsibility to provide assistance to these bilingual education efforts? And the second issue: is some sort of bilingual-bicultural education an appropriate and effective means of helping maintain the languages and cultures of minority groups? And if so, to what extent is it a federal responsibility to provide assistance for such programs?

I would like to focus my remarks on the first of these issues. As I understand it, the Bilingual Education Act of 1968 was a response to the fact that many children from language minority groups were having much difficulty in school. There were two assumptions, apparently. First, it was assumed that a major source of their difficulty was they did

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not have enough proficiency in English to understand English as the medium of instruction, and therefore, they needed special help in bringing their proficiency in English up to a satisfactory level. The second assumption was that many of these children would make more progress in school if their early instruction in basic school subjects were to be carried on, at least in part, in their first language rather than in English, at least for a certain period of time until their English competence reached the level necessary for them to understand instruction carried on in English.

Now if I can take what Mr. Epstein said at face value, the *Lau* decision of 1974 reaffirmed the proposition that these language minority children needed some sort of special help; that is, as I understand it, the *Lau* decision did not specify exactly what sort of special help should be recommended. Now I can't question the first of these assumptions. I wouldn't want to question it. That is the assumption that children need to have a certain level of proficiency in the language of instruction in order to make progress under that instruction. In fact, I made "ability to understand instruction" one of the major components in a so-called model of school learning that I proposed some years ago, and which is more or less the foundation of a system of mastery learning that has been developed by Benjamin Bloom here at the University of Chicago.

Now this model is one that presumably applies to all children and students everywhere, regardless of their language, whether they're in bilingual programs or monolingual programs or whatever, so even monolingual native speakers of English differ enormously in their levels of development in understanding English. And children with non-English speaking backgrounds will obviously have even greater difficulty until that English proficiency reaches a certain level. The problem, as Mr. Epstein points out, is to specify that level. Now I'm certainly not satisfied that we have fully clear research indices that allow us to specify that level readily and easily. There is some question as to whether we can trust the judgments of teachers in this respect. Nonetheless, I think this is a problem that ought to be quite easily solvable with appropriate research.

There is more difficulty, I think, in confidently accepting the second assumption on which the Bilingual Education Act was predicated, namely that it is necessary, or at least desirable, to provide early instruction in basic school subjects in the child's basic mother tongue when the mother tongue is not English. The history and research on this problem goes back many years. For example, in the 1940s, it was found in the Philippines that language minority children there—that is those who did not speak the majority Tagalog or whatever it might be—were much more likely to succeed and stay in school if the instruc-

tion in the first two or three years was given in their mother tongue rather than in the majority language of Tagalog.

In many developing countries, like Nigeria, the language of wider circulation is not introduced until the children have had basic instruction in their mother tongue. And this practice seems to have had reasonably good results. Yet the question may still be raised whether that early instruction, carried on in the mother tongue, is really necessary, or even if it is necessary, how long it should be continued in order to ease the transition into the second language. The research evidence on that question is not terribly clear, unfortunately. It seems to depend upon the particular circumstances that you are dealing with.

One of Mr. Epstein's main recommendations is that serious and sensitive comparative research needs to be done with the transitional approach, the immersion bilingual approach, and perhaps with other approaches. With this recommendation I am in hardy accord. And I hope that ways can be found to fund and conduct this research. I hope that that twenty million dollars will be not only authorized but appropriated. But, as Mr. Epstein points out, bilingual-bicultural advocates unfortunately tend to express strong opposition to including even a limited test of the emergent bilingual approach despite the promise it holds for many children. Apparently a good deal of the opposition is based on the notion that the immersion bilingual approach is nothing more than a return, or a regression, to traditional approaches which are said to have failed for decades in the United States.

I am not really in a position to evaluate the merits of this claim that traditional approaches have produced massive failures. I am prepared to believe that there have, indeed, been massive failures in many cases. He cited a statistic of 45 percent, or something like that. That means, of course, that maybe 45 percent of the kids throughout the nation have failed. But we don't know how this breaks down locally. There are probably some programs where a hundred percent of the kids failed and others where maybe zero or very small numbers failed. My only actual contact with so-called traditional programs for language minority children came some years ago when I looked at English education programs for American Indians, particularly in connection with the education of the Hopi and Navajo.

It was my distinct impression at that time that for the majority of these children, when the teachers were well-trained and sensitive to the needs and developing capabilities of these children, the more or less traditional approach seemed to work quite well. That is, even when children entered the first grade without a knowledge of English and were taught by a monolingual English-speaking teacher, by the end of the first grade they were operating quite successfully in English—not

only in speaking and understanding but also in reading and writing.

If there was any real problem in these American Indian programs, it was more likely to show up in adolescence, when some students began to have greater difficulty than might be expected, perhaps because of motivational problems. It was also my observation at that time that Hopi and Navajo parents were very supportive of education in English from the start—and quite resistant to the notion that any instruction in Hopi or Navajo was necessary or even desirable. In fact, as you may know, back in the thirties and forties, there was a program of one of the commissioners of Indian Affairs, John Collier, to try to have a bicultural education program in the American Indian communities, and this was stoutly resisted in many cases. Now that was more than twenty years ago, and perhaps the attitudes of many American Indian parents have changed. Perhaps the situation in American Indian education is not comparable to that of some other minority groups, such as the Hispanic groups that we've been hearing about.

Although I said earlier that I have not been paying attention in recent years to general problems of bilingual education, it happens that I have had a good deal of contact with the work going on in Canada, with the so-called immersion classes in French for native English-speaking children. I have personally observed these immersion classes, and I have extensively evaluated the research done in Ontario that was designed to demonstrate—was designed to evaluate, really—the effectiveness of these techniques. Although this research leaves a number of important questions unanswered (for example, the question of whether immersion programs necessarily have to start in the earlier grades), I can vouch for the main conclusions.

Not only do the children learn a second language quite well, but they also make quite adequate progress in their other subjects, even when those subjects are taught in French, or they make adequate progress in English, when reading and writing in English is introduced, maybe in the second or third or fourth grade. And the children seem to have very little difficulty with these skills. If they have any initial difficulties, they more or less disappear a year or so later. In the long run, the French immersion techniques produce children who are truly bilingual in English and French, in the sense that they are perfectly comfortable with instruction and social interaction in either language. Perhaps their competence in French is not quite as facile as their native French-speaking counterpart, but for all practical purposes, it is adequate.

Thus, if I were asked about the best way to teach English to language minority children, if that's the problem anyway, I would recommend serious consideration of something like the immersion techniques that have been successful in Canada. I believe there are important dif-

ferences between these techniques and the traditional techniques that are said to have produced massive failures in United States language minority education programs. There are some similarities, to be sure, but the differences may be critical.

From my understanding of what some of the traditional techniques in the United States have been, here are some important differences. First, in the United States, children have been restricted from using their native language and often severely punished for doing so, even outside of class on the playground. In the Canadian immersion programs, restrictive and punitive techniques have never been employed as a part of instructional policy. Children are not restricted from using their native language on occasion. On the contrary, they naturally get rewarded for using the second language. Also, teachers are bilingual and are able to communicate with children in either language.

Now, only those children judged by teachers to be able to learn well in the immersion classes are placed in those classes. Usually the judgment is made at the kindergarten level on the basis of the child's performance in the French instruction periods. I don't have figures to enable me to estimate what proportion of all children are judged suitable for immersion classes, but my guess would be that about half the school population is judged apt for this. There is some evidence that has correlated profit from immersion classes with socioeconomic and other background factors. Nevertheless, there have been many children from lower socioeconomic backgrounds in the immersion classes, and they do well. Also, there is the real possibility that, in the Canadian situation, the teachers were unduly cautious and conservative about judging children's likelihood of success in immersion classes.

Finally, the curriculum in French, the French instructional materials are well-designed and well-adapted to the needs of the children. Many of the instructional materials have been taken over or adapted from materials already developed and tested in schools in the French-speaking regions of the country. In traditional United States programs, it is my understanding that it was often the case that little account was taken of the particular needs of the language minority children in learning English. The vocabulary and concept were foreign to them, and therefore, inappropriate. However, I am not even sure that that is a terribly important problem. A good and sensitive teacher ought to be able to take care of those problems reasonably well.

Several additional facts about the Canadian immersion program need to be mentioned. In the Ontario experiments, and elsewhere, the immersion technique was compared with a fair variety of other techniques of second language instruction, for example, with a technique similar to the FLES programs in the United States, where the second language is

taught in only a small part of the school day. The immersion technique was clearly superior to these other partially bilingual programs. I mean, you don't have to be searching for a small statistical difference in such things. The differences were just immense.

I believe that one reason the immersion techniques worked so well is that instead of the second language being the object of instruction it was the means of instruction. When children learned their math, social studies, and the rest in French, they realized the usefulness of the second language in learning and communication. Secondly, I found little evidence that the immersion programs produced any great psychological trauma in the children who were participating. A few children were, to be sure, dropped from the immersion classes and referred to clinics, but as far as we know, they were children who might have had difficulty in regular classes anyhow.

I found serious defects and limitations in one research report that claimed immersion classes produced special and unique stresses for some children. Now, we would have to recognize certain practical problems, and also theoretical problems, in applying immersion techniques in many situations in the United States, although we have applied them in some cases. The Canadian children in immersion have been, for the most part, already speakers of the dominant language, and the target language was the language of secondary importance to them. In the United States minority language programs, the situation would be reversed. Just how critical this reversal would be is not yet clear, but I've seen no reason why any adverse effect could not be either minimized or averted completely if the program is well-designed and sensitively conducted.

Another practical problem is the question of whether an immersion program is advisable when the children in a class are of mixed language backgrounds.

Despite these and other unanswered practical questions, my main point is that the immersion technique need not be anything like the traditional techniques that have been assailed for their failures. Even if immersion techniques should prove to be unsuccessful with a certain relatively small proportion of the children who need help, I would wager they would be more successful with the larger majority of children than other techniques proposed. And I say that in the light of the comment that was made by somebody this morning that they believe that the Spanish minority language children ought to be able to learn English just as well as another group. I would certainly endorse and support that idea.

In testing the usefulness of the immersion technique, as well as other promising techniques, there is need for sound, well-controlled research.

I would hope that the courts and the legal experts, and indeed, all the interested parties, such as minority group leaders and parents, could withhold some of their rejections and constraints, within reason, long enough to permit this research to be accomplished under favorable conditions. My interpretation of the *Lau* decision would be that the Court was in fact asking educators to perform the research necessary to come up with good answers as to what kind of special attention language minority children need. It is tragic and ironic that four years after that decision we have hardly begun to find those answers.

My discussion up to this point has been predicated largely on the assumption, which I find reasonable, that raising children's competence in the language of instruction is a necessary factor in permitting them to succeed under that instruction. To this extent, language is a factor in school success, but obviously, it might not be the only factor. Even when children understand the language of instruction, there can be many school failures among them.

There have been many studies of factors in school success. The NIE and the Office of Education and others have done a great many of these studies, and we do know a lot about the factors in school success. Some of these factors are what is ordinarily called intelligence or mental ability or aptitude. Certainly there are individual differences in these things, which are correlated with school success, although it is a problem exactly what the source of these differences is—whether it's genetic or mainly environmental or in home background and experience, for example.

Recent studies have shown that a lot of the differences in the success of school children could be attributed to the fact that some children are given the opportunity to learn and others are not, in the sense that children have to be presented with the right content and an adequate amount of time to learn it. And others, that some differences come because particularly the slower learners are not given enough time to learn what they have to learn. Then there are problems in motivation—willingness on the part of the children to spend the amount of time that they do need to master the kind of content. Another thing which has been mentioned is the quality of the instructional material. The sensitivity and communicative teaching abilities of the teachers are very important. Research in the schooling of language minority children must take all these factors into account. It would be unfortunate if the language factor were to be blamed for failure when the actual source of failures lies in other factors. Indeed, I am afraid that this is precisely what has happened in many instances. And this has been the source of much confusion, conflict, and woe.

ISIDRO LUCAS*

Political Demands of Spanish-speaking Communities in the United States

The Politics of Margination

On August 17, 1978, President Carter signed once more a proclamation, designating the week beginning on September 10 as Hispanic Heritage Week in the United States.[1] Throughout the country, governors, mayors, and other officials followed this example and signed similar documents. In fact, the president was following the directive from Congress to issue such a proclamation every year.[2]

The thrust of this document can be the theme of this paper. It is summarized in the first paragraph, where the president states:

> I want to reaffirm my commitment to ensuring the full participation of our Hispanic citizens in all levels of society and government.[3]

Participation is emphasized as a goal. That is because Hispanics in the American political scene can be characterized by lack of participation.[4]

The Hispanic Caucus in Congress was organized on December 8, 1976, under the leadership of Representative Edward Roybal (D.) of California. There are now 115 Representatives and 24 Senators listed as honorary members of the caucus, almost all the Congressmen with large concentrations of Hispanic constituents. But there are only five formal members of the caucus: four Congressmen and the non-voting resident commissioner of Puerto Rico. Since the recent loss of Joseph Montoya of New Mexico to Senator Harrison Schmitt, there has been no Hispanic in the Senate of the United States.

There are 7,562 elected legislators in the fifty states of the Union.[5] Of

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those, approximately 80 are Hispanic. Of the 325 state supreme court justices, only one (in New Mexico) is Hispanic. Of all major state elected officials, a total of 302 according to the Council of State Governments, only four, all in New Mexico, are Hispanic, or Spanish-surnamed. Among the states with large numbers of Hispanics, California has 40 senators and 80 representatives; of those, there are 3 Hispanic senators and 8 Hispanic representatives. New York, with 60 senators and 150 representatives, has 2 of each that are Hispanic. Texas elects 181 legislators, 23 of whom are Hispanic. Illinois has no Hispanic legislator among its 59 senators and 173 representatives. Only New Mexico has a substantial representation of Hispanics in its legislature: 11 out of its 42 senators, and 19 out of the 70 representatives.

The only Hispanic governor in the country today is Jerry Apodaca of New Mexico. Governor Carlos Castro of Arizona resigned to become an ambassador. At the city levels, the picture is quite similar. Mayor Maurice Ferre, a Puerto Rican in Miami, is the only Hispanic to preside over a major American city. Los Angeles, with a Chicano population in excess of one million, has no single Hispanic serving in the city council. Chicago, where Latinos comprise between 7 and 10 percent of the population, has no Latino among its 50 aldermen.

Lack of participation is the reality of today's Hispanics in the United States. In Third World concepts (particularly in Latin America) the most-often used word to describe this phenomenon is *margination*, the condition of large groups of population outside the margins of political and public life (at times in Latin America, even outside the margins of a money economy). Margination then seems the most appropriate word to describe the prevalent political reality of the 11 to 16 million Hispanics in the United States today.

The concept of margin offers a further insight into Hispanic political life. In the recent series of close electoral results, blocs of votes that can be identified as such can claim to have provided the margin of victory for a specific candidate. Consider the case of President Carter's victory in 1976:

> Latinos cast 1,887,600 votes in the 1976 presidential election. Jimmy Carter received about 1,529,000 of these, or 81 percent. . . . Latino voters in the pivotal electoral states of Texas and New York provided Carter with crucial vote margins. In Texas, which Carter carried by only 129,019 votes, Latinos gave him 205,800 more votes than they did Ford. In New York Carter received 277,680 Latino votes and won the state by 288,767. . . . Our Ohio projections are less precise, but we estimate that Latinos there gave Carter an 18,000 plurality. He carried the state by only 11,116 votes. If Ford could have overcome Carter's slender margins in these three states, he would still be President.[6]

This condition of margin, the provision of swing vote blocs for a given

candidate, is evident in other elections as well. In 1960, Kennedy, the first presidential candidate to mount a specific campaign to get the Hispanic vote with the Viva Kennedy clubs, obtained 85 percent of the Chicano vote in the Southwest, and with this vote, the winning margin.[7] In 1964 with the overwhelming victory of Lyndon Johnson in the emotional aftermath of Kennedy's death, Goldwater's victory in his own state of Arizona can be attributed to the lack of participation of Chicanos in that year's election. The number of Chicano voters in 1968 shrunk substantially. Those who voted did so for Humphrey in 87 percent of the cases. But the lack of Chicanos who voted can be considered a crucial factor that allowed Nixon to obtain the needed pluralities in the Southwest. This fact was not lost on the Republican politicians, and for the first time, in the reelection campaign for Nixon in 1972, the party devoted substantial attention to the Hispanic vote. The internal workings of this attention came to light at the Watergate hearings, with the "Responsiveness Program" of grants and other government support to Hispanic projects during Nixon's first term.

The argument can be made that marginal voting, that of the Hispanics in this case, can and has in the past played a pivotal role in the national political scene. The impact of such a role, however, can be more apparent than real. The problem with claims of "swing vote" participation in contested elections is that they can be made by almost any group. Any one identifiable voting bloc can claim to have put the candidate over the top. And in practice the benefits of victory cannot be shared by all those claimant groups. The results revert then to margination: Hispanics' voice in the administration, Congress, and other political forums does not carry much weight.

This reality underscores any analysis of actual political issues and demands from Hispanic communities. But prior to a concrete description of those issues, a further question is appropriate: an inquiry into the causes of the lack of participation, the marginality of Hispanics to the national political process.

It is not enough to point at the problem and exhort Hispanics to participate:

> Its problems (the Mexican-American community's) are . . . a disposition to political apathy. This last characteristic is particularly telling, for without involving itself in politics, the Mexican-American community will remain unnecessarily dependent.[8]

Socioeconomic factors, this paper submits, are at the roots of political marginality that appear to the outside observer as apathy.

Exploring Margination: Socioeconomic Conditions

Political participation that fully incorporates a group into the

mainstream of decision-making and impact on the political processes must be predicated in the context of conditions that characterize the group in itself and in relationship to society at large. Coleman has suggested a set of such conditions or political resources—actualized or potential: freedom of social action, control over economic resources, educational attainment, numerical size and geographical concentration, social cohesiveness, political solidarity, "leisure" time, political representation and access, etc.[9]

Of particular interest is the concept of "leisure" time. It is closely related to control over versus dependence on socioeconomic conditions in a particular group. In a sense, it is another manifestation of the popular "hierarchy of needs" scale proposed by Maslow[10] and adopted by many psychologists and social policy proponents today. To a large extent, political activity is a "self-actualization" process and can occur only when there is "leisure" time, free from the urgency of survival demands. It is a more sophisticated postulation of the old Latin proverb *primum vivere, deinde philosophare* (first, to live; only then to worry about philosophical questions). This is not to say that political action will not occur as a consequence of intolerable socioeconomic conditions. However, action thus motivated usually takes the form of radical, revolutionary activities; and even then, it requires the presence of a leadership group, whose individuals manage to free themselves from the present survival needs to devote time and energies to longer-range planning and setting of goals. This type of political activity has appeared and is present in some Latino communities, as will be explored later. For the most part it calls for sporadic, one-issue battles. The model of "leisure" time as a precondition for political activity is valid for mainstream politics and for the type of political demands that aspire to comprehensive intervention and ongoing effort.

The current socioeconomic conditions of Hispanic groups in the United States are not conducive to political participation. In fact these conditions can summarize the entire axiology of the lack of participation in the political life that has been characterized as margination.

One of the best tools for measuring life standards and comparative socioeconomic conditions is an analysis of social indicators:

> Social indicators are a special type of statistics used to measure and describe social conditions. . . . (They) can provide a measure of the degree of improvement or decline in the level of well-being of some part of society.[11]

Income

The first elementary measure of the well-being of the Hispanic (or other) communities is the level of income they reach.

Median Household Per Capita Income[12]			
	1959	1969	1976
"Majority"	$1,472	$2,601	$4,333
Puerto Ricans	868	1,362	2,153
Mexican-Americans	742	1,334	2,130

The main Hispanic populations in the country have a median income under one-half that of the "majority populations." Moreover, the difference is actually increasing (at a rather high rate for the Puerto Ricans). Incidentally, as of 1976 the median income of Puerto Ricans and Mexican-Americans had slipped below that of the blacks which, although still way below that of majority families, shows a steady increase in relation to it.

A corollary of this economic condition is the percentage of poverty-level families among Hispanics:

Poverty Rates: Families and Unrelated Individuals[13]		
	1969	1976
"Majority"	13%	9%
Puerto Ricans	28	32
Mexican-Americans	28	24

The gap in the numbers of families with incomes below the poverty level compared with that of the majority population is large and increasing. The percentage of Puerto Rican families in poverty is increasing as well. (It is worth noting that similar phenomena are occurring among black families, and in female-headed households across racial and ethnic lines.) The depth of the problem is not easily perceived. Even the Hispanic Congressional Caucus underestimates the level of poverty among Hispanics when it pegs it at twice that of other families.[14]

Other indicators further convey the problem of poverty among Hispanics. Thus, overcrowded housing conditions exist almost six times as often among Mexican-Americans as among "majority" households in renter-occupied housing, and five times as often in owner-occupied households.[15]

Employment

Income is a consequence of employment in the great majority of American households. Impact of employment or unemployment on the "leisure" time availability that we have postulated as a pre-condition of political activity is obvious.

Unemployment and Teenage Unemployment[16]						
	1960		1970		1976	
	Total	Teen	Total	Teen	Total	Teen
"Majority"	4.7%	9.8%	3.9%	10.6%	5.9%	15.0%
Puerto Ricans	8.8	14.8	6.3	17.9	16.3	55.2
Mexican-Americans	8.1	14.4	6.4	14.8	11.1	24.3

More sophisticated measurements can supplement the insight of these data into the employment picture of Hispanics. Such measurements include occupational mobility, prestige occupation ratios, etc. But even the first-glance value of the basic employment-unemployment figures have immediate political implications. They could signal a warning for radicalization of Hispanics as well as other minorities. The teenage unemployment figures portend a minority class of individuals who are growing up without the experience of the normalcy of a work-day discipline and satisfaction. If one adds to this schooling that is inadequate in itself and alienating in its ideological content, it is not impossible to understand how youths were the primary actors in the radical political movements among Hispanics in the sixties.

In emphasizing the current economic conditions of Hispanic communities in terms of their impact on political participation and voicing of demands, there is a tendency to minimize the economic power of these communities in absolute terms. Even with lower economic levels than the majority populations, however, Hispanics still represent a buying power of more than $31 billion, with a median family income of $9,551 a year in 1975.[17] They are largely concentrated in major metropolitan areas, and represent a young consumer market. As the economic and marketing implications of these facts have been stressed—as well as the presence of a flourishing media group serving this market[18]—so, too, could the political consequences of political campaigning and increased attention to these communities.

Education

It is a cherished American tenet that education equals opportunity of access to the economic success ladder. At times education has been proposed as a primary constitutional right, although the courts have rejected such a claim.[19] A basic, minimal education has been convincingly argued to be at least a secondary constitutional right, necessary for the exercise of the franchise and to give meaning to the freedom of speech guarantees of the First Amendment.[20]

In terms of political participation and political demands, the relevance of education occurs at two levels: the socially sufficient education for access to and operation in the political mainstream, and the training of leaders who will articulate the political realities of the communities for inclusion in national agendas.

In the first area, "sufficient education" is not a pedagogical but a sociological concept. It varies with time and place. In the United States today, a high school diploma represents to such an extent this minimum of society's educational demands that those who lack the diploma are labeled "dropouts" and their presence in large numbers was characterized at one point as "social dynamite."[21]

Several studies have focused on the Hispanic dropout problem. Their results show dropout rates of 71.2 percent[22], 56 percent[23], etc. Such a failure rate indicates that the responsibility for this problem must be ascribed, not to the individual "dropout," but to the education system that lacks or refuses to exercise retention power, creating instead the phenomenon of the "push-out," a terminology preferred by many Hispanic communities.

High school diplomas are not yet as frequent among Hispanics as among the "majority" population:

High School Completion—Percentages[24]			
	1960	1970	1976
"Majority"	69%	83%	87%
Puerto Ricans	24	44	68
Mexican-Americans	34	55	64

These figures, for individuals from twenty to twenty-four years of age who have completed twelve years of schooling, show remarkable progress, but there is still a considerable gap. Other indicators can help to explore further the educational conditions, such as delayed education, etc. Another series of data would give evidence for society's discouragement of efforts to close the gap; these include job-overqualification figures and relative proportion of education to earnings on a comparative basis.

The second level of impact of education on the political process can be measured to some extent by statistics on college completion. The assumption is that for those who achieve that higher level of education, a better job will follow and with it the ability and the tools to enter the conventional political arena.

College Completion Percentages[25]			
	1960	1970	1976
"Majority"	20%	22%	34%
Puerto Ricans	4	4	6
Mexican-Americans	4	5	11

This indicator presents perhaps the most dramatic gap between Hispanic and majority populations. Its meaning is stressed with the datum that the level of earnings of various Hispanic groups represents anywhere from 86 percent to 46 percent of that for majority males.

One more dimension is relevant as the impact of college education is measured in terms of leadership potential for political participation. Hispanics, except for a couple of exceptions, (the Juárez-Lincoln University, affiliated with Antioch College, for instance) lack a network of Hispanic institutions of higher learning.[26] The absence of those institutions is better understood by recalling the prevalent role played by Negro colleges in the days before the full acceptance of blacks in the mainstream institutions and the emergence of affirmative action programs in college admissions.

These socioeconomic conditions, even in the absence of less quantifiable cultural and historical circumstances influencing attitudes and participation of Hispanics in mainstream politics, would go a long way in explaining the functional absence of these communities in the larger context of the American political scene. The concept of margination thus acquires a full meaning. Political demands to be examined now will be posited from this context.

Political Demands of Hispanic Communities in the United States

Participation has been underscored as thematic in the political demands of Hispanics. Others have called it empowerment and representation.[27] It is the other side of the coin of the definition of these communities as marginated. Hispanics so described constitute what is called in America a "minority." Thus their political experience is likened to that of racial minorities such as blacks. Historically both groups share a great deal: involuntary conscription to America, racial as well as cultural characteristics, and a history of explicit discriminatory practices.

There is another approach: the comparison of Hispanics as a distinct language and cultural group of newcomers with previous European waves of immigrants. In analyzing political demands, this approach provides useful insights. However, allowances must be made for the

changed conditions of the country that Europeans and Hispanics joined: a full industrial (even post-industrial, service) society, with an awareness of resource and development limitations, a fully settled territory, and a national identity more established than in years past. The disparity of reception to a group coming in with the same old virtues of a strong back and a willingness to work in such a developed society is obvious.

There is yet another aspect of the Hispanic experience in the United States: the elusiveness of the concept of *Hispanic* itself. It is not descriptive of a single community but is a convenient administrative and statistical concept. In reality, no one relates vitally to being a Latino, a Hispanic, or Spanish-speaking. What exists in reality is a series of nationality groups. Each group shares or apportions for itself general and differential speech and cultural contents. Only sporadically is there coalescing on single-issue efforts.

Nowhere is this diversity more apparent than in political demands. There is empathy among Hispanic groups for the demands of each one of them, but this attitude is not pervasive, particularly among the rank and file. In issues of social policy, where commonality surfaces most often, common positions are frequently arrived at independently by each group, and only enlightened leadership allows for common strategies and action.

For these reasons, and because of the nature of the political process itself, it is very difficult to find a defined set of political demands that can be analyzed and subjected to classification and criticism. Contents for a description of political demands must be gleaned from occasional statements, ephemeral writings and periodicals, and even conversations. The attempt at description of the demands can be labeled presumptuous when it is considered more than pure narrative report and interpreted as representative postulation. The author is seen as staking a claim as spokesperson for the individual or collective communities. Therefore, it is good to emphasize at this stage that the purpose of this paper is limited to reporting for further knowledge, rather than presuming to define or judge the value of the political demands of Hispanic communities today. In the light of these disclaimers and qualifications, the following political demands have been grouped almost arbitrarily and are perceived to a large extent subjectively.

International Politics

The Status of Puerto Rico. In 1978, the United Nations once again brought up in committee the status of Puerto Rico, at the insistence of Cuba. To many Third World countries, the concept of commonwealth (an intentionally imprecise translation of the *Estado Libre Asociado*

definition) is but a veiled disguise for the colonial status of the island. The governor of Puerto Rico, Romero Barceló, is himself an advocate of statehood status for the island. He denied the charge that Puerto Rico is a colony of the United States.[28] To him and many advocates of statehood, the final structure of Puerto Rico-United States relationships will be a decision of the Puerto Ricans themselves, and this decision will have to be accepted by the United States through its legislative and executive branches.

To a sizeable group of Puerto Rican intelligentsia, commonwealth status—*a fortiori* statehood—means less than full franchise. It excludes voting for the election of the president and has representation but no vote in Congress. Advocating an all-out struggle for independence, this group contends that the full realization of Puerto Rican nationhood can only be accomplished in a total structural separation of Puerto Rico from the Union.[29]

Finally, a great number of Puerto Ricans (the majority in the last plebiscite on the subject) and an articulate political leadership prefer the current arrangement of commonwealth or free associated state. They remember the progress this represents from the Foraker Act of 1900 and the Jones Act of 1917. They are aware of the economic conditions on the island (an official unemployment rate of 19 percent, a trade deficit of nearly $2 billion—mostly with the continent—a scarcity of natural resources[30]) and consider the present arrangement, with some modifications, the best for Puerto Rico.[31]

The status of Puerto Rico is an issue today not only in the United Nations but in the United States as well. In the waning days of his presidency, Gerald Ford's call for statehood for Puerto Rico surprised only those who had not kept abreast of the issue. Then in January of 1977, Rep. Philip Ruppe of Michigan formally submitted a bill embodying the outgoing administration's policy. Very shortly before, on September 26, 1976, the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs had debated the proposed New Compact of Permanent Union proposed by the Bi-Lateral Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Puerto Rico.

The issue is pressing both domestically and internationally. To many Puerto Ricans, on the continent and on the island, it has been historically the primary issue, and all other demands of any scope must wait until it is resolved. A few comments on its translation into political demands of Hispanics in the country:

a. The basic demand is a question of nationality and self-identity for Puerto Ricans. Advocates of independence, often in a Marxist political context, seek this identity in total independence. In so doing they use the rhetoric of the Third World and stress the connection of Puerto Rico with the rest of the Spanish-speaking hemi-

sphere.[32] But advocates of statehood for the island, as they stress full political participation as a state in the Union, also demand strict preservation of culture, language, and other characteristics of sovereignty for Puerto Rico. In doing so, they invoke the principles of federalism debated since the time of the Founding Fathers, with arguments for state autonomy that would seem in the tradition of the most constructionist of the constitutionalists.

b. Puerto Ricans on the continent feel most keenly as their own the question of status for the island.[33] Their intervention in congressional hearings is often for the purpose of asserting their stake in the issue. Implications of this attitude, at times incomprehensible to outside observers and congressmen, go beyond the nostalgic interest in the "old country." There exists a closeness and continuous contact, and the migration process is not and may never be completed. The level of return and repeated migrations may make Puerto Ricans an immigrant group unlike any of the earlier arrivals.

c. A phenomenon difficult to document in the written word strikes the observer. Among the Puerto Ricans on the continent there are a great number who support independence as the ultimate status. In the absence of formal surveys, individual observations over a number of years would lead the observer to venture that proportionately this leaning is more prevalent on the continent than on the island. If this observation reflects a reality, its axiology may provide particular insights into the feelings of alienation that are the results of the migration experience for many first- and second-generation Puerto Ricans.

The trend also elicits an echo among non-Puerto Rican Hispanics. At the recent National Convention of IMAGE, in the summer of 1978, in Washington, D.C., a motion of support for Puerto Rico's independence was submitted. It never passed, after being heatedly debated. But the fact that it was proposed is remarkable in itself, when one considers that the organization, a grouping of Hispanic government employees, has an overwhelming majority of Chicanos among its members.

The Right to Enter the Country. President Carter proposed in 1977 a new initiative in the area of immigration. Administration bills H.R. 9531 and S.2252 were introduced in Congress. Only the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on the bills. The policy changes had a primary thrust: they were attempting to deal with the problem of the "illegal aliens," better referred to as undocumented workers.

The history of immigration policies in the United States towards the Western Hemisphere and particularly towards Mexico is long and com-

plex. Often the implementation and enforcement of the laws by the successive administrations have been subject to the vagaries of labor needs from agribusiness or major industries.

The numbers of estimated undocumented aliens in the country have soared in the last five to seven years. At their height, claims were made that this population may number up to twelve million. (General Leonard Chapman, Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service addressing the national convention of the American Legion in 1975 warned the Legionnaires of a "silent invasion" that would threaten national security.) The methodology used to reach these figures consisted of questions to the INS district office directors or projections of total populations from number of apprehensions. (Recently Leonel Castillo, current INS director, voided the contract that had disbursed $750,000 to a consultant to perform a reliable count; he alleged the firm was nowhere near reaching an appropriate estimate.)

In this context, the Carter administration proposals were complex. There were some forms of "amnesty" for undocumented workers, depending on length of stay and substantial residential linkages established by individual workers. There were also mild penalties for employers of the undocumented.

The reactions of Hispanic groups to these initiatives were for the most part negative. It must be kept in mind that the issue has been alive among the Hispanics for a long time. The drive for unionization of migrant farmworkers, that propelled César Chávez to the national limelight in the mid-sixties, was possible only after the temporary entry of farm laborers in the Bracero program was discontinued in 1964. Hispanics have fought for the undocumented in court and the political arena.[34] Opponents of the presidential initiatives labeled them insufficient in a human rights context.

Demands of Hispanic communities in this area call for a liberalization of immigration policies as well as for a just and generous adjustment of status for those already in the country without proper authorization. There is again in this issue an empathy that binds several Hispanic groups in the concern for this subclass of population that lives without rights and in pervasive fear.

There is also an issue of survival. Many of the proposals to stem the tide of the undocumented focus on penalties to employers who hire them. This is perceived by many as a direct threat to Hispanics everywhere: from denying employment to the undocumented Mexican to rejecting anyone who "looks" Mexican or Puerto Rican, there is a small step.

The political demands, therefore, acquire a national dimension at the same time that they are fought in the local United States district court

in individual cases. The issue is likely to grow as demographic pressures south of the border grow.

Other International Issues. The issues thus far described have a double edge as domestic as well as international concerns. Like other nationality groups, Hispanics also express demands in various areas of international policies of the United States. The Cubans, for instance, reacting in the pattern of previous exile groups, predictably wish to reject or delay normalization of relations with the present regime in Cuba. Hispanics also aligned themselves solidly behind the administration on the new treaties with Panama.[35]

In general, and mostly among the most articulate leadership of the Hispanics, international policy demands are based on a sense of affinity with the rest of Hispanic America. Natural cultural and emotional ties lead United States Hispanics to empathetic feelings towards other Spanish-speaking countries in the Western Hemisphere. In doing so, Hispanics also increasingly demand a specific role in the United States relationships to those countries. Cultural commonalities, Hispanics assert, make them the natural bridge of understanding and cooperation in the Western Hemisphere. In this context, the fact that the United States is the fourth largest Spanish-speaking country in the world acquires particular relevance.

Domestic Policies

The Politics at the Margin: Radicals and Revolution. Throughout history there have been Hispanics who have expressed political demands backed by radical or revolutionary tactics. From the *Manos Negras* in Texas in the second half of the nineteenth century, through Juan Nepomuceno Cortina and his guerrilla tactics, Hispanics have reacted to their perception of oppression in radical departures from political processes that they saw closed to them. In Puerto Rico, the independentist efforts of a Pedro Albizu Campos followed yet another radical path.

In the sixties, there was a flurry of revolutionary movements in the United States. Some of them sought reparations for past specific injuries, like the Rejes Tijerina *Alianza Popular de los Pueblos Libres* defending the land grants and historical territorial claims.

Often the radicalization occurred in a context of Marxist ideology, in a trajectory that led youth to political activism from an initial paralegal youth association.[36] That was the history of the Young Lords in Chicago and New York, and that of the Brown Berets, initiated in California and branching out into the Midwest.

Today there seems to be a lull in this type of activity. Socioeconomic conditions prevail that could rekindle these movements anew. But the

current revolutionary movements seem to be only those of the Puerto Rican Liberation Front and their terrorist bombings in New York and Chicago.

A separate chapter in a history of political activity outside of conventional two-party systems was written in Texas by the *La Raza Unida* Party. Learning from the mainstream politics in America, leaders centered on local educational and municipal issues. The party thus achieved a measure of success in Crystal City, Texas, where it gained control first of the school board and then of the city government. It has since laid a claim for more ambitious undertakings and has been involved in national politics. It presented slates of candidates for statewide elections. The full impact of this movement and its leaders is still to be felt fully. The basic demand here has been one of the right of participation in a primary area of power, that of the local community.

The Politics of Poverty: Socioeconomic Demands. Under this heading fall political demands that are specific to Hispanics but may be shared with other minorities as well. These are the types of demands more often expressed by the leadership at the national level and also deeply felt by the *barrio* grassroots to the point where they may move to action and capture headlines.

On July 20–22, 1977 in Dallas, Texas, a National Hispanic Leadership Conference took place. It was a unique meeting. There had been gatherings before: the El Paso conference, alternative to the Johnson administration hearings at the same time and place; the Latino Caucuses at the 1972 and 1976 National Democratic Conventions, etc. What was new in Dallas was a conscious attempt at Hispanic unity among national groups and at a rational intellectual planning of goals and strategies for Hispanic political demands. Most of those fell in the areas of socioeconomic conditions.[37]

First is the demand for participation in voting. The Southwest Voter Registration Project, the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund, present and former elected and appointed officials at all levels of government agreed. As they detailed the history of voting rights violations, they emphasized the need for full voting registration and participation. In the past, there have been obstacles to voting: the voting tax, literacy tests, at-large elections, yearly re-registration, etc. MALDEF continues specific legal actions. The extension of the Voting Rights Act in 1975 included the mandate for language diversity and bilingualism in the voting process.

An aspect of this drive for the exercise of the franchise is the reliance on federal legislation and authority (this reliance is also evident in other socioeconomic areas such as housing, education, health, etc). This re-

liance is decried at times,[38] with a conservative distrust for increased government regulation, but in general it is pervasive.

The trend reflects immediate past history. The black struggle of the sixties for recognition took place wherever needed, and freedom riders and Selma marchers brought the issue to local communities. But it was the wisdom of black strategists at the time to bring their demands to the national conscience, to the point where the full resources of the national government were brought to bear on the attainment of black local goals that would otherwise have been impossible.

The strategy worked then to a large extent. It is hard to predict the potential effect today, when the national mood calls for retrenchment of government size and intervention at every level.

An immediate corollary of this approach is the political demand for participation at the appointive and civil service levels of government. President Johnson initiated a drive to this purpose with the creation of the Mexican-American Interagency Committee. It was upgraded by President Nixon when Congress established the Cabinet Committee on Opportunities for the Spanish-Speaking People. The committee was left to expire in 1974 because it was seen to place too much stress on partisan politics. But by then, nineteen Hispanics had been given prestigious presidential appointments, twenty-two had been appointed to high-level federal government positions, and thirty-seven had been appointed to various part-time roles in commissions, councils, and committees.[39] These figures constitute a benchmark that the current administration cannot but keep in mind. It was also during the past Republican administrations that the variously named programs for Hispanic access to federal employment were formally instituted, as part of the equal employment efforts. As a result, the federal Hispanic work force is not yet large enough for population parity, but a new leadership is emerging. When those employees grouped into their own organization (IMAGE), it became in only three years one of the most articulate voices for Hispanics in the country.

Times have changed. The entire principle of "affirmative action" in government is now being questioned. The Supreme Court in the *Bakke* decision was perceived to have put the concept on the defensive. What effect this new national mood will have on these political demands remains to be seen.

Underlying the various socioeconomic needs and political demands, an increasingly relevant issue for Hispanics is statistical representation. Most government programs are moving from the categorical, discretionary mode into the formula grant, depending heavily on statistical base data. Hispanics have long complained of insufficiency and unreliability of the data available to study and plan for this population.

The basic statistical tool, the census, has been criticized for undercounting Hispanics.[40] When this author, in 1973, suggested that the Midwest census undercount for Hispanics in the Decennial Census of 1970 might have been as high as 20 percent, demographers denied any credence to this figure. Yet, the Current Population Survey figures for 1974 show an increase in Spanish origin populations of 15 percent in one year. The only explanation for this demographic anomaly has to be methodological. Noncomparable nomenclators, scarcity of bilingual census takers, difficulty of the data-gathering process in the inner city, and the natural distrust for government inherent in any marginal population combine to make accuracy in the census difficult.

Scarcity of data carries over to other areas: the Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics) does not yet carry data on Hispanic unemployment for states and major city labor markets.[41] Similarly, the National Center for Educational Statistics lacks information on Hispanic education, leaving the responsibility to the Office for Civil Rights.

Without a solid data base, recognition and planning are hampered. To that extent, sound statistical measurements remain a major political demand of Hispanics. Since 1970, and facing the 1980 decennial, the Bureau of the Census has appointed an Advisory Committee for Hispanic Heritage Census Count. The accuracy of that census will have great relevance for projections: the notion is repeated often now among Hispanics that they will constitute the largest minority by 1990.

In health, the specific issues for Hispanics blend with those of other minorities. Hispanic children are often under-immunized, the result of urban mobility, or over-immunized, as children of migrant farmworkers enter and exit various educational and health jurisdictions. Periodic epidemics of diphtheria or other contagious diseases are met with ad hoc, sporadic campaigns.

Problems of health also include dietary changes in a population in transition: diabetes and tuberculosis are perhaps among the most prevalent forms of morbidity among the urban Hispanics. Parasitic tropical diseases may go undetected or misdiagnosed among Puerto Ricans.

In health, political demands are difficult to translate into action. Government intervention here has increasingly given way from categorical grants (OEO's community health centers) to geographic urban health planning, mired in the complexity of technical demands, and incorporating health service agencies into the network of all-purpose governments. The resulting governing boards do not reflect necessarily the Hispanic presence among the population, and planning for these communities is done without their input.[42]

A growing, explosive issue is that of law enforcement. MALDEF recently presented the attorney general with a list of cases of alleged po-

lice brutality, where federal intervention was demanded because of lax corrective measures adopted by local jurisdictions. Thirty of those cases were located in Colorado alone.[43] Chicago, in June 1977, experienced disturbances, after a Puerto Rican parade, which resulted in two deaths. The issue is explosive, because this is an area where violence is at the surface, and public, dangerous confrontations are likely to occur.[44]

The list of issues in the socioeconomic area is long: housing (most Hispanics are urban dwellers—85 percent of Chicanos and 97 percent of Puerto Ricans) where Hispanics occupy old housing stock and their *barrios* can be characterized as ghettoes;[45] adequate representation in the media;[46] definition of mental health and survival of neighborhood helping networks;[47] transportation to and from work in an era of industrial and business flight from the city cores; etc. Many of these issues are shared by Hispanics with other minorities. Others are more specifically felt by Hispanics, like the plight of migrant farmworkers.[48] All of them arise from and fit into the original description in this paper of Hispanic communities as a marginated population.

A Specific Political Demand: Bilingual Education. Education is also a socioeconomic political demand. Among its many aspects several could be considered: presence of Hispanics in institutions of higher education, achievement levels in the elementary and secondary schools, high school retention rates, etc. In recent years, however, Hispanic demands on education have been centered on a specific new approach to the Hispanic pupil. This approach is not limited to Hispanics, but it has received from them its strongest political impulse. It is bilingual education.

Few issues and political demands have been as uniquely Hispanic—across nationality lines—as bilingual education. The concept—an old one among nineteenth century European immigrants in the Midwest and north Midwest—was suggested in the sixties in the Southwest, as a means to extend to Chicanos the social benefits of the Great Society programs. The enactment of the federal legislation was spurred in Congress by the plight of the newly arrived Cubans in Florida, and bilingual education spread quickly across the country, eagerly adopted by Puerto Ricans, Chicanos, and Cubans.[49]

The first national conference on bilingual education was called by the Texas Educational Agency in 1972 and attracted about 300 practitioners, pioneers of a new, untried concept. By 1977, the National Association of Bilingual Education called its annual meeting in New Orleans, and 5,000 professionals attended. Title VII ESEA federal funds were distributed for the first time in 1968 to the Southwest, the Eastern Seaboard, and Florida. Illinois pioneered state funding for bilingual edu-

cation in 1970. State legislation prohibiting the use of non-English language in the classroom was quickly repealed. Massachusetts, in 1972, was the first state to make bilingual education mandatory under certain conditions. Today, bilingual education is perhaps the most pervasively held political demand of Hispanics in this country.[50]

The issue is complex. In the recent past, it has been approached from a compensatory, equal opportunity in education context. The 1974 Supreme Court decision in *Lau* v. *Nichols* represented for Hispanics a landmark similar in scope to *Brown* v. *Board of Education* in 1954. It has been said rhetorically that the unanimous *Lau* decision was the first recognition of a constitutional right: the right to one's own culture.

Today, this approach to bilingual education from a civil rights viewpoint is experiencing many contradictions. A devastating one is the apparent conflict with desegregation demands: desegregation tends to disperse minorities among the total pupil population; bilingual education requires grouping the students so that appropriate classrooms can be identified. The fact that both civil rights demands have a common basis—the provision of equality of educational opportunities—is not enough to override the distrust of those who would see bilingual education as yet another subterfuge to delay integration.[51] Clarifications in court decisions and social policies will yet have to be made so that both minority needs can be met.

But bilingual education is subject to further controversy today; it has to do with the general retrenchment of the national mood and its outlook for social services. The criticisms of bilingual education center on the value and cost-effectiveness of bilingual education programs. The best known of these critiques is the massive American Institutes for Research analysis of Title VII, ESEA programs.[52]

The reaction to these and other criticisms of bilingual education has been violent and articulate, from Hispanic educators and policy leaders. The reason for this reaction is the deeper perception that attacks on bilingual education are, at the bottom, attacks on bilingualism. The two issues are closely intertwined. Bilingual education is both an expression of and the best hope for bilingualism. And bilingualism is but one manifestation of an affirmation of cultural identity: biculturalism. The defense of Spanish becomes then a rallying point for Hispanics, as it symbolizes a growing sense of nationhood, demand for acceptance by society at large of individual cultural values.

> If language is considered in its broadest aspect—that is as the most important means of holding a culture together, and as the characteristic that sets one population apart from another—then the significance of this common bond cannot be overstated. Spanish represents more than merely a shared language; it is a shared experience dating to childhood.[53]

Bilingual education alone as a pure educational tool or methodology could be suspect as a "late feature of advanced colonialism."[54] Instead, higher principles are invoked:

> At stake are not merely the educational or language rights of the Puerto Ricans, but also the very fiber and legal foundations of political association in the United States and specially the role of the federal government and courts in protecting the rights of minority peoples. More specifically, what is at issue is the content that can be given in the United States to such concepts as "linguistic or cultural pluralism. . . ."[55]

In this adherence to language as a primary expression of group cultural identity, Hispanics are retracing today past language struggles in the United States.[56] In doing so, Hispanics come to the task from a background of stubborn attachment to language to an extent unparalleled by any prior linguistic group. Physical manifestations of this struggle—subway signs, newspapers, telephone instructions—are apparent in major urban areas today. And in this area, as in the question of status for Puerto Rico, Hispanics are moving from a mere defense of Spanish to a new definition of purpose and creation of a national language policy.[57]

To the extent that they can carry this demand to the national consciousness, they will have transformed policies and even mores in the country. The accepted myth of pluralism in the United States will have come closer to reality.

Conclusion

Hispanics have been described in this paper as a minority group in America, and their position *vis à vis* the political mainstream has been described as margination. The reasons for this margination have been explored in terms of socioeconomic conditions that prevent Hispanics from full access to political participation.

A series of political demands (even chosen and described from an arguable subjective viewpoint) can be identified. Some of them are shared by Hispanics with other minority groups; some are unique.

The fact is that among Hispanics there can be perceived a strong movement for action. A leadership has emerged and is consolidating a position in the national scene. Professional organizations in the educational, legal defense, and political areas are here. Old national leadership groups are sharing their representative role with new, more militant, articulate groupings.

And behind this movement there is the swelling force of a growing population. The fastest growing minority in the country, Hispanics are expected by many to be the largest minority in the United States within the next twenty-five years. In the wider context of an increased world

interdependence, with a Western Hemisphere that combines soaring population rates and a vast array of natural resources, Hispanics in the United States claim a new role in both the domestic and international areas.

The future of this "rise of the Hispanic strain"[58] will not want to exclude any possibility. Its concrete manifestations will be defined by and make an increasing impact in the national political realm.

Notes

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2. Joint Resolution, September 17, 1968 (36 U.S.C., 169 ff.).
3. Proclamation, supra note 1.
4. Bill Curry, *Washington Post*, March 28, 1978. This paper will not discuss the confusing nomenclators used to designate the Spanish groups in the United States. Retaining the word "Spanish-speaking" in the title, to keep this paper consistent with the general theme of the conference, we will use most often the term "Hispanic," preferred today more and more by government agencies.
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24. *Social Indicators*, p. 12.

25. *Social Indicators*, p. 14.

26. Luis Martinez-Perez, "Hispanic Students in Higher Education," a paper to the National Conference on the Education of Hispanics, Alexandria, August 20–23, 1978 (mimeographed draft).

27. Paquita Vivo, "A Puerto Rican Perspective on Women, Power and Politics," a speech to the Thi d Biennial Convention of the National Women's Political Caucus, San Jose, Calif., September 11, 1977 (mimeographed).

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29. *See* statements by Sen. Ruben Be ios Martinez, *Hearings on H.R. 11200 and H.R. 11201 to Approve the Compact of P manent Union between Puerto Rico and the United States*, Part II, March 20 and 2 . 1976, pp. 410 and 419. (Hereafter cited as *Hearings*.)

30. *See* Ruthanne DeWolfe, *Information Co cerning Puerto Rico*, for the Information of Region V Advisory Committees, Chicago, Ma 1978 (mimeographed).

31. *See* for instance the statement by Hon. aime Benitez, *Hearings*, Part II, p. 1, and others.

32. *See* Maldonado Denis, *Puerto Rico: Una Interpretacion Politico Social*, Mexico, Editorial Siglo XXI.

33. *Hearings*, Part I, pp. 486 ff.

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38. Ramon C. Cortines, "A Perspective/Federal Policy," a paper to the National Conference on Education and the Hispanics, Alexandria, Virginia, August 20–23, 1978 (mimeographed).

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MARIO OBLEDO* and CARLOS ALCALÁ†

Discrimination Against the Spanish Language in Public Service: A Policy Alternative

It is a great pleasure to address a conference whose purpose is to examine federal and state governments' policies directed toward the use of the Spanish language. Many of the current administrative policies either limiting the use of the Spanish language or now more commonly providing linguistically inaccessible services find their genesis in laws adopted in an age of racism and xenophobia. These linguistically restrictive policies and inaccessible services are today impractical anachronisms whose existence is perpetuated by inertia.

Language restrictive laws were not always the rule in America. When the immigrant pool to America was white Anglo-Saxon Protestant, these laws were nonexistent. The latter part of the nineteenth century and early part of the twentieth century saw the adoption of scores of literacy-in-voting laws which were initially directed against the new immigrants as opposed to chic old immigrants; for example, Irish Catholics were the targets in Massachusetts and Connecticut in 1857 and 1855, respectively. These two literacy laws were the result of an anti-Catholic, anti-Irish, Protestant crusade conducted by the Know-Nothing party for whom barring the franchise to the new immigrants was a primary goal. Between 1890 and 1920, seventeen more states including California and Arizona passed laws requiring literacy tests for voting. The California law was accompanied by legislative protestations against the voting participation of Mexican-Americans and Chinese-Americans.

English literacy was not universally required for either voting or citizenship until the twentieth century. It was not until 1926 that the last

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(The paper was delivered to the conference by Mr. Alcalá.)

state barred the franchise to lawful residents and not until 1950 that Congress required English literacy as a condition of citizenship—although earlier in the century judicial opinions had established the English literacy requirement for citizenship. Thus, laws that had their origins in anti-immigrant feeling soon discriminated against nonimmigrant minority groups such as Indians, Puerto Ricans, Chicanos, and blacks whose high illiteracy rates are the product of poverty and unequal educational opportunity.

English literacy tests having their origins in anti-immigrant feeling were, until the 1970 Voting Rights Act, used to discriminate against minorities that are readily identifiable by color: Chicanos, blacks, Indians, and Boricuas (Puerto Ricans).

Chicanos are particularly susceptible to exclusion based on English literacy testing. Although, in 1975, Congress extended the Voting Rights Act permanently suspending English literacy test requirements for voting in federal, state, or local elections, temporarily unenforceable English literacy test laws had remained on the books in fifteen states including: Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Washington, and Wyoming.

The United States Supreme Court upheld the Voting Rights Act in *Oregon* v. *Mitchell* in 1970. Similarly, the California Supreme Court held English literacy tests in voting to be violative of the state constitution in *Castro* v. *State*—a lawsuit brought by the Chicano community. While English literacy tests in voting have declined, other statutory bars to the full participation of language minorities in American society remain unattenuated. Four states, including California and Arizona, require English speaking ability to hold some state and local offices. Three states restrict foreign language instruction, and twenty-nine states, including Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico, New York, and Illinois, specify English as the main language of instruction in public and private schools—although some of these states, including most that I mentioned, have now made provisions for bilingual education. Other states and territories require that all legislative proceedings, court proceedings, official records, or legal notices be in English. Finally, occupational restrictions barring either aliens or the non-English-speaking from employment remain in force. While these bars have most prominently been applied to the professions—law, medicine, and dentistry—the restrictions have extended to other "critical" occupations such as the public's critical interest in plumage and junk, as both barbers and junk peddlers have in various states and at various times had citizenship and English literacy requirements.

And while the Supreme Court recently held a United States Civil Service Commission ban on federal employment against lawful resident aliens to be illegal, President Carter has recently perpetuated the discrimination by Executive Order. Discrimination in public employment is a phenomenon of the twentieth century whose roots lie deep in the same discrimination against immigrants so prevalent during the anti-alien hysteria. This discrimination has a deleterious effect on both the "new" immigrants—Chicanos and Asians who are easily identifiable by color, and on Chicano resident aliens who reside in barrios where English is rarely spoken and citizenship is even more rarely attained due to literacy requirements. This discrimination is not job-related and, if committed by a private employer, would be illegal. Thus, statutory discrimination on the basis of language has receded but has not been eradicated.

But today's language discrimination is not so much the result of statutory bars as of neglect. Governmental laws and policies have simply failed to make provision for the non-English speaking. While the Court's and Congress's interest in protecting the fundamental interest of the right to vote has spawned protective legislation in voting, efforts have not gone so far as to recognize the needs of language minorities or to create affirmative obligations to provide government social services in a linguistically comprehensible manner. The distinction is important because, while the elimination of English literacy tests in voting is an important example of legislative sensitivity to statutorily imposed language discrimination, linguistically inaccessible services due to administrative policies rather than statutory bars have become the increasing focal point of public concern.

The most prominent example of this public concern is the education area where the United States Supreme Court ruled in the San Francisco case of *Lau* v. *Nichols* that English-only schools discriminated against Chinese-language youths. The holding of the case was rapidly expanded to the Chicano community. Problems persist because the Supreme Court did not set standards for educational provisions necessary to insure compliance with the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Thus, the problem today is addressed in every manner imaginable: everything from real bilingual education to the presence of an English-speaking instructor teaching ESL. Responses have lacked consistency; consequently, success has been uneven. Despite the absence of standards defining bilingual education programs and their relative newness, a recent study entitled the AIR Report severely criticized the effectiveness of bilingual education. While the AIR Report itself has been sufficiently discredited to warrant disregard of its conclusion, the racism that spawned it can-

not be ignored. The report comes at a time when the public mood seems to say that bilingual education is an unnecessary use of public resources and the harbinger of a separate Quebecian region in the Southwest. Nothing could be less true. Bilingual education is absolutely essential to the education of our children for whom a laissez-faire educational system has failed miserably. Nothing has contributed more to the alienation of the Chicano than the bitterness created by an insensitive educational system whose failures are commonplace. The absence of bilingual education in the Southwest will not mean the demise of the Spanish language—it will mean the perpetuation of unequal educational opportunity.

Inherent in today's discussion is an effort to expand the holding of the *Lau* decision beyond education into government social services, just as *Lau* itself was an expansion beyond voting rights. It is worthwhile to note that voting rights involve a fundamental interest and education involves an interest as nearly akin to a fundamental interest as could exist without being declared a fundamental interest. It is in the presence of a judicial finding that a fundamental interest to our society is adversely affected by governmental action that the courts have given special judicial solicitude to complainants. But government social services are viewed as a privilege whose provision may vary with the whims of the electorate; Proposition 13 is grim testimony to that fact.

Why is this discussion of fundamental interest important? Because the mandatory expansion, beyond voting, into education, was not legislative but judicial. One could predict that the most likely avenue for the expansion of language-sensitive requirements into government social services would be judicial. This is not to deny the efforts of many states prior to *Lau*, but it is a recognition that these efforts were weak and not always mandatory. It is also a recognition of the force of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Supreme Court, the mandatory nature of the *Lau* decision, and the fact that the farthest reaching state bilingual education efforts have come after the *Lau* decision. In California, Health and Welfare Secretary Mario Obledo was involved in initiating a bilingual social services lawsuit against his predecessor in *Mixta* v. *Swope*. As a result of that litigation, bilingual hiring was ordered in the California Department of Benefit Payments. Today he finds himself in the ironic position of having the Department of Benefit Payments under his jurisdiction and monitoring their compliance with *Mixta*. Moreover, Secretary Obledo is the new defendant in the case because the order applies to whoever is Secretary of Health and Welfare. We have worked diligently to effect the court's order in *Mixta:* linguistically accessible services.

We believe that the *Mixta* case was correct and that it is the responsibility of government to offer accessible services to all people within its

jurisdiction. The Greek philosopher Aesop memorialized this principle millennia ago in his story about the fox and the stork. The fox invited the stork to dinner and served soup in a shallow dish from which the stork could not drink. Aesop referred to the fox's action as a cruel joke. Is it any more cruel than the situation of Spanish-speaking patients who find themselves in mental hospitals or community mental health centers where they are treated by English-speaking staff who may be well-intentioned but unable to communicate with these people in need of counseling, understanding, and compassion? In California, the Department of Mental Health Services has adopted guidelines which will insure that every community mental health program receiving state monies retains adequate statistics to identify the language of both clients and staff. Where it is evident that the language-minority client population exceeds comparable staff proportion, the mental health program is required to adopt an affirmative action plan to make the services linguistically accessible. Other aspects of the guidelines requiring representative mental health advisory boards have since been codified into statute. I have brought copies of those guidelines for your convenience. Similarly, the Department of Health Services recently held San Francisco General Hospital out of compliance with Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act for failing to provide emergency bilingual health services.

Following receipt of two complaints from Latinos for Emergency Bilingual Health Services and Chinese for Affirmative Action, respectively, the state Civil Rights Office assigned investigators to the hospital on a 24-hour basis for three weeks. For investigative purposes, hospital administrative and services units such as wards were classified into seventy-five separate units. In the process, state investigators and hospital staff reported 38,440 public contacts in seventy-five units. Of these public contacts, 4,804 or 12.5 percent were made by Spanish monolingual people; 1,135 or 3 percent were monolingual Chinese speaking, and 496 or 1.3 percent were monolingual Tagalog speaking. Contemporaneously, only 7 percent of the staff in public contact positions could speak Spanish and these were not evenly distributed by unit and shift.

For example, in looking at the seven emergency units, we found the services to be inaccessible to all but the English-speaking. In psychiatric emergency, a 24-hour unit with three shifts, none of the nineteen people on the day shift, none of the thirteen people on the evening shift, and only one of the fourteen people on the night shift could speak Spanish. Who was treating the 7.1 percent of all clients who spoke only Spanish? In emergency admitting where every moment is valuable, only one of the twenty-seven people on three shifts could speak Spanish.

Yet, 20.8 percent of all contacts these employees have with the public are with people who speak only Spanish. Two of the six emergency units had no Spanish-speaking personnel on the day shift, and three of the emergency service units had no Spanish-speaking personnel on the night shift. These same units reported having substantial Spanish-speaking client contact.

Additionally, civil rights office investigators witnessed on three different occasions in the emergency room triage area incidents where hospital employees tried to communicate in English and in hand gestures with monolingual Spanish-speaking persons.

Similarly, 12 percent of all clients in the labor and delivery emergency area spoke only Chinese, yet none of the nineteen employees in any of the three shifts spoke Chinese.

When asked how staff assignments were made, hospital staff cited seniority as the critical factor. This is unacceptable. Public need should be the byword of publicly funded or publicly licensed services. Similar investigations are now under way in other California county hospitals. It is important to note that the complaint against San Francisco General Hospital was received in February 1978. The lengthy, comprehensive investigation was concluded and a letter of noncompliance was issued by June 30, 1978. It is important because I believe that justice delayed is justice denied.

During the course of the investigation and immediately following the issuance of the letter of noncompliance, administrators at San Francisco General Hospital made arrangements for and eventually hired twenty-seven translators in six languages. Negotiations with the state continue because we believe that the bilingual certification of existing positions to be filled by attrition, rather than the creation of new translator positions, is the best long-range solution to a chronic problem.

The list of other changes made in the last four years is lengthy. For example, all California hospitals constructed with funds under the Hill-Burton Act must prominently display their free service and community service obligations in English and in Spanish. Services to the developmentally disabled are required to be linguistically accessible and when the County of Los Angeles sought to discontinue funding to the only Spanish language mental health program for the developmentally disabled in East Los Angeles, our Civil Rights Office fought successfully to maintain the level of linguistically accessible service. Sterilizations may no longer be performed on Spanish-language women in the absence of safeguards to insure that consent has been both informed and voluntary and that consent was linguistically understood at the time it was rendered.

The legal basis for these regulations lies in existing laws. Both state

civil rights laws adopted over the last fourteen years and general "health and safety" provisions of other statutes have provided sufficient authorization for regulations either forbidding language discrimination or requiring linguistically accessible services. Moreover, where additional legislative authority was required, the state adopted a general statute drafted by Carlos Alcalá which mimicked Title VI and its progeny with two exceptions: first, the law is punctuated by "shalls" rather than "mays"; and second, the Secretary of Health and Welfare is directed to provide standards for all departments.

In the process of incorporating federal civil rights regulations into state law by reference, federal regulations forbidding linguistic discrimination will become California law. By comparison, when the legislature adopted the Dymally-Alatorre Bilingual Services Act requiring state and local agencies to employ bilingual staff as needed, the statute remained unenforced. The agencies charged with monitoring compliance never adopted implementing regulations. Local agencies were left to their own devices to determine when there were "sufficient" numbers of non-English-speaking people to warrant bilingual hires. Consequently, the act is a paper tiger. Those local agencies that want to do something are doing it; others ignore the statute. The problem is less and less the absence of helpful laws and increasingly a problem of neglectful bureaucrats. In order to adopt all the language discrimination rules and regulations of the last four years, not one new law was required. In those instances where new programs such as health service agencies have been created, we have integrated language-conscious provisions into the statute, but even here it is the function of a responsive bureaucracy to suggest provisions which will assist in the operation and management of new programs. In the absence of a responsive bureaucracy, old laws will not be enforced, new program laws will have no civil rights integration, and new civil rights laws will go the way of old civil rights laws—relegation to a dusty shelf.

We have made the bureaucracy responsive by providing the moral leadership and commitment to insure a climate of language discrimination sensitivity. Our concentration on regulations forbidding linguistic discrimination institutionalizes these civil rights policies and creates legally enforceable and more judicially cognizable rights. Moreover, administrative agency recognition of linguistic discrimination and of necessary remedies serves to insulate local or state programs from charges of reverse discrimination—that is the clear message provided by Justice Powell in the *Bakke* case.

Changes have happened because of administrative commitment. Actions were bottomed on a statute that has retained its vitality—the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As long as Secretary Obledo and I are in positions

to influence public policy in California, those positions will be used to protect the poor and the dispossessed. The alternative which we propose requires neither new laws nor lengthy judicial processes. It only requires a commitment to the egalitarian platitudes which politicians frequently mouth. We do not pretend to have solved all the problems which exist in Spanish language discrimination, but we have done our best to insure that our actions do not perpetuate the unfairness which Aesop's fox represented.

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JAMES COLEMAN*

Final Discussion and Summary

To attempt to summarize developments that have taken place in a conference like this is really a very difficult task. What I would like to do is to attempt to focus attention on some issues that seem to me to be critical issues, to try to see what are the fears and goals of two sets of persons. One set of persons are English native speakers, and the other set of persons are Spanish native speakers. Then I will say a little bit about bilingual education itself, because there is some controversy that's arisen with regard to that. Then I will discuss two types of pains and the problems associated with them.

I would like to suggest that there have been three major types of issues raised. One is the issue of whether one should encourage persons to be bilingual. There are really two kinds of questions: One is whether persons whose native language is English should be encouraged to be bilingual. The second is whether persons whose native language is Spanish should be encouraged to be bilingual. By encouraged, I mean whether institutions should be established to do this. Now with regard to the second of these, a fundamental question arises: If that occurs, then will this lead to loss of Spanish? This bilingualism of persons is the first issue, and as I've suggested, it arises principally with regard to persons whose native language is Spanish.

A second issue which arises is: Should services and facilities be bilingual? (which is very different from the question of whether persons should be bilingual). And under that there are four subquestions. One is: If the answer is in some general fashion, "yes," then we have to ask more specifically, should it be everywhere, or only in some places? The example of everywhere is the example of the Canadian law, which has required bilingual services and facilities throughout the country, in rural

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Quebec, having English signs and in British Columbia, having French signs. So should it be everywhere or in some places? The second question is: Should this be the case with government services and facilities? The third is: Should it be the case with nongovernment services and facilities (telephones, signs in stores, cereal boxes, etc.)? And the fourth: Should it be encouraged, or should it be required? That is, should there be required bilingualism with regard to services and facilities? Now Carlos Alcalá has given some horror stories of situations in which certain kinds of fundamental services, such as emergency services in hospitals, were not bilingual. So I think one should keep that in mind in answering this question.

The third issue is: Should there be an encouragement of bilingualism in a different sense, that is, in a third sense? What I'm trying to do is to break the whole notion of bilingualism into three parts. This third sense is: two monolingual cultures, an English-speaking culture and a Spanish-speaking culture. Now one point suggests itself, namely, that this will probably occur only if there is geographic continuity. In other words, the existence of a monolingual Spanish culture will arise in the United States only where there is a high enough density of monolingual Spanish-speaking persons in a reasonably large geographic area. Obviously that is the Southwest.

So those are the three issues that seem to me to be critical in the discussion that's occurred so far. Should there be an encouragement of persons to be bilingual? Should there be an encouragement or requirement for services and facilities to be bilingual? Should there be an encouragement of bilingualism in the sense of two monolingual cultures? The last of these is, sometimes, what is meant by cultural pluralism.

Now I would like to mention two sets of fears and goals. One is the fears of the English native speaking population; the other is the fears and concerns of the Spanish native speaking population. I think that a large part of the difficulties arise from these two sets of fears. I believe the fears of the English native speaking population can be described as two kinds of fears. One is the fear of cultural and linguistic divisiveness in the society and the second is fear of a loss of cultural dominance. That is, as someone said yesterday: "It's no fun to be equal." Who was it who was quoted? Dick Gregory. So this is, I think, the second fear—loss of cultural dominance.

I think the fears and concerns of the Spanish native speaking population are more complex. There are, I think, two major fears of the Spanish native speaking population, and I'll go into a little bit more detail with regard to those. The first of these, and I think the most fundamental, is the fear that children are not getting a fair opportunity in education. By fair opportunity I mean the opportunity to have a chance

for a career and occupational success, leaving aside the question of whether that occupational and career success is in English or Spanish. Now this breaks down, however, into three aspects, somewhat different for three types of persons. One type is cyclical immigrants, that is, persons who will not be permanently in the United States, but who will return to a country in which Spanish is the dominant language, and move back and forth between these two. One must raise the question of an educational system for such persons. A second has to do with new permanent immigrants, and a third has to do with long-term permanent residents. And the question is: Should there be the same educational program for each of these three groups? I think there really are three very different groups: cyclical immigrants, new permanent immigrants, and long-term permanent residents.

Now I would want to remind English native speakers, considering the first of these—cyclical immigrants—to ask themselves what kind of schools they put their children in when going to non-British Europe? Now, a few of them, when going to France, say, put their children in French schools and let their children struggle. But many of them put their children into schools which are English-speaking schools. I would like to ask the English native speakers to put themselves in this position, because some of them have been in this position of cyclical immigrants. At the same time, I would like to remind Spanish native speakers, considering now only the cyclical immigrants, to ask themselves whether the English language schools in non-British Europe are state-supported. So there are two questions. One is: What kind of schools are appropriate? The other is whether they should be state-supported.

So the first fear and concern of Spanish native speakers is a fear and concern principally of children not getting a fair opportunity in education. Let me also call that a goal to be achieved. A second fear, which can also be described as a goal, is the fear of destruction of the community and culture, which is a fear of assimilation. That is a different fear from the first, a different fear from the fear of a child not getting an appropriate opportunity. It is a fear of somehow being assimilated into a bland culture which has nothing of one's cultural background in it. Now, I should say, one part of that fear is fear of the continuation of discriminatory actions that have occurred in the past and continue to occur in the present. There are many such discriminatory actions, precisely on the basis of language, some of which have been described today and yesterday. But that is, I think, only a part of the fear of destruction of the community and culture itself. A part lies in the natural processes of achievement in and accommodation to the dominant culture. This fear of destruction of the community and culture stands beside the fear of unequal opportunity in the minds of Spanish native speakers.

Now let me say a few words about bilingual education, since that has been a critical issue. The first question is: What is the aim of bilingual education and how does it relate to the two fears, or goals, of the Spanish native speakers? In other words, I would like to raise the question of how bilingual education relates to these two goals, which are really very different goals. The first question I would like to ask is this: Is bilingual education effective in achieving the first goal, that is, in achieving the goal of having children receive a fair opportunity in education? But the second question is different, namely: Will bilingual education, if it is effective in achieving the first goal, destroy the second goal? What I mean is, if bilingual education or education in general is effective in providing fair opportunity in education to children, will it speed their movement out of the community, into an English-speaking community? I think it may very well do so. This has been the history of immigrant groups in every country.

What I am suggesting in this is that there may well be serious conflicts between the first goal and the second goal. If a child drops out of school, perhaps he'll be more likely to remain within a Spanish-speaking community and strengthen it. If he continues in school and is very successful, perhaps he'll leave the community. So that's the question I want to raise. If bilingual education, or whatever kind of education, is effective in achieving the first goal, will it destroy the second?

The final thing that I want to say has to do with two kinds of pain. There is a pain that's associated with learning a second language. That is a very extensive pain which most of the Spanish native speakers here know much more fully than the English native speakers. They know it much more fully because most Americans who are English native speakers, going to Europe or to Mexico or to French Canada, never do acquire a second language. They realize a little bit of the pain, but not very much. It is quite clear to anyone who has learned a second language in a natural setting that there is a high degree of pain associated with it. That is a pain that arises from the absence of communication, from a blank look in somebody else's eyes, from the absence of being able to achieve one's goals, from the inability to get around in a community.

Now a fundamental point, one often forgotten, and one that I think we have to keep in mind, is that in the absence of such pain, a second language will not be learned. The pain is intrinsic to the learning of a second language.

There is also a second pain, and that's a pain that's *not* productive for learning a second language. There are an enormous number of examples of that sort of unnecessary pain which have occurred, and continue to occur, with regard to Spanish native speakers in the United

States. This pain occurs in a variety of situations such as the ones that Carlos Alcalá has described, situations that are not only not productive in learning a second language, but are destructive in other ways as well, such as in the triage section of a hospital emergency room. Do we want to eliminate the second kind of pain? The answer is, I think obviously, yes.

A much more difficult question is: Do we want to eliminate the first kind of pain, the pain of learning a second language? From a humanitarian or equal rights point of view, the answer is yes. But from the point of view of the first goal of Spanish native speakers, that is, a goal of providing a fair educational opportunity, we may not want to eliminate that pain.

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